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ABSTRACT 
 
In recent decades, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have increasingly taken on 
development and political roles in Africa. This has partly been attributed to the New Policy 
Agenda (NPA) mounted by the international donors. The NPA is predicated on neo-liberal 
thinking advocating for an enlarged development role for the private sector and a 
minimalist state. This relatively new shift in development thought has been motivated by the 
declining capacity of the African state to deliver development and guarantee a liberal 
political system. 
 
This study, therefore, set out to empirically examine whether NGOs are capable of 
effectively playing their new-found development and political roles. The study was based on 
Kenya with the Western Province constituting the core research area. The fact that the 
Kenyan state has been gradually disengaging from the development process has created 
a vacuum of which the NGOs have attempted to fill. Equally important has been the 
observation that, for the greater part of the post-colonial period, the state has been largely 
authoritarian and therefore prompting a segment of civil society to take on political roles in 
an effort to force it to liberalize and democratize. 
 
Urban NGOs in particular, have been the most confrontational to the state with some 
remarkable success. Unlike their urban counterparts, rural-based NGOs have tended to be 
more developmental and play a politics of collaboration with the state. Many of the latter 
NGOs, although playing a significant role in rural development, have been co-opted into 
patron-client networks. Factors that influence NGOs= posture towards the state include the 
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nature of their leadership, the extent of their international connections, and the level of 
resources at their disposal.  
 
The study=s principal conclusion, is that, in as much as NGOs and overall civil society have 
provided a basis for development and opposition to the state, there is an urgent and 
growing need for them to shift from a position of dependency, whether domestic or 
international, to relative autonomy. Only then, will their contributions be sustainable in 
society. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), a central component of civil society, have in the 
post-1980 period been regarded by many in the field of development politics as alternative 
development actors to the Third World state, and more specifically, the African state. 
However, in as much as this thinking remains salient, conflicting theories and explanations 
compete as to why the African state has suddenly become impotent giving saliency to 
NGOs= intervention. Equally ridden with controversy is the impact of NGOs in their new-
found development and political roles. 
 
The intervention of NGOs in development has, in essence, been an attempt to shift from 
centralised state planning and implementation strategies that characterised the 1950s= 
through the 1970s= decades in Africa. However, operating within territorial jurisdictions of 
states, NGOs have had to forge a working relationship with African states that has kept on 
shifting between collaboration and confrontation and in some periods manifesting in  a 
combination of the two contradictory relations all at the same time. In this chapter therefore, 
the study attempts to make a succinct rationale for the research in terms of synthesizing the 
context and parameters of the problem, study justifications, the attendant conceptual 
framework, as well as the hypotheses and objectives guiding the research.  
 
1.1 Statement of the problem 
Poverty alleviation, with the ultimate objective of its eradication, continues to  dominate the 
development agenda in Third World countries. However, for numerous reasons, the 
achievement of this objective has continued to elude development theorists and 
practitioners despite the myriad efforts. Indeed, for Africa, development has remained an 
unfulfilled dream for its million of inhabitants, a majority of whom reside in the rural areas. 
For Sub-saharan Africa in particular, the 1980s and the 1990s have been years of 
exceptionally deep disappointment. There has been stagnated development with often 
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sharp negative reversals which has prompted, in some circles, the description of Africa 
with much justification as the lost frontier in the transformation of the global political 
economy (Callaghy, T. R 1993:161-259, 1994:31; Shaw, 1993: 62). 
 
Development problems afflicting most of the African states have included among others: 
falling exports and prices; a rapidly rising and unmanageable debt burden; declining per 
capita incomes; spiralling costs of living; increased unemployment rates; rising food 
shortages; generally decreased ability and capacity of the state to provide basic services 
to the citizens; and from a political and administrative perspective, a dysfunctional 
bureaucratic apparatus and an uncertain democratic future that more often than not has 
been tainted with authoritarianism (Chege, 1987; Seidman and Anang, 1992:24; Stewart 
et al, 1992:14; Callaghy, T. R 1993, 1994; Cassen, 1994:7; 
Lensink, 1996:1; Olukoshi, 1996:52-53; Houngnikpo, 2000:5-12). Callaghy (1994:31) for 
instance, while commenting on Africa=s gross domestic product (GDP) and per capita 
incomes has noted, AAfrica=s per capita income levels and growth rates have declined 
since the first oil crisis in 1973,@ and continues to observe that, in comparison to other 
developing regions of the World Africa has recorded the lowest growth rates. For the 
period 1982-1992, average annual GDP growth for Africa was only 2% while the per capita 
GDP rate was only 1% (Callaghy, 1994; 31). Callaghy=s figures are more or less consistent 
with those of the Economic Commission for Africa (cited in Rasheed and Chole1994) 
which place Africa=s average  annual growth rate of GDP in the period 1990-1994 at only 
1.3% and per capita income at 1.8%. Although the World Bank (1999) would want to argue 
the situation has improved, this is contradicted by its own statistics of a paltry 2% overall 
GDP growth rate in 1998 which does not show any marked improvement from the earlier 
years. Comparatively, Africa=s development crisis has been the worst in the developing 
regions of the world. Whereas Africa=s GDP per capita in the period 1980-86 declined by 
about 20%, for Latin America it was by only 7% and a similar pattern occurred in terms of 
gross domestic investments and terms of trade ( Ghai and Alcantara, 1991:23-24; see 
also, Griffin & Khan,1992; World Bank, 1999). 
 
This development crisis, to a large extent, has cast doubts on the appropriateness of the 
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development paradigms, approaches and strategies adopted by development agencies in 
the 1960s and 1970s, which among other things, emphasized economic growth centred on 
centralized state planning with  stress on large-scale industrialization at the expense of 
agriculture. It has, in the recent times, been observed that emphasis on economic growth 
failed to institute mechanisms that could ensure redistribution of growth benefits to the 
majority poor among countries, within countries, and between socio-economic groups (see 
among others, UNDP, 1979:15; Ollawa, 1977:405-410; Hardiman et al, 1982:53-54; 
Hyden, 1994:311-312). 
 
From the late 1970s, new development thinking that placed less emphasis on state-
directed development came into force. The African state began to be seen increasingly as 
the main obstacle in the development process (Hyden, 1985:xii; Kinyanjui, 1985a:2; Young, 
1986:25; Bgoya and Hyden, 1987:6, 17; Bratton, 1987:1; World Bank, 1989b;  Ng'ethe & 
Kanyinga, 1992;  Ndegwa, 1996:15; Colclough, 1996:6; Toye, 1994:24-25; Edwards and 
Hulme, in Dicklitch, 1998:2; Gelinas, 1998:60). 
 
Two schools of thought have competed in an attempt to explain the African development 
crisis. For the neo-liberals, internal factors, both economic and political, are largely to 
account for the crisis. Economistic assumptions include: the excessive intervention of  the 
state in the economy leading to the distortion of market forces of supply and demand; and 
mis-allocation and mismanagement of investments (Mkandawire, 1991:83-84; Seidman 
and Anang, 1992:25-29; Onimode, 1992: 8-2; Lensink, 1996:35-40). Politically, the African 
state has been seen to be pre-capitalist, being largely neo-patrimonial in nature and 
characterised by personal leadership that relies on outmoded patron-client relations. As a 
>soft= state, it is bedevilled with >backward= forms of economic relations that are 
characterised by the >economy of affection=. These political relations have rendered the 
state not only unsuitable for economic development but also promoted nepotism, ethnicity, 
rampant corruption, and an unproductive bureaucracy. To maintain itself in power, the 
leadership where necessary, relies on repression and violent coercive power (Hyden, 
1980, 1983; Azaria, 1988:3; Callaghy, 1988:67-83; MacGaffey, 1988:172-173; 
Mkandawire, 1991:84-85; Sandbrook, 1991:98-109; Onimode, 1992:8-12; Scott, 1995:49-
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68). To this extent therefore, the African states have lost some of the elements that 
Crawford Young (1988:31-33) calls >elements of reason of state=. Foremost among these is 
the ability to command loyalty from the citizens based on consent and legitimacy leading to 
reliance on authoritarianism. 
 
The dependecistas, who are mainly guided in their thinking by Dependency theory, have on 
the other hand, blamed Africa=s woes on largely externally-induced factors beyond the 
control of African states. Foremost, colonialism and its policies is seen as a major culprit in 
terms of its legacy to African economies= productive and distributive relations. In addition, 
factors such as a biased world trade system, restricted foreign capital flow in the recent 
times and extensive debt-servicing are also to blame (Onimode, 1992:12-18; Seidman 
and Anang, 1992:29-35; Adedeji, in Taylor, 1992:24; Lensink, 1996:41-45). In dismissing 
those who stress internal factors, they argue Africa=s relatively stable 1970s= economies 
could not have been so if most of the so-called internally inherent African weaknesses have 
always been present. The sudden economic collapse of the post-1970 decade can 
therefore not be explained by the so-called internal factors and that the only rational and 
viable explanation is to be found in the externally-induced global economic relations (see 
among others Mkandawire, 1991:87; Onimode, 1992:18). Whereas it remains fairly 
controversial in determining the real culprit accounting for the dismal performance of the 
African state, the position of this thesis is that both external and internal factors ought to be 
taken into consideration in the search for a solution. 
 
However, the imposition of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) on Africa by the 
International Finance Institutions (IFIs) and the donor countries in the early 1980s can be 
interpreted as victory for the neo-liberal school and its assessment of the crisis. Generally 
demanding  economic changes that would help roll back the state in favour of market 
forces (Helleiner, 1992:53-54; Cassen, 1994:8), political liberalization also became a 
political conditionality for the resumption of foreign aid (Robinson, 1994:46). 
 
In the meantime, as explained in chapter two, NGOs and the wider civil society were 
increasingly substituting for the state as Africa=s motor of development evidenced by the 
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increased donor funding channelled through them (Arnold, 1985:94; Bratton, 1987:5; 
Cernea, 1988:5; World Bank, 1989:182; Ng=ethe et al, 1992:16; Holmen and Jirstrom, 
1994:28; Ndegwa, 1996:18-19; Chege, 1999:6). Contrasted with the African state, NGOs 
are said to be: cost-effective; innovative; close to the grassroots; and utilizing participatory 
development approaches (Hyden, 1985:120-123; Bgoya and Hyden, 1987:27; Cernea, 
1988:17-18; World Bank, 1989b:182; Ng=ethe, 1991:8; Friedman, 1992:140; Holmen and 
Jirstrom, 1994:30; Smillie, 1994; Riddell et al, 1995:36-37; Clark, 1997:46; Chege, 
1999:6). 
 
1.1.1 The Kenyan crisis 
The Kenyan state, like most Africa states, was and still is undergoing an economic crisis. 
Indeed a larger portion of Kenya=s post-colonial history has been a chequered one. 
Interpreted in some circles as a neo-colonial state, she has witnessed lop-sided growth 
with increasing economic inequality, insecurity and generally poor living standards for the 
majority of the citizens (Leys, 1976, 1996:161-162; Hazlewood, 1979:198-202; Ochieng=, 
1995:98-100; Ogot, 1995b:260). Himbara (1994), in a recent study on Kenya, has argued 
that it is a virtually disintegrating state apparatus with collapsing public institutions that are 
characterised by incompetence, financial indiscipline, and inability to implement 
development goals. It is precisely for these reasons that the IMF and World Bank 
intervened in the late 1980s armed with SAPs in an effort to forestall the collapse of the 
state (Himbara, 1994:151-152; Southall, 1999:94-95). The lamentable development record 
of the state has been recognized by the Kenya government itself in light of the facts that the 
number of Kenyans living below the absolute poverty line has increased, and that gross 
domestic product has been falling annually, for example, from 6.6% in 1964 to 2.5% in 
1995 (Republic of Kenya, 1997:1). 
 
The decay of the state has not been restricted to the socio-economic sector. Regime 
legitimacy has been subject to an increasing challenge, forcing the state to resort to 
increasingly repressive and coercive means to keep the leadership in power (Okumu, 
1984:65; Oyugi, 1994b:160-163; Ogot, 1995b:196-200; Ochieng=, 1995:98-99). Like 
elsewhere in Africa, it was not until the early 1990s that the leadership bowed to extensive 
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internal and external pressure to reinstate plural party politics initially banned in 1982. The 
slapping on Kenya of political conditionalities by the donor community was a clear 
indication of the extensive political deterioration as well as widespread mismanagement 
and abuse of public resources (Himbara, 1994:123-136; Orvis, 1997; Southall, 1999:105-
106). 
 
Recognizing state inability and incapacity to fund and manage development, the Kenya 
government officially welcomed the participation of NGOs as partners in development in 
the early 1980s (Republic of Kenya, 1989). The number of formal NGOs (organizations that 
have clearly defined decision-making structures and that have been formed essentially for 
the purpose of benefiting of the wider community) in Kenya has risen tremendously and 
was estimated to be between 400-600 in the early 1990s with the number sharply 
increasing to over 1000 by 1999 (Bratton, 1987:5; Ng=ethe, 1991:30-31; Ng=ethe and 
Kanyinga, 1992:13; Ndegwa, 1994:23; Daily Nation, 20th November, 1999). In addition, 
self-help NGOs (small-scale community-based organizations that are generally informal in 
structure and serve primarily own membership) which were estimated to number, in 1991, 
between 20,000-25,000 (Ng=ethe, 1991) have also increased. 
 
This study, is devoted to an empirical examination of whether the new-found optimism 
about NGOs= positive role in promoting development and democracy is well founded (also 
see Arnold, 1985:97-98; Kinyanjui, 1985:4; Mutiso, 1985:62, 65; Bratton, 1987:7; Cernea, 
1988:18-19; Ng=ethe, 1991:7; Friedman, 1992:140-141; Smillie, 1994; Chitere, 1994; 
Riddell et al, 1995; Clark, 1997:56; Gariyo, 1998; Chege, 1999:7). Susan Dicklitch=s 
(1998:3) caution in her book on Uganda entitled The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa: 
Lessons from Uganda, should be taken seriously: 
This recent surge of interest in NGO activity in Africa calls for an examination 
of what role they actually play as opposed to what role they are expected to 
play in political and economic liberalization leading to democratization. A 
realistic appraisal of what NGOs can and cannot achieve is crucial, to avoid 
the pitfalls and disappointments of past development efforts. 
 
In focussing on the Western Province of Kenya, this study is directed in particular at 
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evaluating the contributions of development NGOs to the process of rural development.  
Western Province, in spite of much potential for development as dictated by suitable soils 
and adequate rainfall (see Republic of Kenya, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c, 1997b, 1997c, 
1997d), remains trapped in  poverty  with a majority of the inhabitants unable to secure the 
basic needs of food, clean drinking water, quality health standards, and the relevant 
education and entrepreneurial skills. Vihiga (Republic of Kenya, 1994c:38) and Busia 
(Republic of Kenya, 1994b) Districts, for instance, have respectively 98 per 1000 and 95 
per 1000 infant mortality rates which is well above national average of 87 per 1000 due to 
the prevalence of several preventable diseases. There are many other development 
bottlenecks in the Province, as extensively documented in the respective Western Province 
districts= development plans. Western Province has a considerable NGO concentration 
estimated at over 20 formal NGOs (see Lekyo and Mirikau, 1988;  Republic of Kenya, 
1994a, 1994b, 1994c, 1997b, 1997c, 1997d) and over 1000 women=s groups (Republic of 
Kenya, 1994a, 1994b:23, 1994c:16). This high number of NGOs makes Western Province 
a suitable research area to measure the contribution(s) of NGOs to rural development. In 
terms of national politics, Western Province, with the exception of Bungoma District, has 
been predominantly a stronghold of the Kenya African National Union (KANU), which has 
been the ruling party since independence in 1963. 
 
Consequently, this study was guided by among others, the following issues: variables that 
influence relations between NGOs and the state and the resultant impact on the 
development and political process; the organizational capacity of NGOs and influence on 
development; the extent to which NGOs employ participatory development strategies and 
how this impacts on the development process; and NGOs= ability and capacity to promote 
equitable development in the rural sector. 
 
1.2 Objectives 
The main objective of this study is to analyse the place and role of NGOs in Kenya=s 
development politics with a focus on their contributions(s) to rural development in the 
Western Province of Kenya. To facilitate the achievement of this overall objective, other 
specific objectives included the need to critically examine:  
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(a) the nature of the Kenyan state and its influence on NGOs= intervention in the 
development and political space; 
(b) the organizational capacity of NGOs in terms of their human and material resources; 
(c) the ability and capacity of NGOs to empower rural communities through participatory 
development strategies; and, 
(d) the role of NGOs in promoting equitable development through resource allocation. 
 
1.3 Justification 
Considering that NGOs are increasingly being regarded  important actors in the process of 
development evidenced by the increased channelling of development resources through 
them by donor organizations, and their rapid proliferation in Kenya and Africa in general, 
there is a well-grounded need to carry out an empirical study on them. It is significant that 
their actual role in development politics be understood. This relates in particular to their 
ability and capacity to open up the development space, hitherto dominated by the state. 
The mushrooming and sustenance of local development organizations that are said to have 
led to institutional pluralism, has largely been credited to the existence of NGOs. The 
combination of formal NGOs and the many community based organizations, in turn, is 
thought to widen the base of the decision-making system through the involvement of the 
voluntary sector in public policy advocacy and therefore the resultant development policies. 
 
Equally important, is the need to establish why NGOs and other civil society organizations 
intervene in politics at all and their potential to influence democratic change by forcing the 
state to retreat from entrenched authoritarianism. It has been argued that NGOs may 
intervene in politics, especially oppositional politics, to fill the vacuum left by formal political 
institutions (such as political parties) that may be too weak to offer formidable 
representation to interest groups in society. On the same wavelength, NGOs may engage 
in politics to oppose hegemony rather than because of the sheer weakness of formal 
institutions (the state and the ruling party) (Clarke, 1998:40-41). 
 
Ultimately, this study is therefore an attempt to bridge the gap between facts and mere 
beliefs concerning the role of NGOs as political and development actors. In the process, it 
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is hoped that it will be a meaningful contribution to the perpetual efforts to conceptualize 
and understand the intractable phenomenon of development and the actors involved. 
 
1.4 Hypotheses 
The study is guided by the following hypotheses and assumptions generated from an 
extensive literature review: 
(a) that rural-based NGOs that are more developmental in objectives tend to play a politics 
of collaboration with the state; 
(b) that NGOs with a strong resource base are likely to be more effective in influencing  
communities realize their goals; 
(c) NGOs utilizing a participatory approach to development are more likely to enhance local 
communities= capacity for self-reliance and sustainable development by way of creating 
awareness, self-confidence and commitment to development efforts; and 
(d) that NGOs= selective support for groups and individuals is likely to result in development 
imbalances in the rural sector. 
 
1.5 Conceptual framework 
The explanations of poverty and other related problems of development are diverse.  This 
is clearly reflected in the many theories and approaches of development that have been 
formulated over time. Among these are, modernization theory, dependency theory, the 
basic needs approach (BNA) and in the recent times, the human development approach 
(HDA), and the voluntary organization approach which emphasises the role played by local 
organizations. 
 
Modernization theory, with its deep roots in the Western world, emerged in the period 
immediately following the Second World War. As a concept, modernization is closely 
associated with the reconstruction efforts in Europe at the end of the Second World War 
and the decolonization process in the developing areas. It was essentially targeted at the 
Third World countries with the sole purpose of transforming their societies to become 
"modern" and "progressive". 
Modernization theorists explained poverty in terms of reliance on "backward" and 
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"traditional" values and institutions prevailing in the developing world. These so-called 
backward and traditional values and institutions were said to include: subsistence 
agriculture, traditional methods of production and primitive technology;  traditional social 
institutions and cultural values; and dictatorial authoritarian political systems. The general 
solution, it was argued, was for people in the traditional societies to adopt the 
characteristics of modern societies by investing heavily in industry, adopting "modern" 
Western cultural values, and establishing liberal democratic systems (Lerner, 1958; 
Goode, 1963; McClelland, 1964; Nurkse, 1976; Spybey, 1992). In this connection Lonsdale 
(1981:109) has observed: 
This development theory (Modernization) had placed the blame for Third 
World poverty upon the suffocating grip of traditional societies which 
resisted >modernization=....It echoed colonialism=s own self-justifying 
ideology. Capitalism was seen not as a mode of production but as a set of 
normative values; these were destined, so it was thought, to liberate 
traditional man for innovation by >penetrating= his social relations. 
 
Orthodox modernization theory can be illustrated by Walt Rostow=s ( Spybey, 1992:22) five 
stages of economic growth which are distinguished in progressive manner: 
(a) stage 1: traditional society is characterized by fatalistic values and undeveloped 
political institutions in which output is limited without the application of Western science and 
technology; 
(b) stage 2: sees the emergence of the pre-conditions for take-off which include the 
introduction of ideas for economic progress, involving education, entrepreneurship and the 
expansion of a commercial infrastructure; 
(c) stage 3: features the take-off stage in which traditional barriers are overcome, Western 
technology is introduced through the mechanization of agriculture and industry and political 
institutions developed; 
(d) stage 4: is distinguished by the drive to maturity when 10-20% of the national income is 
invested, and the use of consumer technology becomes widespread; and 
(e) stage 5: is an ultimate phase of high consumption, when the mass production of 
consumer goods dominates the economy and a large economic surplus is created. 
 
Modernization theory took the form of various strategies that came to include initially, 
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economic growth, which apart from some of the features listed above, emphasized  growth 
targeting the well-to-do in society through providing them with the necessary development 
inputs in the hope that their success would have >trickle-down= beneficial effect on the poor 
in society (see among others, Hyden, 1994:311). Re-distribution with growth was yet 
another modernization strategy adopted in the 1970s when it was realized the trickle-down 
strategy of pure economic growth was failing to alleviate poverty (Hardiman et al, 1982:53-
54). But even with the redistribution with growth strategy mostly relying on the state to 
progressively tax the rich to finance the development of the poor, results have not been 
encouraging (Jazairy, 1992). It can also be convincingly argued that Community 
Development (CD) efforts of the 1950s and 1960s were an integral aspect of 
modernization theory, for as a strategy they targeted  rural communities with the sole aim of 
improving physical infrastructure and educating the >traditional= rural communities to 
appreciate >modern= living (UNDP, 1998a; World Bank, 1994). 
 
Overall, modernization theory, in the form it appeared in the 1950s running into the early 
1970s, was characterized by inability to have a significant impact on poverty reduction. 
Criticism of modernization theory ranged from its misplaced argument that economic 
growth through industrialization would necessarily raise the levels of living by increasing 
wage employment (Hardiman et al, 1982) to the erroneous assumption that anything from 
the non-Western world was culturally backward and an impediment to the development 
process of which the only solution was the adoption of the >modern= Western culture (Tipps, 
1973:214; Chinapah et al, 1979:24). Meanwhile, recent characterizations of the African 
state as >soft=, in the sense that it is incapable of carrying out successful capitalist 
development as it is pre-capitalist in orientation and still steeped in primitive >economies of 
affection=, suggest that the only medicine for successful development is to >harden= the 
African state by breaking the backbone of the economy of affection and abandoning 
kinship and patron-client ties (see Hyden, 1980, 1985; Callaghy, 1988:67-83; MacGaffey, 
1988:172-173 etc). Such views have been interpreted as a form of >neo-modernization= in 
that they attempt to revive modernization theory=s insistence on the abandonment of 
>traditional= institutions and processes, and their replacement with >modern= Western ones 
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(Mkandawire, 1991:85; Scott, 1995:49-68). However, as widely recognized, the biggest 
undoing of modernization theory was its placement of the state at the centre of 
development in charge of both planning and implementation at the expense of a people-
driven development (Ghai, 1991:4; Gelinas, 1998:59-60). The aftermath was excessive 
centralized planning favouring industrialization at the expense of agriculture, and in the 
African context, widespread mismanagement of resources meant for development by 
those in control of the state and thus persistent poverty. 
 
Dependency theory, which emerged in the 1960s, was essentially a reaction to the 
shortcomings inherent in modernization theory. Its starting point was that modernization 
theory is empirically invalid, theoretically inadequate and politically ineffective (Spybey, 
1992:27). Some of its protagonists include Gunder Frank (1969), Stein and Stein (1970), 
Rodney (1980), and Amin (1974, 1976). In explaining the prevalence of poverty in the 
under-developed world, dependency theorists subscribed to the thesis that 
underdevelopment is a result of the exploitation of the Third World by the developed 
industrial nations. This exploitation supposedly occurred from the time of the international 
slave trade through colonialism and imperialism and continues today in the form of neo-
colonialism. International trade and capital are given as means through which the 
developed nations perpetuate exploitation and dependency. The destruction of capitalism 
as a mode of production in the world market and the de-linking of the other chains of 
"exploitation" is viewed as a major solution to the poverty problem. Key themes in 
dependency theory that pertain to solving the poverty crisis in the underdeveloped nations 
therefore advocate fair and equal participation by the underprivileged in the local and 
international economy as well as the development of their capacity for self-reliance. 
 
However, just like modernization theory, dependency theory has been criticised on many 
grounds. Critics (Long, 1977:103; Kinyanjui, 1980:22) have argued the theory 
overemphasizes issues at international levels at the expense of local level. As a 
consequence, issues of significance at local level, especially micro ones, are left largely 
unexplained. Dependency theorists have also been criticized for assuming that the only 
factors capable of explaining Third Word underdevelopment have to do with the economic 
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exploitation by the Western industrial countries. This is a major shortcoming on the part of 
the dependency theorists, considering that crucial internal factors within the under-
developed world have a significant bearing on the persistent poverty. These factors range 
from internal economic mismanagement to other socio-political variables inherent in the 
so-called exploited countries of the world. 
 
An attempt to address the shortcomings of modernization and dependency theories led to 
the development of the basic needs approach (BNA). Prompted by the prevalence and 
persistence of mass poverty, the BNA advocates argued for the adoption of a 
comprehensive range of economic and social policies, which focus specifically on the 
problems of poverty and inequality in the Third World. Galtung (1980:3) defines >basic 
needs' as: "something human beings can not do without, in their own judgement without 
suffering basic degradation as human beings". This definition implies that what constitutes 
basic needs differ from individual to individual;  from society to society;  and from nation to 
nation depending on their priorities and levels of development. For its realization, while 
incorporating national governments, the BNA has largely relied on the support of  
international organizations such as the World Bank, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the various United Nations specialised organs 
such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) ( Rutjes, 1979; Fishlow, 1996: 26). 
 
The BNA, gaining ascendancy as a development model in the 1970s, rejected 
modernisation theorists' stress on economic growth as a sole measure of eradicating 
poverty.  It was realized that, by itself, economic growth cannot eradicate poverty. The BNA 
attacked the idea that growth was synonymous with development by pointing out that a 
country could increase its per capita income (hence growth) yet still remain under-
developed due to existence of serious poverty, inequality and unemployment (Hardiman et 
al, 1982:58). Growth with equity, focussing mainly on social development, therefore 
became the cornerstone of development policy (Hyden, 1994:311-312). 
 
While agreeing with some of the arguments of dependency theorists, such as the negative 
impact which international economic exploitation has upon the under-privileged, the BNA 
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advocates felt that the dependency school offered few policy prescriptions for the 
alleviation of mass poverty especially at the micro-levels.  The BNA advocates thus argued 
for a comprehensive poverty-focussed strategy which placed emphasis on local autonomy, 
participation and self-reliance (Hardiman et al, 1982:58-59). 
 
Basic needs may be divided into five groups (Rutjes, 1979:3): 
(a) the need for personal consumer goods such as food, clothing and housing, 
(b) the need for universal access to services such as primary education, adult education, 
health care, communication etc, 
(c) the need for a physical, human and technological infrastructure with the capacity to 
produce the capital and intermediate goods necessary to provide consumer goods and 
services, 
(d) the need for productive employment yielding sufficient output and equitable enough 
remuneration so that individuals and families can earn a decent living and have an effective 
access to consumer goods, 
(e) the need for mass participation in decision-making in formulating strategies and in 
exerting influence on the implementation of projects and leadership. 
 
According to Ghai and Lisk (1979:92), a programme may be defined as a basic needs 
activity if it incorporates some or all of the following features: 
(a) it raises incomes of the target groups through employment creation, asset redistribution 
and productivity - enhancing measures to reach the basic needs= target levels over a 
specified period; 
(b) it makes a direct contribution to the achievement of the targets established in respect of 
core basic needs such as nutrition, health, education, housing and water; 
(c) it increases production of other basic goods and services purchased by low-income 
groups from their disposable incomes and by public sector and communal agencies; and, 
(d) it enhances decentralization, participation and self-reliance. 
 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has in its series of annual reports 
been developing and refining the concept of Human Development, which has come to 
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constitute the Human Development Approach (HDA).  In a sense, HDA takes much from 
the BNA as it shall be illustrated later. The UNDP Report (1992:2) defines Ahuman 
development@ as the process of enlarging the range of peoples= choices, increasing their 
opportunities for education, health care, income and employment, and covering the full 
range of human choices from a sound physical environment to economic and political 
freedoms. In a further elaboration, the UNDP Report (1993) observes, AHuman 
development strategy is a way of fulfilling the potential of people by enlarging their 
capabilities, and this necessarily implies empowerment of people, enabling them to 
participate actively in their own development.@ It continues, AHuman development is also a 
means since it enhances the skills, knowledge, productivity and inventiveness of people 
through a process of human capital formation broadly conceived.@ 
 
Human Development encompasses and goes beyond the traditional development theories 
and approaches in that unlike the conventional economic development theories it does not 
treat gross national product as an end in itself but as a means whose end is human 
progress. Unlike the BNA, which focuses on providing material goods and services to 
deprived population groups, it places further emphasis upon enlarging human choices in all 
fields to include political freedom and cultural values (UNDP Report, 1992:12, 1995:11-12). 
The HDA argues for increased participation of the poor in their own development, if 
possible, through local organizations and institutions to enable them identify their own 
priorities and to implement programmes of direct benefit to them. By implication, civil 
society must be strengthened, although the role of the public sector (the state) must remain 
active. The public sector is essential in strengthening and supporting the development of 
social capital (departments and ministries dealing with issues and matters close and 
relevant to the poor such as health, water and sanitation, education, food and nutrition etc) 
which in turn can lead to the improvement of human capital and therefore human 
development. However, even within ministries concerned with social services, the HDA 
insists there are greater returns on investments when government expenditure is increased 
at the base of the pyramid than higher levels, for instance, on primary education more than 
on secondary education and so on, better benefits on primary health care and preventive 
medicine than on hospitals and curative medicine. The logic here is simple and straight 
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forward in that the poor are likely to be targeted when government spending is on the social 
services= basics, needs that the very poor lack and yet must  be empowered so as to be 
more economically productive (Griffin and McKinley, 1993). 
 
The UNDP Report (1995:12) succinctly summarises the four key elements of HDA: 
(a) productivity: people must be enabled to increase their productivity and to participate 
fully in the process of income generation and remunerative employment. Economic growth 
is therefore a subset of human development models; 
(b) equity: economic growth must be combined with equitable distribution of its benefits; 
(c) sustainability: equitable opportunities must be available both to present and future 
generations; 
(d) empowerment: development must be by people not only for them. People must 
participate fully in the decisions and processes that shape their lives. 
Emphasizing the place of sustainability in human development, the UNDP Report (1993:4) 
described sustainable human development as, A...pro-people, pro-jobs, and pro-nature. It 
gives the highest priority to poverty reduction, productive employment, social integration 
and environmental regeneration...@ 
 
Over time, the various UNDP Reports (1990-1999) have developed the human 
development index (HDI) as a measurement for human progress. The HDI, as opposed to 
the more traditional GNP, is a more comprehensive socio-economic measure for it 
includes three salient components of human development namely: 
(a) life expectancy, representing a long and healthy life, 
(b) educational attainment, including both adult literacy and formal schooling, 
(c) and real GDP (Gross Domestic Product), representing a descent standard of living. 
 
Whereas both the BNA and HDA have been criticized for arguing so much for human 
development through emphasis on investment in social capital while giving lip service to 
growth that must generate income and revenue for supporting these very social services 
(see, for example, Ranis, 1996), it can be argued in summary that starting with BNA, and 
then HDA, there was at least for the first time in recent development history, an elaborate 
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and sustained effort to focus on poverty and the means (social welfare and services) by 
which to alleviate it. Unlike with the development approaches of the 1950s and 1960s that 
over-emphasized income generation and problems of inequality without necessarily 
pointing out that poverty was the worst outcome and manifestation, the BNA and the HDA 
have attempted to attack the phenomenon of poverty head-on (Fishlow, 1996: 32-33). Yet 
another credit that can be given to the approaches of BNA and HDA is their realization 
(although not entirely new thinking) that the public sector is fundamental to the alleviation of 
poverty strategies through its intervention in large scale areas of social and physical 
infrastructure and redistribution efforts (UNDP, 1993; Fishlow, 1995). In other words, they 
argue that market forces on their own are inadequate to alleviate poverty. Bardhan 
(1996:70) enumerates some of the advantages associated with an activist role of the state 
in development to include the raising of funds for development, in underwriting of risks, the 
supply of training and extension services, investing in larger infrastructure and co-ordinating 
macro-development. 
 
Yet another key advantage associated with UNDP=s HDA is its emphasis on the political 
dimension of progress. By arguing for human freedom, it shares the neo-liberal thinking 
that visualizes NGOs as promoters of democracy as opposed to the authoritarian tendency 
of the African state. To this extent, a link is created between democracy and development. 
Neo-liberal thinking has in recent times been widely embraced by the international finance 
institutions and donor countries. 
 
As noted by many analyses (Sandbrook, 1991; Taylor, 1992:30-31; Bardhan, 1996:70 etc), 
the African state is essentially a weak state traceable to the economic and political crises 
originating in the 1970s. This therefore justifies an additional actor in poverty alleviation 
efforts, the voluntary sector, consisting of mainly indigenous and to some extent foreign 
organizations to supplement state endeavours in rural development. Local peoples= 
organizations, in particular, have been credited for possessing relevant knowledge 
pertaining to local resource mobilization and management. They have an affinity for local 
projects. There is thus no project identity crisis among the participants who are effectively 
regulated by peer monitoring and local sanctions. Overall, local and voluntary organizations 
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are deemed to be better promoters of participatory development that is sustainable (see 
among others, Cernea, 1988; Hyden, 1994:313; Holmen and Jirstrom, 1994; Bardhan, 
1996:68). 
 
This study will therefore adopt the ideas of HDA and BNA that argue for the development of 
social capital to facilitate human development. This is mainly through the public sector 
(however weakened in Africa) and the voluntary sector, especially local organizations, in 
the mobilization and management of local resources utilizing participatory approaches. 
This strategy ought to lead to the economic and political empowerment of the poor and 
marginalised. 
 
1.6 Methodology 
In general, the study is an examination of NGOs as development and political actors in 
Kenya but with a particular focus on Western Province=s three Districts of Kakamega, 
Busia and Vihiga. Kakamega was selected for having the highest concentration of NGOs 
in the Province. Kakamega town serves as the Provincial headquarters. As for Busia 
District, it represents one of the least developed districts in the Province and yet among the 
oldest in establishment. In the case of Vihiga, it presents an interesting case by virtue of 
being the most densely populated District in the Province with an average of 1015 persons 
per square kilometre and thus experiences the most acute land shortage in the Province 
(Republic of Kenya, 1994:7-8; 1997c). 
 
1.6.1 Methods of data collection 
Data collection for this study was a gradual process, with fieldwork starting in late 1996 and 
throughout most of 1997. A further revisit to the field was conducted between November 
1999 and February 2000 with a view to updating the data in addition to collecting detailed 
data on Partnership for Productivity, the case study. Thus, two basic sources were used in 
data collection: secondary sources focussing on published and unpublished material; and 
primary sources that included the use of self-administered questionnaires and oral 
interviews. Secondary materials included the analysis of documents such as relevant 
papers and articles, theses, media articles, government and NGO reports and publications. 
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In using the primary survey method, both self-administered questionnaires and oral 
interviews were useful in generating in-depth, firsthand information. The study utilised four 
types of questionnaires targeting government officials, NGO project managers, NGO 
project beneficiaries and local people on the NGO management committees (for details 
see the appendix). 
 
1.6.2 Sampling 
NGOs sampled in Western Province were of two types: formal NGOs that are basically 
supra-local organizations on scale and are non-membership in nature; and self-help NGOs 
that are essentially local community-based organizations serving the interests of their own 
membership. 
 
Sampling of Formal NGOs 
The Districts= development plans, the Kenya National Council of Social Services (KNCSS) 
national NGO directory and interviews with the relevant government officials enabled the 
drawing up of a fairly accurate list of 35 NGOs operating in the three Districts of 
Kakamega, Busia and Vihiga. In selecting NGOs for study the following factors were taken 
into consideration: 
(a) where an NGO had activities in more than one district, the focus was on the area where 
it had worked for the longest period; 
(b) where two or more NGOs had similar activities, emphasis was placed on only one of 
the NGOs based on accessibility. 
Based on these criteria, which exemplify an aspect of non-probability sampling technique, 
the following 8 NGOs qualified to constitute the study sample: the Christian Health 
Association of Kenya (CHAK); Partnership for Productivity (PfP); the Community Education 
and Economic Development Association (CEEDA); Promotion of Rural Initiatives and 
Development Enterprise (PRIDE Kenya); Vihiga Emuhaya Sabatia Tiriki (VEST); the 
Business Development Society of Kenya (BDS); the Kenya Energy and Environmental 
Organization (KENGO); and the Kenya Wood Fuel Development Programme (KWAP). 
PfP, while initially given general treatment in this study in terms of its role in rural 
development alongside the rest of these NGOs, is towards the end of the thesis studied as 
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a case study for purposes of gaining a deeper insight into how a specific NGO has 
functioned and its limitations in the process of development. Reasons for selecting PfP for 
a case study included the facts that it was the oldest NGO in the sample having been 
established in 1970 and that it had the most elaborate activities among the sample=s 
NGOs with fairly well established local and national networks. 
 
CHAK was regionally based in Kakamega District and had projects spread out in the 
entire District with some spilling over into other Districts such as Vihiga. As an NGO it had 
been active in Kakamega since 1994 and its main activities involved the strengthening of 
the management capacity of health units, implementation of an integrated family planning 
programme, and, implementation of Community Based Health Care as part of Primary 
Health Care. The second NGO, PfP, established its activities in Kakamega in 1970. PfP=s 
main functions revolved around promotion of small-scale enterprises through the 
improvement of entrepreneurial/business skills as well as the provision of credit facilities to 
small businesses. The third NGO, also based in Kakamega, was CEEDA. CEEDA was 
founded in 1989 and its overall objective was the facilitation of capacity building among 
self-help groups through training programmes aimed at creating community awareness of 
community felt needs and local resources. The fourth NGO in Kakamega was Promotion of 
Rural Initiatives and Development Enterprise (PRIDE) which was just being introduced to 
the area by late 1996 and by then had no concrete projects. PRIDE Kenya functions were 
to include promotion of small-scale enterprises through the offering of training that can lead 
to better management and also the provision of small credit facilities to small businesses. 
 
In Vihiga District, VEST, began its activities in 1990. Its major concern was with water and 
sanitation. It involved itself with the construction of roof-catchment ferro-cement water tanks 
and modern pit latrines for individuals and organizations. As for BDS, it was founded in 
Vihiga in 1993 and concerned itself mainly with the promotion of small-scale enterprises 
through the extension of credit facilities and entrepreneurial training to small-scale farmers 
and traders. 
 
KENGO operated mainly in Busia District and launched its activities in 1989 focussing on 
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energy and environmental matters. Sustainable land use management, water pollution 
monitoring, afforestation programmes, and the production of energy-saving cookers ( jikos 
) were among the key activities of KENGO. Another NGO working in Busia was KWAP and 
began its activities in the District in 1993. Its major concern had been agriculture, energy, 
and environment. Among KWAP=s key objectives were:  the initiation of afforestation 
programmes with the aim of encouraging farmers to grow multi-purpose tree species; and 
the development and formulation of training materials for use by other development 
agencies such as NGOs and the Government. 
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Table1 : Formal NGOs= key functions in Western Province 
 
 
NGO 
 
Year of commencement of 
activities and District 
 
Key activities of the NGO 
 
1. CHAK 
 
1994, Kakamega 
 
The strengthening of the management capacity 
of health units; implementation of an integrated 
family planning programme; implementation of 
community-based health care. 
 
2. PfP 
 
1970, Kakamega 
 
Provision of entrepreneurial training to small 
scale entrepreneurs; provision of credit to 
promote small scale businesses. 
 
3. CEEDA 
 
1989, Kakamega 
 
Self-help groups= capacity building through 
training. 
 
4. PRIDE 
 
1995, Kakamega 
 
Training to small-scale entrepreneurs and 
provision of credit. 
 
5. VEST 
 
1990, Vihiga 
 
Improvement of water and sanitation systems 
through the dissemination of modern technology 
in the construction of quality roof-catchment 
ferro-cement water tanks and pit latrines. 
 
6. BDS 
 
1993, Vihiga 
 
Extension of credit facilities to small-scale 
enterprises of farmers and traders. 
 
7. KENGO 
 
1989, Busia 
 
Sustainable land use management; water 
pollution monitoring; afforestation programmes; 
dissemination of energy-conserving technology. 
 
8. KWAP 
 
1993, Busia 
 
Afforestation programmes; energy-conservation 
technology. 
 
Source: Interviews with NGOs= officials and analysis of brochures 
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Sampling of self-help NGOs 
In as much as this study=s main focus was on formal NGOs, the inclusion of self-help NGOs 
was found to be important, first, because they constitute a key channel through which formal 
NGOs penetrate the grassroots, and secondly, for comparative purposes, for unlike formal 
NGOs which focus on providing community service, self-help NGOs emphasize their own 
members= welfare and thus embody a relatively different development approach. 
 
Information on the existing self-help groups in the three Districts, as earlier pointed out, was 
through the analysis of the Districts= development plans, the Ministry of Culture and Social 
Services= records, and field information gathered from local government officers such as 
the District Social Development Officers (DSDO). Among the various types of  self-help 
NGOs, the study concentrated on women=s groups. Combined, the three Districts of 
Kakamega, Busia, and Vihiga have approximately 1000 registered women=s groups. 
Criteria for the inclusion of a group into the study sample was purely on non-probability 
sampling technique (purposive sampling) based on factors such as easy accessibility and 
relatively a long period of establishment (at least 5 years). A total of 8 women=s groups 
were included in the final study sample. 
 
From Vihiga District we had Esabalu Self-Help Group based in Luanda Division. 
Established in 1990, its key development activities were vegetable growing, bee-keeping, 
dairy farming, and provision of Community Health Care personnel. By the time the fieldwork 
was carried out, it had a membership of 162. Also from Vihiga District, Vihiga Division, 
was Fadhili Women=s Group which came into existence in 1989. Its main activities included 
brick-making, poultry, vegetable growing, and tree-farming. Fadhili had a membership of 
16. Nziwa Women=s Group in Vihiga Division, established in 1984, had a membership of 
27 and its key development activities were pottery, weaving, tailoring, knitting, poultry, 
making of energy-saving jikos, and dairy farming. Also from Vihiga District, but Sabatia 
Division, was Tamu Women=s Group with a membership of only 15 having dropped from 
50 at the time of its establishment in 1990. Its key activities were poultry, tree-farming, and 
vegetable growing. 
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In Kakamega District the women=s groups chosen were Ujirani Mwema Group and 
Emulundu Group. Ujirani Mwema, in Shinyalu Division, was founded in 1988. Having a 
membership of 22 at the time of the fieldwork, it had several development activities that 
included rearing of pigs, vegetable growing and poultry. Its membership had declined from 
the initial one of 42. As for Emulundu Group, it was established in 1987 and had a 
membership of 20 with the main development activities consisting of vegetable growing, 
dairy farming and poultry farming. 
 
Lastly, in Busia District, two groups were studied: Twendelee Mbele and Kitenge Women=s 
Groups. Twendelee Mbele, in Nambale Division,  was established in the early 1980s. Its 
development activities included tree farming, jiko making, and sharing of labour among the 
membership on various projects. Kitenge Group in Amukura Division was founded well 
back in 1979 and had a membership of 30. Key development activities were dairy farming, 
brick-making, tree farming, and other agricultural activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 25 
Table2 :  Self-Help NGOs (Women=s Groups) in terms of when and where established and 
the key activities 
 
Group and 
membership 
 
Year of founding and 
District 
 
Key activities of group 
 
1. Esabalu Self-help 
Group (162) 
 
1990, Vihiga 
 
Vegetable growing, bee-keeping, dairy farming, 
community health-care services. 
 
2. Fadhili Women 
Group(16) 
 
1989, Vihiga 
 
Brick-making, poultry, vegetable growing and tree 
farming 
 
3. Nziwa Women 
Group(27) 
 
1984, Vihiga 
 
Pottery, weaving, tailoring, neating, dairy farming 
and jiko-making 
 
4. Tamu Women 
Group(15) 
 
1990, Vihiga 
 
Poultry, tree farming and vegetable growing 
 
5. Ujirani 
Mwema(22) 
 
1988, Kakamega 
 
Pig farming, vegetable growing and poultry 
 
6.Emulundu 
Group(20) 
 
1987, Kakamega 
 
Vegetable growing, poultry and dairy farming 
 
7. Twendelee 
Mbele(26)    
 
1981, Busia 
 
Tree farming, jiko-making, contribution of 
membership labour to individual members= projects 
 
8. Kitenge 
Group(30) 
 
1979, Busia 
 
Dairy farming, brick-making, tree farming, and other 
agricultural activities. 
 
Source: field data based on interviews with groups= members and officials. 
 
Sampling of respondents in Formal and Self-help NGOs 
All the 8 project managers of formal NGOs and the 8 chairpersons of self-help NGOs were 
interviewed. In addition to the project managers, 7 local members on the NGOs= project 
management committees were interviewed. As for project beneficiaries, the study relied on 
both systematic random and non-probability sampling techniques for selection purposes. 
Using 1990 as the departure point, lists of beneficiaries were compiled from NGO records 
which were later divided by 20 for each formal NGO and by 10 for each self-help NGO to 
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give the respective sampling intervals. The figures >ten= and >twenty= for self-help and formal 
NGOs respectively, were based on the understanding that for each self-help NGO 10 
beneficiaries were interviewed, and for formal NGOs, 20 per each. In situations where the 
selected respondents could not be traced, we replaced them with others purposively 
chosen. While self-help NGOs= beneficiaries were individual members of these groups, 
beneficiaries of formal NGOs= projects were non-members  constituting of individuals, 
groups and institutions. The study expected to interview 160 beneficiaries of formal NGOs= 
projects but in reality ended up with 126. The main reason explaining this shortfall was the 
fact that at the time of this fieldwork PRIDE was just being introduced in Kakamega and 
thus did not offer any beneficiaries for interview. However, PRIDE Kenya was significant for 
the reason that it provided the much required insight into what goes into establishing a new 
NGO in a community as relates to its objectives vis-a-vis local community priority needs. 
On the part of self-help NGOs, 74 members were interviewed although our initial target was 
80. This was due to unreturned questionnaires. 
 
Sampling of Government Officials 
Those interviewed were District Development Officers (DDOs) and District Social 
Development Officers (DSDOs). In total, three DSDOs and two DDOs were interviewed. 
These are the officers who were directly in charge of the co-ordination of  development 
matters  at District level. Among their responsibilities was the obligation to monitor NGO 
development activities. 
 
1.6.3 Data analysis techniques 
Data was manually analysed. Coding instructions were prepared for open-ended questions 
to help in the logical and rational ordering of responses for analysis. In the analysis and 
interpretation of data, the descriptive statistic of percentage was central. This enabled the 
analysis to place weights on the various responses and in the process making it possible 
to test and measure their significance. 
 
1.6.4 Problems and shortcomings encountered in the course of the study 
The fact that active involvement of NGOs in development was a relatively recent 
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phenomenon in Kenya had obvious  implications for this study. For instance, accurate 
records about the numbers and activities of NGOs presented some difficulties. This was 
evidenced by the more often than not conflicting information contained in the secondary 
sources vis-a-vis primary data gathered from field trips. Matters were not made any easier 
when some of the government officers in charge of development issues at the local level 
who should have known better, were incapable of having accurate or up-to-date data on 
NGO activities. However, some NGOs were also to blame considering that, although they 
were registered as being operational in their respective areas, in reality they had no actual 
development activities on the ground and thus remained >paper NGOs=. The implication 
was that more emphasis had to be placed on the >search= for NGOs before coming up with 
relatively reliable information on their activities and distribution within the study area. 
 
Self-help NGOs provided a further difficulty in that a substantial number of them had either 
poorly kept records or even worse, no formal records at all. This occurrence could be 
attributed to the lack of facilities such as offices and stationery due to the poor resource 
base of these organizations. Equally important, were the low levels of formal education 
among the membership of these organizations which could account for the inadequate and 
poorly managed records. As a result, much time was taken up in establishing the nature of 
activities as well as the challenges being faced by these organizations. In this exercise, 
field observations and personal interviews proved invaluable. 
 
At a more methodological level, the reliance on survey data for certain aspects of  this 
study, in some instances, may not have captured in detail some of the aspects of these 
organizations. It is precisely because of this shortcoming that a case study of Partnership 
for Productivity (PfP) was included in the study. In the study of PfP, primary data contained 
in the organization=s minutes of various meetings, annual reports, minutes of District 
Development Committee meetings, among other reports were utilized. It is hoped that the 
analysis of PfP will contribute further to the understanding of NGOs as actors in 
development politics. 
 
Summary and Conclusion. 
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In this introductory chapter, a case has been established for the research. The widespread 
involvement of NGOs in development in the post-1980 period has been tied to the declining 
political and economic capacities of the African state. Also important, has been the 
increased funding for NGOs by donor countries and institutions propelled by the new 
development thinking underpinned by neo-liberalism and liberal democracy. The central 
message is the need to shrink the state while at the same time expanding the role of the 
market, of which NGOs are seen as close partners. However, in as much as the NGOs and 
the wider civil society are increasingly viewed as the new motor for development, in place 
of the African state, this study questions the viability and implications of this new-found 
optimism. Through empirical research, the study  endeavours to address the following 
central question: ATo what extent are NGOs capable of playing the role of  development and 
political actors that is increasingly being transferred to them by international donor 
organizations?@ 
 
To address the above question, hypotheses have been developed that inquire into NGO-
state relations, the internal capacities of NGOs, the development approaches utilized by 
NGOs, and NGOs= criteria for resource allocation. As a guide, the research adopts a 
conceptual framework consisting of ideas inherent in basic needs and human development 
approaches in combination with local organizations= initiatives. The objective of this 
approach is to combine public intervention and private voluntary community efforts in the 
tackling of poverty and promotion of rural development. 
 
The study focuses on Kenya, a country, that has not been exempt from the African 
development crisis. Western Province, one of the eight provinces in Kenya, constitutes the 
case study for various reasons foremost being the extent of its impoverishment. A detailed 
methodology has been developed to explain methods of data collection, sampling 
techniques, and a brief discussion of the problems encountered during the course of this 
research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
2.0 NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOs), CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE 
      POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT 
 
Recognition of the rapid rise of NGOs globally and the accompanying diversification of 
functions away from relief and welfare to development in the last quarter of the 20th century 
can be seen as constituting a major shift in the development literature. The NGO explosion 
can not be ignored as it is Aan important phenomenon which has implications for the 
development prospects of poor people, for the future of these organizations themselves, 
and for the wider political economy of which they form a small but growing part@ (Edwards 
and Hulme, 1998:4). 
 
A relevant analysis of the nature and role of NGOs in the global political economy, however, 
demands a conceptual assessment of NGOs in relation to definition, historical roots and 
theoretical justifications. An attempt at this task is made in the following discussion. 
 
2.1 The NGO concept: definition, origins and theoretical justifications 
The complexity of NGOs in terms of organizational characteristics, functions and scale of 
operation, has rendered the NGO concept elusive. Cernea (1988:9), expressing concern 
over the issue has noted that, AAt first, the term >non-governmental organization= seems 
deceptively simple. But the residual nature of the term itself offers such a broad umbrella for 
a kaleidoscopic collection of organizations that attempts at simple definitions are quickly 
rendered meaningless@. Ng=ethe (1991:13), as well as Holmen and Jirstrom (1994:8-10), 
have also expressed views to the effect that the NGO  concept presents difficulties in 
relation to having a common terminology that can accurately describe what NGOs are. 
Increased interest in the what and why of the NGO phenomenon in the recent times can, as 
intimated to earlier, be explained by the fact that NGOs have literally exploded on the 
development scene as the state seemingly retreats. The existence of terms such as Private 
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Voluntary Organizations (PVOs), Voluntary Agency (VA), Private Development 
Organizations (PDOs), Peoples= Organizations (POs), Grassroots Organizations (GROs), 
Community Based Organizations (CBOs), Third Sector, Non-profit Sector among others 
(see Fowler, 1985:7;  Holmen and Jirstrom, 1994; Salamon and Anheier,  1996; Edwards 
and Hulme, 1997:14) are all attempts to cope up with the mushrooming NGO sector and 
what it represents. 
 
The World Bank (1989a) defines NGOs as A...groups and institutions that are entirely or 
largely independent of government and characterised primarily by humanitarian or co-
operative, rather than commercial objectives@. On the other hand, Salamon and Anheier 
(1996:3-4) pick out what they deem to be the salient characteristics of an NGO definition: 
the organizations have some institutional reality and internal organizational structure; the 
organizations are non-governmental in the sense of being structurally separate from the 
instrumentalities of government; the organizations are private and do not exist primarily to 
generate profits, either directly or indirectly and are not primarily guided by commercial 
goals and considerations; the organizations are (or ought to be) in a position to control their 
own activities through internal governance procedures, and enjoy a meaningful degree of 
autonomy; and the organizations embody the principle of voluntary participation. Cleobury=s 
(2000:92) NGO conception in terms of the four central defining characteristics of 
voluntariness, autonomy, not-for-profit and not self-serving, shares much in common with 
Salamon=s and Anheier=s above. Ng=ethe and Kanyinga (1992:4) provide yet another 
definition of NGOs as being A...simple self-help community-oriented organizations whose 
formation is motivated by the welfare of members. In addition NGOs can be formal 
organizations voluntary and purposely formed to help other people who are not necessarily 
constituting the organization=s membership@. 
 
This study adopts a working definition of NGOs which includes both formal (service or non- 
membership) and self-help (membership) organizations that are characterised by: being 
private and autonomous from government; voluntary participation; being non-profit (for 
mainly formal NGOs); and serving the welfare of members (for self-help NGOs). This NGO 
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conception is shared by Fowler (1985), Ng=ethe and Kanyinga (1992), Cernea (1988), and 
Holmen and Jirstrom (1994). It has the advantage of identifying and defining positively the 
organizations that constitute NGOs by clearly setting them apart from the state and its 
institutions as well as from the purely market sector. In addition, it expands the NGO 
conception to include grassroots community based organizations (self-help NGOs). 
 
Categorization of NGOs has been yet another dimension of conceptualizing NGOs as 
organizations. Several variables have been used to facilitate the task of categorization  of 
NGOs according to:  
(a) function whether in the agricultural sector, environment, income generation and other 
activities (Lekyo, 1988); 
(b) source of funding and staff, whether local/indigenous or foreign (Fowler, 1985); 
(c) geographical area of operation, say in Europe (thus European NGO) or Africa (African 
NGO) (Kajese, 1990; Anacleti, 1990); 
(d) scale of operation in relation to area of coverage and thus local, national or international 
NGO (Cernea, 1988); 
(e) historical evolution in terms of time perspective and therefore first generation, second 
generation and third generation NGO (Korten, 1987). 
Burbank (1994) has attempted a synthesis of the various forms of NGO categorization 
developed over time. The important issue is to acknowledge the fact that  these various 
types of categorization tend to overlap and are by extension complementary. For this study, 
a combination of the function, funding and scale of operation criteria for categorization is 
adopted. The three forms of criteria enable the accomplishment of  several goals: 
distinguishing local, national and international NGOs as this to scale of operation; and 
differentiating formal NGOs that are mainly service-oriented and externally funded, and self-
help NGOs that are primarily locally funded and are membership-oriented. 
 
2.1.1 Origins and theoretical justifications of NGOs 
The emergence of NGOs as major providers of services and goods beside the modern 
nation-state, can arguably be traced to the post-World War two period in Europe. In efforts 
to reconstruct war-ravaged Europe, NGOs such as Co-operative for American Relief 
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Everywhere (CARE) and Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM) came into 
existence serving as relief and emergency agencies. With the end of the reconstruction 
period in Europe, most of these NGOs had to redefine their objectives and justify their 
existence. In the process they shifted geographically to the developing countries, and in 
addition to their immediate concerns with relief and welfare, extended their activities into 
the sector of development (Ndegwa, 1996:17; Cleary, 1997:3). 
 
Theoretically, the NGO phenomenon has been viewed as part of >civil society= (Bebbington 
and Riddell, 1997:108-110; Blair, 1997:24; Ahrne, 1998:86). The concept of civil society, 
however, like the NGO concept has been controversial in terms of what it represents. To 
this extent Reeve and Lively (1997:66) have noted that, AThe historical discussion of the 
concept of civil society has been confused and ambiguous, and we suspect, present day 
understandings of it are in no better shape.@ Bebbington and Riddell (1997:108-109), 
make it no better when they reckon: Acivil society is a notoriously slippery term...it is used in 
different ways by different people and those uses are not always consistent.@ However, for 
this study, Stepan=s definition of civil society as Aan arena where manifold social 
movements...and civic organizations from all classes...attempt to constitute themselves in 
an ensemble of arrangements so that they can express themselves and advance their 
interests@ (Stepan, 1988 in Bratton, 1989:417; see also Pillay, 1996 and Fletcher, 1996) is 
seen as fairly adequate. UNDP=s further clarification that civil society is separate, at least 
analytically, from state and market is an important addition (UNDP, 1993 in Bebbington 
and Riddell, 1997:109; also Blair, 1997:25; Roniger, 1998:68). 
 
The growth of the concept of civil society, which today encompass NGOs  alongside other 
voluntary associations and social movements, has historically undergone three fundamental 
phases. Initially, it was used in the pre-18th century by political philosophers such as John 
Locke and Thomas Hobbes to refer to the emergence of organized political society in the 
form of the state. In this sense, civil society was contrasted not with the political order but 
with a condition of nature, that is the state of nature. The second phase, from the 18th 
century, dressed the concept with a different meaning reformulating it as a middle ground 
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between private property and the state. In this sense, the notion therefore became 
detached from both political society and the state (Tilly, 1984; Fine, 1997:8; Lively and 
Reeve, 1997:66-67). Finally, as outlined by Fine (1997:9), the third phase of the concept 
has come to be understood in the context of >contemporary civil society theory= tied to the 
momentous events in Eastern and Central Europe in the late 1980s that led to the collapse 
of communism and the Soviet Union. Fine (1997:9) has argued that this third phase of civil 
society is unique in that AIts distinguishing mark is that it privileges civil society over all 
other movements or spheres of social life on the grounds that civil society furnishes the 
fundamental conditions of liberty in the modern world.@ He continues, AIts (contemporary 
civil society theory) mission is to defend civil society from the aggressive powers which 
beset it: on one side, the political power of the state, and on the other, the economic power 
of money.@ >Contemporary civil society theory= has not been without its harsh critics (see, 
Kasfir, 1998:135-142). Fine (p.25) has lamented: 
Born out of the struggle against totalitarianism in its communist form, civil 
society theory contains within itself elements of that which it most opposes. 
When it takes one moment of the complexity of modern ethical life, civil 
society, and grants it primacy over all other moments - property, family, state 
and so on - it unwittingly mirrors its enemy=s conceptual armoury. It was a 
genuine and major achievement of civil society theory to recover the concept 
of civil society in the face of the would-be totalizing state, but the reactive 
privileging of civil society loses sight of its place within the whole. 
 
When placed squarely in the Western tradition, civil society emerges both as a rival and 
alternative power centre to the state. This interpretation suggests a confrontational 
relationship with the state. To this extent, the implication is that only those organizations 
and movements opposed to the state, constitute civil society (Keane, 1988; Chazan, 1988, 
1994; Bayart, 1986). This treatment of civil society has major limitations. For instance, 
Kasfir (1998:4) has argued, ADefining civil society as confrontational creates 
problems....One question is whether civil society disappears when its actors are engaged 
in non-confrontational activities.@ It is precisely for this salient handicap in the 
conceptualization of civil society  that this study adopts a flexible interpretation to include 
collaborative activities. Civil society after all, is not a homogenous grouping but consists of 
organizations and movements with varying and at times conflicting interests, all struggling 
to influence the state. In this connection, Lewis= (1992:36) observation is quite 
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representative: AWhile civil society intrinsically resists state encroachment, the various 
interests within civil society also seek to influence the state in the exercise of public policy 
and the allocation of valued resources. This engagement may be either cordial or 
antagonistic, but it does reflect a common recognition of state sovereignty...@ 
 
Bratton (1989:411) has argued that neither NGOs nor civil society are new in Africa, nor 
were they colonial innovations. Rather, there is much evidence to the effect that civil society 
was always vibrant in pre-colonial Africa (see also Wipper, 1995). Forms of civil society 
organizations in pre-colonial Africa ranged from welfare associations and agricultural work 
parties to credit associations. Hopkins (1973:50,57,70) provides empirical examples from 
pre-colonial West Africa of such associations which included craft production guilds 
exercising control over entry to a craft, methods of production, standards of workmanship 
and prices. He also gives examples of a variety of traders= organizations which exerted 
control over prices and competition. Traders= organizations were also used to represent 
members= interests in negotiations with state authorities, and in helping to enforce 
regulations regarding weights and measures, and laws governing debt, contract and 
agency. Furthermore, Hopkins has shown the existence of credit associations in pre-
colonial West Africa such as the Yoruba >enusu=, which were organized by kinsmen or by 
groups of friends, and were devoted mainly to social purposes including the raising of 
monies for funerals. Some of these pre-colonial associations, in the face of colonial 
penetration, developed into protest organizations championing the interests of the 
colonized while opposing colonial exploitation. 
 
The post-colonial proliferation of development NGOs in Africa, especially following the 
1970s, was a reflection of the disillusionment with the earlier development strategies that 
had failed to lift Africa, in particular, Sub-Saharan Africa from the throes of poverty. Rural 
development strategies such as Integrated Rural Development (IRD) and Community 
Development (CD) introduced and practised in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s had failed to 
deliver favourable results. IRD was a multi-sectoral, multi-faceted approach to solving rural 
poverty through integration of the low-income elements of the population in the production 
process, co-ordination of the different government departments and institution-building 
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activities (UNDP, 1979:13). On the other hand, CD was a deliberate reaction to the 
sectoral production approach which, it was argued, paid insufficient attention to local 
participation and incorporation of the rural poor in development endeavours. CD was thus 
a combination of welfare services, agricultural extension and construction of small-scale 
works on a >self- help= basis (UNDP, 1979:13, 1998a). 
 
The important fact to note is that in the 1950s running into the 1970s the popular theme 
governing development approaches centred on industrialization to achieve the much 
sought after economic growth. The state was conceived as the motor of development and 
there was therefore stress on public planning and management. Economic growth through 
the >trickle-down= effect was seen as the perfect formulae to Africa=s underdevelopment 
crisis (Hyden, 1994:310-311). The choice of the African state to lead the development 
process during this period, was based on the understanding that there was no strong 
African private sector to spearhead economic growth independent of the state. 
 
However, economic growth alone, as it came to be realized later in the mid-1970s, was not 
adequate to alleviate poverty through >trickle-down=. If anything, it became obvious that the 
rich were growing richer while the poor elements of the population became even poorer. 
Faith in development being coterminous with growth declined. Once again, the solution to 
poverty had to be sought anew and the alternative to pure economic growth now became 
>redistribution with growth=. Redistribution with growth strategy focussed more on social 
development through the enhancement of social capital. For implementation, the state was 
to deliberately tax the incomes of the rich to support the development of the poor (see 
UNDP, 1979; Ollawa, 1977:405-410; Hardiman et al, 1982:53-54; Hyden, 1994:311-312). 
The results of redistribution with growth strategy, like those of pure economic growth, were 
however, disappointing since the level of poverty was never appreciably reduced in the 
developing countries. The tax formulae through central planning proved itself inadequate to 
generate substantial income to develop social capital (Jazairy, 1992). 
 
The post-1970s= moves to introduce more participatory approaches in the development 
process that would encourage the participation of the poor in their own development and 
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upliftment, are partly reflected in the UNDP=s Reports (1992-1999). There has also been a 
greater focus on local initiatives through local organizations and institutions (Cernea, 1988; 
Hyden, 1994; Holmen and Jirstrom, 1994; Bardhan, 1996). This, to some extent, has 
marked a radical break with the conventional models of development prominent in the 
1950s and 1960s that emphasized the state as a salient actor in development. In a radical 
departure, it is no longer fashionable to view development management exclusively as a 
government domain. Other organizations, non-state actors, in which people (ought to) 
participate voluntarily are being emphasized. It is in this context that NGOs have come to 
dominate the new development paradigm constituting what in some circles has been 
termed >Alternative Development= (Friedman, 1992; Hyden, 1994:313; Riddell et al, 
1995:15-17; Ndegwa, 1996:17-19). 
 
Reflecting the new shift in development thinking, donor funding, both bilateral and 
multilateral, has increasingly been channelled through NGOs. In 1980 and 1981, the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), contributed grants worth 2.6 billion dollars per year through 
NGOs to Third World development (Arnold, 1985:94). By 1987 this funding (both private 
and official) had increased to 5.5 billion dollars (World Bank, 1989b:182). Smillie 
(1994:156) estimates that by 1993, NGO funding by Western sources had doubled to 
approximately 10 billion dollars per year. Africa=s share alone of funding via NGOs was 
estimated to be 3.5 billion dollars in the late 1990s, compared to under 1 billion dollars in 
1990 (Chege, 1999:6). 
 
In popularizing the role of the NGO sector in development as opposed to the state, 
development theorists and practitioners have argued that NGOs possess development 
potential arising from their unique characteristics such as: their cost-effective operations in 
that they rely on low-cost technologies; their capacity to be innovative in implementing 
flexible programmes relevant to local needs; their ability to work with the poor in the 
remotest of areas; and their use of participatory approaches to development leading to the 
empowerment of the poor, among others (Hyden, 1985:120-123; Bgoya and Hyden, 
1987:27; Cernea, 1988:17-18; World Bank, 1989b:182; Ng=ethe,1991:8; Friedman, 
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1992:140; Holmen and Jirstrom, 1994:30; Smillie, 1994; Riddell et al, 1995:36-37; Clark, 
1997:46; Chege, 1999:6). 
 
Overall, the embrace of NGOs by Western bilateral donors and the International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs), notably the Bretton Woods Institutions of the World Bank (WB) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), as the panacea for Africa=s intractable development 
problems should be interpreted as part of what has come to be termed as the >New 
Development Agenda= (NDA) (Hulme and Edwards, 1997:5; Dicklitch, 1998:14-16; 
Edwards and Hulme, 1998:12-14). The NDA is centred on the twin poles of neo-liberalism 
and liberal democratic theory which are witnessing a strong resurgence. 
 
Because they are seen as essential parts of civil society, NGOs are viewed to be 
promoting democracy. This is through the enlargement of pluralism and the empowerment 
of the poor by allowing them to fully participate in development decision-making and policy-
making, and in the process forcing open the African state. NGOs thus become a 
counterweight to state power in protecting human rights, opening up channels of 
communication and participation, and in some cases, providing training grounds for 
activists (Dicklitch, 1998:10-14; Edwards and Hulme, 1998:4; Kasfir, 1998:123-134). 
 
The logic for the establishment of liberal democracy in Africa in the post-1980s was 
prompted by the authoritarian nature of the African state manifested in gross abuse and 
decay of political institutions and processes since political independence in the 1960 
decade (World Bank, cited in, Robinson, 1994:36; Ibeanu, 1998:2). Whereas at 
independence, most African states were multi-party systems, within less than a decade, 
virtually all had lapsed into being either one-party or no-party political systems through a 
combination of constitutional manipulation and naked force. In justifying the establishment 
of a one-party state, the common reason given by African leaders revolved around the 
assumption that African societies were basically classless and  homogenous and that 
unlike Western societies divided along class lines, did not warrant a plural political system 
based on social classes (Mboya, 1986:87-94). Many of these reasons have long been 
rejected by critics as having been excuses for purposes of authoritarianism and 
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personalization of power (see among others, Nwabuzor and Mueller, 1985:152-154; 
Wanyande, 1987; Chazan et al, 1988:44-51). Personalization of power had the effect of 
centralizing power in the presidency and the executive at the expense of other institutions. 
Chazan et al (1988:50) have thus observed: 
The personalization of decision-making was a concomitant of the overall 
trend towards centralization. Leadership became a substitute for regularized 
channels of policy-making. This was the case...indeed throughout the 
continent. Even when, because of the complex nature of decision-making, 
other agencies were naturally involved in making key policy decisions, it 
usually was the president (endowed with increased executive powers) who 
had the final say. 
 
 
In addition to manipulating the regime apparatus, the leadership of the post-colonial African 
state endeavoured to manipulate other state organs. Extensive bureaucratization of the 
state became the norm, justified under an all-encompassing Africanization policy. The 
overblown bureaucratic structure ultimately became a major strain on state coffers, not only 
in terms of wages, but also monies swindled to satisfy selfish ends. As argued by Chazan 
et al (1988:48), AThe expansion of the administrative apparatus also proved to be a crucial 
means for personal advancement. The facilitation of bureaucratic institutions allowed select 
individuals to gain direct access to state resources and to enjoy the not inconsiderable 
privileges associated with administrative office.@ This enlarged bureaucracy was no 
blessing to African states: rather than serve the purposes of development, it became 
ineffective and inefficient rendering the state incapable of performing even the barest of 
development tasks. 
 
Thus, the aftermath of the establishment of one-party and no-party states was political 
decay characterised by the stifling of opposition, stage-managed elections, abuse of civil 
liberties, and general suppression of the legislature and judiciary by the executive arm of 
government (Mugwenyi, 1987:160; Wanyande, 1987:75-83; Agbese, 1992:240-241). In the 
light of declining democratic prospects in Africa, demands for political reforms by donors 
became inevitable and was couched in terms of >political conditionality=. Political 
conditionality has involved the suspension of foreign aid pending the installation and 
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institutionalization of >good governance=, human rights and plural party politics (Robinson, 
1994:46). 
 
Indeed in the economic realm, African states were a continuous disaster as from the mid-
1970s. Economically, Africa became a marginalised continent in the global economy with 
Shaw (1993:62) describing the 1980s as a >lost decade=. The economic crisis presented 
itself in the form of lagging exports, stagnating and increasingly falling per capita incomes, 
an increase in government deficits and other malfunctions (Chege, 1987; Seidman and 
Anang, 1992:24; Callaghy, 1994:31; Cassen, 1994:7; Toye, 1994:18-20; Lensink, 1996:1). 
Even GDP rates had fallen from 6.4% between 1965 and 1973 to 3.2% between 1973 and 
1980. The situation was to continue worsening with the times (Toye, 1994:19). 
 
Anyone interested in the analysis of the African economy was at least agreed it was 
shrinking rather than expanding. But the specific reasons accounting for the rapid decline 
remained  a hotly contested issue. However, the contending arguments can be grouped 
into two main schools: the dependecistas and structuralists; and the neo-liberals. The 
dependecistas have laid stress on largely external-based factors, such as a biased world 
trade system unfavourable to Africa, a decrease in real foreign capital flow, and extensive 
debt-servicing, among other factors (Seidman and Anang, 1992:29-35; Lensink, 1996:41-
45). On the other hand, the neo-liberal school has blamed Africa=s economic woes on 
mainly internal factors hingeing on government policies which hinder the optimal operation 
of competitive market forces (see an elaboration by Seidman and Anang, 1992:25-29; 
Lensink, 1996:35-40). 
 
With neo-liberal economics enjoying an aggressive ascendancy in the 1980s, such 
explanations for the African crisis won the day, and with it, the hearts of the Bretton Woods 
institutions as well as the leading Western bilateral donors. The African state, it was 
argued, was at the centre of the problem, resulting from excessive intervention in the 
economy at the expense of market forces, leading to the latter not being able to facilitate 
efficient resource allocation. The solution, it was again argued, was to roll back the state in 
favour of the more efficient, rational, and profit-motivated market (Colclough, 1991:6; Toye, 
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1994:24-25; Edwards and Hulme, in Dicklitch, 1998:2). 
As part of the efforts to roll back the state and enlarge market forces, the IMF and the WB 
introduced Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the early 1980s. The SAPs 
requirements included: major currency devaluations, major cuts in government subsidies to 
the public sector, liberalization of the import sector, reduced price controls, privatization of 
government-controlled enterprises, and ultimately political reform to allow for democracy to 
be rooted (Helleiner, 1992:53-54; Cassen, 1994:8). Transparency and accountability in the 
management of public matters became the international finance institutions= (IFIs) and 
donor countries= catch phrase. 
 
The success or failure rate of SAPs in rejuvenating African economies has been a 
controversial question. Among others, Onimode (1992), Ajayi (1994:66) and Cassen 
(1994:9) have expressed serious reservations about the success of SAPs with the overall 
observation that they (SAPs) have failed to bring about statistically significant positive 
impacts on micro-economic variables. Cassen (1994:9) has succinctly argued that in the 
1980s: 
Growth was not being restored, savings and investments were falling rather 
than rising, balances of payments were only modestly improving, foreign 
indebtedness remained severe; poverty and social conditions, far from 
being redressed, appeared in several cases to be getting worse. 
 
Looking at the record of SAPs, Ajayi (1994:66-67) has presented an argument for a return 
of the state, seeing in it the role of umpire through the provision of the necessary enabling 
environment for the private sector and for the catering of the much needed development of 
human capital and technology. Mkandawire and Soludo (1999:138-143), in one of the most 
recent and harshest critiques of SAPs, have called for the adoption of a middle road by 
relying not only on market forces but also the state. The state, according to their analysis, 
ought not to be ignored in the bigger picture of development as largely implied by the neo-
liberals. 
 
The verdict on SAPs aside, there is no denying the fact that the African state, as from the 
1980s, has been on the decline characterised variously as >overdeveloped=, 
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>underdeveloped= and >soft= (Callaghy, 1988:67). Taylor (1992:30-31), discussing the crisis 
of the African state, has aptly noted, AAfrican governments have had to concentrate 
increasingly on crisis containment rather than on development planning during the 1980s 
and there is a general recognition that the state in Africa has failed in its attempts to reach 
its development goals.@ AIn many African countries@, he continues, Arural communities have 
realized that they can not build a better life through assistance from central authorities and 
planning agencies. Either by choice or by necessity the state is >withdrawing= from the rural 
areas, at least in terms of the provision of adequate development services...@ But if it be 
said, it is not just the state >withdrawing= from its socio-economic responsibilities, for the 
citizenry is also >disengaging= from the state. As noted by Azarya (1988:7), citizens= 
withdrawal from the state has served as a hedge against its instability and dwindling 
resource base (also see Olorunsola and Muhwezi, 1988:189). 
 
The combination of a weak state and the New Policy Agenda of the IFIs and donor 
countries (emphasizing neo-liberal economics and liberal democracy), has created not only 
a vacuum in the development space (by de-emphasizing the state), but also a fertile ground 
for the mushrooming and operations of  NGOs in all their shades, largely seen as the 
favoured child of the financial institutions beginning in the late 20th century. 
 
2.2 NGOs and the politics of development: a review of selected literature 
NGOs, as noted earlier, are increasingly becoming involved in the process of development, 
in particular, rural development with the objective of poverty alleviation among the poor. 
However, it is this study=s contention that, in the pursuit of their objectives, several variables 
intervene to influence their contribution(s). Among these are included: relations with the 
state; NGOs= internal organizational capacities in human and material (funding especially) 
terms;  criteria determining the why and where of resource allocation; and the specific 
development strategies and approaches embraced by NGOs. 
 
2.2.1 NGO-state relations 
Literature on NGO-State relations in Africa tends to portray an overall image of conflict 
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couched in terms of a struggle over development and political space (Bratton, 1987; 
Ndegwa, 1996:21-23; Opoku-Mensah, 1996:9-11; Clark, 1997:47; Edwards and Hulme, 
1997:16; Clarke, 1998; Gariyo, 1998:135; Cleobury, 2000:97-99). Contact between NGOs 
and the state becomes inevitable considering that, however autonomous they may claim to 
be, NGOs are not sovereign entities and can only operate within territorial jurisdictions 
determined by the state. 
 
Foremost among the factors floated for the confrontational relations between NGOs and 
the  state is suspicion and jealousy on the part of the latter that NGOs are infringing on its 
traditional preserve; the development space. The success of NGOs is likely to carry away 
with it the prestige involved, therefore undermining state legitimacy in the eyes of the 
citizens. Gariyo (1998:135-136) puts the case aptly in observing that, AMost African 
governments remain suspicious of any independent initiative which attempts to mobilize 
and provide services to disadvantaged communities without the direct involvement of the 
state. Because increasing NGO involvement in development has been conceived as a 
challenge to state hegemony and a response to state failures, this has intensified the 
suspicions which exist between the state and NGOs.@ 
 
Alan Fowler (1990:11-25) has attempted to formulate a comprehensive framework within 
which confrontational relations between NGOs and the African state can be explained. He 
has argued that, in as much as states have a monopoly over the means of violence that can 
ensure coerced submission, they still require legitimacy built on consent. This second form 
of legitimacy can only be achieved if and when the state is capable of satisfying citizens= 
basic needs, providing a form of political process which is acceptable to the governance of 
citizens, and ensuring social and legal justice. On all these three accounts, the African state 
has proven ineffective. On the contrary, NGOs have increasingly taken on developmental 
responsibilities, in the process filling the vacuum left by the retreating African state. This 
has caused contradictory relations between NGOs and the state, for in doing so, NGOs are 
in a sense becoming the citizens= new patrons and therefore diversifying patronage away 
from the existing state power centres. This has had the effect of diminishing the state=s 
claim to the citizens= legitimacy (Fowler, 1990:17-23). 
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Beside legitimacy, states are said to be characterised by the desire to achieve  hegemony 
and autonomy. This involves the need to retain absolute control over territory and 
population as well as commanding the legal status of internal and external sovereignty. 
However, these imperatives may be compromised when NGOs constitute independent 
power centres supported by their external linkages and sources of funding. In constituting 
autonomous power centres away from state control, NGOs may be tempted to engage in 
oppositional activities and thus invite confrontational responses from the state (Fowler, 
1990:11-17). Also important is the state imperative of revenue collection. Fowler (1990:23-
25) has argued that states consistently and continuously seek revenue to be able to fulfill 
the imperatives of hegemony, autonomy and legitimacy. However, following the economic 
crises, African states have found it virtually impossible to meet the revenue imperative. 
Internally, the state has increasingly found it difficult to continue taxing citizens who due to 
increased poverty no longer have taxable incomes. The situation has been worsened by 
the fact that international multi-lateral and bilateral donors no longer channel aid through the 
state, instead preferring NGOs. This condition of state revenue deprivation has created 
jealousies with African governments seeking to control and direct resources that only 
NGOs seem to have. 
 
Contrasting organizational forms and approaches to development are seen as other 
reasons explaining the uneasy relations between NGOs and the state (Bratton, 1987; 
Opoku-Mensah, 1996). Edwards and Hulme (1997:16) have argued that government 
structures tend to be rigid, hierarchical and autocratic, with power and control resting at the 
top. This makes governments bureaucratic, centralized and control-oriented. On the 
contrary, he argues that, NGOs tend to be flexible and innovative, while emphasizing on the 
non-hierarchical values and relations which in turn call for participatory development. 
 
Susan Dicklitch (1998:6-8) provides a flexible picture of NGO-state relations in arguing that 
the nature of relationship, whether conflictive or collaborative, depends largely on the 
functional role of the NGO. >Gap-Filler= NGOs, which have moved into service-provision 
where the state has withdrawn, tend to buttress the legitimacy of the regime. Such NGOs, 
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she contends, co-operate with the regime in national development schemes. However, 
>Voluntary Organizations= (VOs) and >Peoples= Organizations= (POs) give voice to popular 
demands and engage in collective action in areas of civic education, empowerment of 
members and the wider community. POs and VOs, because of the nature of their roles, are 
likely to get into confrontational relations with the state. However, she argues that most 
NGOs in Africa are of the Gap-Filling type rather than being POs and VOs. 
 
Patron-client relations, a dimension rarely brought out in NGO-state relations, is alluded to 
by Kiondo (1994) in his study of local development in Tanzania. This is significant for it 
touches on a special kind of relationship within the wider context of NGO-state relations. 
Unlike confrontational relations, patron-client networks between the state and NGOs 
constitute a form of collaboration between NGOs and the state. More often than not, the 
state becomes an NGO=s patron in a situation where the NGO lacks an autonomous 
resource base and is forced by the existing realities to be dependent on the state. 
 
Depending on the prevailing nature of NGO-state relations, African states have tended to 
develop certain NGO control and >regulatory= mechanisms. Collaborative relations more 
often than not lead to co-optation, by which an NGO is made a semi-government agency. 
Registration, monitoring and co-ordination have been the most common state techniques 
of controlling NGOs in terms of sources and level of funding, membership and 
programmes. In tense confrontational situations, states tend to employ stronger techniques 
including dissolution, banning and deregistration of NGOs (Bratton, 1987; Kanyinga, 1991; 
Ng=ethe et al, 1992; Opoku-Mensah, 1996:9-10, citing Baldwin; Dicklitch, 1998:24-25). In 
situations where NGOs have the organizational muscle in response to state control 
measures, more often than not they have lobbied for the formation of national NGO 
umbrella bodies to protect and advance their interests, for example, the Tanzania Non-
Governmental Organization Network (TANGO), the Development Network of Indigenous 
Voluntary Associations (DENIVA) in Uganda (Gariyo, 1998:134), and the NGO Council in 
Kenya (Ndegwa, 1994, 1996). 
 
Those who seek a middle road in NGO-state relations have called for a balance between 
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NGO autonomy and accountability as well as the need to recognize the potential positive 
role of the state in development. Edwards and Hulme (1997:16) argue that there are sound 
reasons for NGOs to enter into a positive and creative relation with the state considering 
that the latter is primarily responsible for the macro-sector policies that provide the much 
needed national infrastructure, and that it Aremains the ultimate arbiter and determinant of 
the wider political changes on which sustainable development depends.@ Allen (1990:302) 
has also observed, ARather than argue the state and society are necessarily in conflict, that 
government and NGOs are bound to be rivals, we might better see them as 
complementary, for states and NGOs need each other to be strong and need each other to 
become strong.@ The NGO-state accommodation viewpoint is also shared by other 
contributors (Friedman, 1992:7; Holmen and Jirstrom, 1994; Cernea, 1988; Chege, 
1999:7). An analysis of the above literature on NGO-state relations reveals a lot of 
controversies of which this study hopes to make a contribution to by empirically examining 
the factors that influence NGO-state relations. 
 
2.2.2 NGOs= resource allocation criteria and equitable rural development 
Development NGOs tend to be involved in activities in diverse sectors. In virtually all cases, 
the focus is on improving the living standards of the marginalized in society. Whereas this 
is an ideal objective, NGOs, like any other actor in development, are influenced by certain 
factors and values in decisions concerning resource allocation between and among 
communities and individuals. The question of who benefits and why and in what quantities 
is thus always in the background. 
 
The nature and impact of resource allocation by NGOs has attracted the attention of a 
number of  researchers. Bratton (1987:20-22), Ng=ethe et al (1990a:136-138), Kanyinga 
(1991:51), Riddell et al (1995:92) and Clark (1997:56) argue inequitable resource 
allocation at one level can be linked to poor coordination of development activities by 
NGOs, and at another point, interference by local politicians and administrators. Whereas 
effective coordination tends to have the advantage of establishing information gathering 
and dissemination processes which expose either party to what is going on within their 
environment of operation and reducing the wastage of funds due to duplication, this may 
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not be the case within the NGO sector (see Chitere, 1994:7). Cernea (1988:19) has noted 
that A...NGO projects often are implemented individually not as part of a broader 
programming strategy for a region or sector. Often NGOs carry out their initiatives and 
projects individually and relatively or completely unconnected with other NGOs or 
programmes, a tendency that hinders the establishment of country-wide or region-wide 
programmes.@ 
 
Commenting on the capacity of NGOs to foster equitable development, Cleobury 
(2000:103) has observed: 
It would seem that, in the interests of equality, or indeed of democracy, 
attempts should be made to distribute resources equally to all areas of the 
state. A feature of NGOs= work is that, more often than not, they operate 
within small geographically confined areas. Limitations on the size of most 
NGOs and their >reach= would not enable them to operate in any other way. In 
this respect, NGOs can be seen as >part of the problem=. Their mode of 
operation could, in some circumstances, result in some parts of society and 
the community receiving more favourable treatment than others.... 
 
Lack of effective coordination of NGO projects has tended to lead to inequality between 
and among communities and individuals causing political tension among the beneficiaries. 
The situation is worsened given that NGOs have the freedom to operate in a manner they 
choose, and more often than not in areas of their choice. Riddell et al (1995:90) have 
argued that one of the reasons why NGOs are favoured by local communities is because 
they bring benefits disproportionately to one area or region over others. 
 
Ethnicity and clannism, as well as religious bias, may also influence NGO resource 
allocation criteria causing inequality. Kiondo (1994:79, 84-85), in a study on Tanzania, 
found out that NGOs there are predominantly influenced by religious factors in resource 
allocation. In this particular study, he argued that Islamic organizations tended to act as 
patrons to Muslim communities by favouring them with the supply of social amenities and 
basic needs. He therefore argued that the general effect was to reproduce or even enlarge 
existing inequalities. 
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The involvement of powerful politicians and state administrators as patrons of NGOs and 
some communities has also influenced resource allocation in favour of certain communities 
at the expense of others. This pattern was also evident in Kiondo=s (1994:81) study, which 
found that influential politicians and businessmen had greatly influenced the direction in 
which NGO resources were invested. Thus, based on this premise, this study proceeds to 
assess the links between NGOs= activities and the resultant impact on rural development. 
 
2.2.3 NGOs and participatory development strategies 
NGOs assert that their development activities among the poor are grounded on the 
principle of >participation=. However, in as much as >participation= has become a 
development catchword, it seems to have been subjected to varying interpretations. 
Holmen and Jirstrom (1994:15) have, for instance, noted that Aparticipation is increasingly 
regarded as, perhaps the most central factor behind the success or failure of local 
organizations. While everybody emphasizes the importance of participation, there is, 
however, a great deal of confusion as to what the term stands for...@ 
 
Kabwegyere and Migot-Adholla (1981:3-4) are of the opinion that participation Adenotes an 
intimate involvement where people critically influence the decision about how, when and 
what form they acquire benefits; it implies power transfer to the target groups.@ In utilizing 
participatory approaches, NGOs, according to Clark (1997:43,45,46), are moving beyond 
>a supply-side= approach that concentrated on the delivery of services or development 
projects, to a >demand-side= which emphasizes helping communities to articulate their 
preferences and concerns so as to become active participants in development. The 
politics of the >demand-side= also involve NGOs helping local communities form local 
organizations for articulating their interests.  
 
The UNDP (1998a) has also made a fairly extensive survey of the concept of participation 
in the context of development. In its analysis, the UNDP concludes that participation is 
structural in the sense of developing people=s capacities and skills to negotiate and to seek 
the resources and changes which they require in order to improve their lives, and that it 
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involves the application of certain methods and techniques whereby local people can be 
brought to play a part and to develop a stake in development programmes. 
Participation has also been defined to include political empowerment, in addition to 
economic empowerment (Dicklitch,1998:11-12). Political empowerment, seen as an 
aspect of democratization, is said to occur when NGOs: empower the people to question 
the structural reasons for their poverty; and help in the formation of a mass of organizations 
between the state and the citizen (pluralism), thus assisting in the counter-balancing of 
state power (Kiondo, 1994:82). 
 
Overall, advantages associated with participatory development approaches are said to 
include: utilization of local resources (information, materials, labour etc) in the development 
process and thereby making development more efficient, effective and relevant to local 
needs; growth of capacity by local communities through acquisition of ideas and 
experience which enables them to negotiate and manage the development process; 
incorporation of local socio-economic and cultural conditions into  development, making it 
a people-friendly process; better targeting of benefits to the poorest through the 
identification of key stakeholders who will be most affected by the activities; and cultivation 
of a political culture that emphasizes and thrives on increased accountability 
(Chambers,1989:201; Chitere, 1994:3-5; UNDP, 1998a). However, in itself and by itself, 
participation may generate some disadvantages in terms of: cost and time where there is 
no guarantee of success;  being a destabilizing force in unbalancing existing socio-political 
relationships and thereby threatening the stability of development work; and shifting of the 
burden onto the poor and the relinquishing by national governments of their responsibilities 
to promote development with equity (UNDP, 1998a). 
 
Whether NGOs in reality adopt a participatory approach in development and the impact of 
its usage remains an issue of concern. While other analysts such as Riddell (1995:59-60) 
paint a picture of NGOs= successful capacity to use participatory approaches in 
development, others (UNDP, cited in Smillie, 1994:158; Chitere, 1994:6) have raised 
serious doubts about this type of optimism. Mutiso (1985:65), has for instance, argued that 
AThe current assumption that NGOs are in general more into bottom-up development is 
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largely mythical as many of the external ones (including churches) do not give people 
choices. Neither do most of the local PVOs / NGOs...@ He adds, ANot many NGOs really 
solicit community preferences on development. Few have personnel in the communities.@ In 
a recent study based on Bangladesh, Hashemi (1998:107) has further seriously dented the 
role of NGOs in participatory development by forcefully arguing that, AIt is interesting to note 
that while terms such as >grassroots= and >participation= permeate NGO rhetoric, the 
conscientisation approach is reminiscent of the >vanguard party= of the >Old left=. The 
underlying assumption is that >declassed=, urban- educated, middle class NGO workers 
>from the outside= must go to the villages to conscientise the poor so that they will organize 
and struggle for themselves.@ Hashemi continues to criticize, AIn NGO strategies there has 
never been a sustained faith in the ability of poor people to bring about their own 
transformations. It is this perspective that has disallowed any real participation of the poor 
in NGO activities or the development of systems of accountability to them.@ According to 
Hashemi therefore, beneficiaries= participation in NGO projects has been limited to 
relatively inconsequential areas of decision-making.  
 
2.2.4 Human and material resource base in NGOs 
An organization=s human and material resource base constitutes an important element of 
the organization=s internal capacity to function towards the accomplishment of stated goals 
and objectives (Koontz, 1984:378). Human resource refers to the organization=s staff or 
personnel whose quality is measured in terms of educational, professional and technical 
skills. Material resources include the organization=s finances and equipment necessary for 
task accomplishment. 
 
Existing literature (Hyden, 1985:132-133; Kinyanjui, 1985b; Bratton, 1987:6; Korten, 
1987:149; Kajese, 1990:24-29; Kanyinga, 1991:58; Smillie, 1994; Chitere, 1994:161-162; 
Riddell et al, 1995) seems to question the quality and therefore the capacity of NGO human 
resources. This, it has been argued, could be a by-product of most NGOs= requirements 
that they have voluntary rather than purely professional staff. NGOs, being founded on the 
voluntary principle for purposes of assisting the needy without profit considerations, often 
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see it as a logical extension to recruit staff on an equally voluntary basis. Staff recruited on 
these terms may not be subjected to tight scrutiny in relation to quality as would be the case 
for staff recruited on terms based on remuneration being equivalent to skills possessed 
and therefore productivity. The staff situation in most NGOs is becoming even more acute 
considering that NGOs are now moving into new areas that emphasize the empowerment 
of the people. This empowerment of the poor to challenge the status-quo and the structural 
conditions responsible for their poverty, demand high skills on the part of NGO staff. As 
observed by Clark (1997:45), AThe moving beyond the development >supply-side= to 
>demand-side= activities requires that NGOs develop new skills, partnerships and ways of 
working in order to help communities articulate their concerns and preferences, to 
manoeuver into a negotiating position with official bodies, and to mix technical operational 
skills with >information age= communication, advocacy and networking skills.@ 
 
The other aspect of material resources, especially the finance base, has also been viewed 
as being weak and thus rendering NGOs dependent on external donors. Consequences of 
such dependency have been argued to include: compromised autonomy; inability to 
formulate long-term development plans beyond the traditional project by project formulae; 
and imposition of external foreign thinking, models and priorities (Bratton, 1987:34; 
Kajese, 1990:13-15; Vincent and Campbell, 1990:103; Smillie, 1994; Ndegwa, 1996:24; 
Dicklitch, 1998: 27-29). In a study in East Africa (comprising of Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Uganda), Gariyo (1998:133), out of a sample of 62 NGOs and GROs, found out 36 
depended on foreign donations for between 75% and 100% of their funding, and a further 7 
received less than 50% and 75%. He concluded that Asuch high levels of foreign funding 
tend to deprive NGOs of a strong base in their own societies and contribute to the inability 
to plan for the long term.@ Another associated problem with NGO funding is that, even with 
its limited levels, over 60% of it goes into the cost of administration (salaries and other 
operational expenses) leaving a very small amount for the actual development for the 
intended beneficiaries (Gariyo, 1998:134). 
 
As a remedy for the heavy dependence on external sources of funding, Vincent and 
Campbell (1990:104-105) suggest alternative funding strategies for NGOs: the 
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establishment of a capital reserve fund generated partly by the NGO itself; the giving of 
priorities to self-financing activities such as income-generation projects, the sale of 
services, and in-kind contribution from members; increased fund-raising efforts from the 
local community, businesses, social clubs and the government, and negotiations for long 
flexible programme grants from their external donors. 
 
The foregoing literature review on NGO human and material resource base raises fairly 
important issues that impinge on NGO contribution to the process of development. Once 
again, this study will make an attempt to gain a deeper understanding of this dimension of 
NGOs and development. 
 
Summary and conclusion 
This chapter has made an elaborate attempt to understand through conceptualization the 
NGO phenomenon. In as much as a standard universal NGO definition has been difficult to 
arrive at as clearly shown by the various efforts in the literature review, the study adopts the 
conceptualization of NGOs as being those organizations that are voluntary in founding and 
membership as well as being separate from state institutions and processes and largely 
having operations that are non-profit in nature. These organizations exist largely in two 
forms: service-oriented or non-membership NGOs and membership-based NGOs. 
Whereas service-oriented NGOs tend to be formal in structure and organization and are 
national / international in scope and rely mainly on foreign funding, membership 
organizations (differently referred to as Self-help NGOs, Grassroots Organizations, 
Peoples= Organizations, Community-Based Organizations etc) tend to be informal in 
structure and organization, and local in scale of operation while depending largely on 
locally-generated resources. 
 
The overwhelming rise and spread of NGOs into the development sector in the late 20th 
century, is seen as constituting a development shift from traditional state-motored 
development. Viewed as a central element of civil society, NGOs have been promoted as 
an alternative to the state in the development space. To support the increased NGO 
intervention in development, both bilateral and multi-lateral international donors have since 
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the early 1980s increasingly funded development through NGOs, and in the process by-
passing the African state. 
 
However, it has been argued that, the whole idea of NGO active involvement in 
development is entrenched in what has come to be described variously as >Alternative 
Development= or the >New Policy Agenda=, whose twin poles are neo-liberalism and liberal 
democratic theory. The revival of neo-liberal economics has emphasized the employment 
of market forces, of which NGOs are seen as part, while shrinking the role of the state in 
development. The neo-liberal agenda, in turn, it is argued, can only be effective in a climate 
of democratic liberalism that promotes a culture of plurality and open competitive politics.  
 
The declining African state of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s has provided the New Policy 
Agenda advocates with a fertile testing ground for the ideas of neo-liberalism and liberal 
democracy. Hence, the deafening calls for a rolling back of the state to create room for the 
market amidst other economic and political conditionalities, embodied in what are 
euphemistically called Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). The way forward for 
development in Africa remains stormy and foggy as evidenced by the controversies 
surrounding the on-going impact of SAPs.  
 
There was in this chapter, also, an attempt to slice through general literature on the role of 
NGOs in development so far as pertains to relations with the state, choice of development 
approaches meant to empower the poor, criteria influencing resource allocation and likely 
impact on the poor, and the internal capacities of NGOs in terms of human and material 
resource base. Gaps emerging from the existing controversies and contradictions on these 
issues provide a departure point for this research, which in the next chapter focuses in 
detail on the Kenyan state in an attempt to explain, as well as justify, the entry of NGOs into 
the Kenyan development and political space. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
3.0 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE KENYAN STATE : AN OVERVIEW 
 
The concept of state has had a turbulent and controversial history. Constantly competing 
with other actors in society, there have been moments when it would seem the 
phenomenon of the state has been eclipsed. However, more often than not, the state has 
struggled to reserve its dominant role in society. This has ensured a continued debate of its 
role as observed by Nettl (cited in Hall, J. A, 1994b:9): 
The concept of state is not much in vogue in the social sciences now.  Yet it 
retains a skeletal, ghostly existence largely because, for all the changes in 
emphasis and interest of research, the thing exists and no amount of 
conceptual restructuring can dissolve it. 
 
The state concept controversy has extended to its meaning and function(s). In this respect, 
Chazan et al (1988:36) have observed, AThe concept of the state is inevitably elusive. 
Although most observers... have employed the term freely, they have differed considerably 
in their interpretation of its significance and its main characteristics.@ However, it can be 
argued that a systematic conceptualization of the state has been monopolised by two rival 
schools of thought: the liberals and the marxists. Broadly, the liberals interpret the salient 
function of the state as being that of acting as a custodian protecting a framework within 
which market forces operate according to their own logic. The state, according to liberal 
thought, is thus an impartial arbiter whose role is to advance the national cause of 
economic growth. On the contrary, the Marxists view the state with much suspicion and 
condemn it as a tool of the ruling class whose functional existence would come to an end 
with the demise of the class struggle (Zeleza,1989:37-38; Hall, 1994:commentary; Oyugi, 
1994a:4-9). 
While the differences between the Marxists and the liberals have been centred largely on 
the functions of the state in terms of whose interests it serves, the two have tended to 
coalesce around the Weberian  institutional features of the state. Among these, is the 
observation that a state is a set of institutions monopolizing the means of violence and 
coercion and that it functions within a territorially demarcated area, over which it has a 
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monopoly of rule-making (Greenberg, 1990:11-12; Hall, 1994a:commentary; Mann, 
1994:333; Pierson, 1996:6-27). 
 
This study, in addition to adopting the Weberian conception of state (an organization with a 
monopoly of coercion), also argues that both the liberal and Marxist interpretation of state 
function are relevant to the analysis of the African state. Whereas the colonial state was 
singly representative of the interests of the white bourgeoisie and therefore supportive of 
the Marxist conception of state, the history of the post-colonial African state has shown a 
synthesis of the two models. The post-colonial state borrowed from the liberal perspective, 
in the early decades of independence, when the state, viewed as an impartial arbiter for 
advancing national interests, became the main agency through which statist economic 
policies were pursued with the creation of state enterprises. Yet, equally applicable was the 
Marxist conception of state, where, alongside statist experiments, African governments, 
with much zeal, acted as promoters and protectors of certain class interests, which more 
often than not, converged and overlapped with ethnicity blurring their separation line.  
 
Greenberg=s (1990:12-16) model of the >development of the state= is utilized in the 
examination of the transformation of the Kenyan state from its colonial roots to the post-
colonial status. Greenberg=s model is predicated on the assumption that the >development 
of the state=, involves change and dynamism rather than being static. His model of the state 
employs four interrelated tenets of which the third and the fourth can be married into one: 
property rules; regime form; the nature of the state=s apparatus; and the state=s policies. 
Property rules assume states can be described in terms of their basic economic 
organisation depending on the mode of production and exchange. The regime form takes 
into account the formal ways in  which power is organized and exercised in society and 
may result in political forms ranging from authoritarian to democratic. The nature of the 
state=s apparatus focuses on the bureaucratic nature of the state in relation to  changes in 
the designation and organization of offices as well as on the changes on the nature of tasks 
they perform. Lastly, state policies analyse the actions of leaders in terms of influencing 
broad policy domains in varied areas. Greenberg=s model is advantageous in the analysis 
of the Kenyan state from colonialism to post-colonialism in that it facilitates a critical 
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examination of the role of the state in the transformation of society in all its facets: 
economic, social, and political. Further more, it helps to systematize and reorder the entire 
array of complex data enabling a comprehensive analysis of the Kenyan state. 
 
3.1 The colonial state 
The years between the mid-19th and mid-20th centuries marked the era of European 
imperialism and colonialism in Africa. The ultimate, in this period, was the construction of 
the colonial state. The essence of the colonial state, whose >inner logic was shaped by the 
vocation of domination= (Young, 1988:37), was characterised by: territorial ambiguity of 
which the only boundaries that really mattered were those demarcating the domains of 
different colonial powers, rather than those separating different territories into which an 
imperial state subdivided its possessions; and the exercise of  sovereignty for the colonial 
state by the imperial occupant and thus rendering the colonial state an appendage of an 
empire with no distinctive external interests except as accessories of that empire (Young, 
1988:32-36). 
 
Claude Ake (1984:128-129) elaborates on the colonial state=s >vocation of domination= as 
entailing: 
(a) the presence of an occupying power; 
(b) a monopoly of economic and political power by the occupying power; 
(c) an occupation ideology that represented the colonized as less than human, that 
legitimized their brutalization, subordination, and exclusion from economic and political 
power; 
(d) the existence in the colonial economic structure of contradictions that produced an 
indigenous petty bourgeoisie; 
(e) further inherent contradictions in the colonial system that severely checked the upward 
mobility of this petty bourgeoisie and frustrated the very aspirations that the colonial system 
had imparted to this emerging class; 
(f) the existence of a colonized population, alienated and frustrated by the discrimination 
and oppression of the occupying power, and ready to be socialized into radical politics; 
(g) systematic inculcation by the colonizing power of a sense of inferiority; and 
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(h) pillage of the resources of the colony. 
 
The creation of Kenya as a colonial state can be traced initially to the British establishment 
of a consulate at Zanzibar in 1840. Initially interested in Zanzibar and the coastal region, the 
British were to change direction radically with the arrival of Germans on the scene 
manifested in the treaties Karl Peters was making with local chiefs around the Mount 
Kilimanjaro region. The East Africa region was soon demarcated into spheres of influence 
between the Germans and the British following the Anglo-German agreements of 1886 and 
1890. By these treaties, the Germans took over what became known as the German East 
Africa Protectorate while the British took control of the Uganda Protectorate (1894), the 
East African Protectorate (1895), and the Zanzibar Protectorate (1890). The East African 
Protectorate was in 1920 changed to Kenya colony (see Lonsdale, 1989). 
 
Young=s and Ake=s succinct description of a colonial state, and the attendant colonial 
situation that it creates, facilitates the critical examination of the Kenyan colonial state 
alongside the analytical model proposed by Greenberg (1990:12-16). 
 
3.1.1 The colonial state and economic organization 
The initial penetration of the colonial state into the economic organization of Kenyan 
society was dictated by the realization that the colony had to be self-reliant in terms of 
meeting the costs of administration. Equally important, the Foreign Office in London was 
pushing the new colonial state to see to it that the costs of constructing the new Uganda 
Railway from the interior to the coast was offset. There was also need to see to it that 
revenue was generated to maintain the railway line over time. The solution to this 
predicament was the encouragement of immigration of Europeans into the colony as white 
settlers. In this policy, was born the white settler economy in Kenya (Zeleza, 1989:39-40; 
Berman, 1990:55-56). 
 
However, with the establishment of the agricultural white settler economy based on 
plantation cash crop production for export, contradictions in the management of the colonial 
state=s economy emerged. There was, for instance, increased demand for African labour 
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and yet the African population, being largely self-sufficient, was reluctant to market itself as 
a commodity. Berman (1990:58-59) has proposed that, desperate for labour, Awhat the 
settlers set out to create, putting increased pressure on the state to assist them, was a 
system of labour that relied more on extra-economic coercion than on wage incentives to 
recruit and hold African labourers.@ Leys (1976:30) clearly sums up the colonial state=s 
policy in collusion with the settlers over the labour issue: 
Africans were compelled to work partly by force, partly by taxation, and partly 
by preventing them from having access to enough land or profitable crops to 
enable them to pay taxes without working for wages. 
 
The colonial state acted in large measure as an ally of the settlers and their estate 
production not only in securing African labour but also by providing other inputs that 
facilitated settler production and the entrenchment of agricultural capitalism in Kenya. 
Among these was the state=s deliberate policy to provide: efficient infrastructural services 
such as feeder roads and rail in settler production areas; agricultural extension services 
and other inputs including seeds, subsidized fertilizer, agricultural research information; 
and credit facilities from state firms (Leys, 1976:30; Zeleza, 1989:41-42; Berman, 1990:68 
). 
 
The colonial state=s support for the settler economy translated into what may be called 
parasitic capitalism in that the flourishing of the settler economy depended on the naked 
exploitation of the colonized not only in terms of forced cheap labour but also through other 
primitive means. Africans were subjected to the payment of tax (of which the European 
population was exempt till the twilight years of colonialism) which acted as major revenue 
for the state while in the process literally making it impossible for them to accumulate 
savings (Leys, 1976:31-32; Maxon, 1989:74; Berman and Lonsdale, 1992:114-115). 
However, more punitive, was the state=s policy to shield the settler plantation economy from 
African competition by excluding the African peasant farmer from cash crop production in 
the initial years of colonialism (Swainson, 1980:174). 
 
From the foregoing, it would seem that the agricultural sector constituted the backbone of 
the colonial economy. Up to the Second World War, official British policy did not favour the 
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promotion of the industrial and manufacturing sector in the colonies in the belief that this 
would compete against British industries (Kanogo, 1989:135). The colonies were thus to 
remain importers of manufactured goods and net exporters of raw materials (Swainson, 
1980:26). Out of 8 million pounds allocated for colonial development in Kenya by 1939 by 
the Colonial Development Advisory Committee, only 23,000 pounds or 0.3% of the total 
allocation was for industrial development in the colony (Kanogo, 1989:136). On the few 
occasions that the metropolitan and colonial government supported the establishment of 
light industries in Kenya, it was on the understanding that it posed no threat to British 
industries and that it would act as an outlet for the settlers= produce (Swainson, 1980:30-
31). The British were, however, to develop pro-industrialization policies in the colonies in 
the immediate post-World War two period as a result of increased American and 
Japanese competition. British industries were encouraged to relocate production in the 
colonies to produce manufactured goods previously imported (Swainson, 1980:117). 
 
In integrating Kenya into a capitalistic mode of production, the colonial state accelerated 
the formation of class relations. The European sector constituted the bourgeoisie  based 
on the settler economy, while the Asian population monopolised commerce forming a 
merchant class. The Africans, arising from the contradictions of the colonial economy, 
produced the peasantry and the proletariat following their separation from land, the main 
means of production. An incipient African petty bourgeoisie was also in the making, 
consisting of the owners of petty businesses. For the colonial period, it is important to note 
that there was a convergence of class and race in the emerging social relations (Swainson, 
1980:173-176; Leonard, 1984:142-145; Zeleza, 1989:43-49; Berman, 1992a:194-198). 
 
Overall then, it can be argued that the economic structure of the colonial state instituted 
economic relations that had inherent contradictions, that were largely defined by the 
marginalization and impoverishment of the colonized. The state became the settlers= main 
agent for the primitive accumulation of capital as aptly captured by Bruce Berman 
(1992a:195) in his contention that, AThe settlers were the most important practitioners of 
the >vulgarization= of state power for their own material interests, treating the state as an 
instrument of their aspirations.@ 
 
 59 
 
3.1.2 The colonial state and regime form 
The colonial state was an imposed project via conquest. It was constructed contrary to the 
concept of consent. It therefore represented no covenant between the ruler and the ruled. 
Marxon (1994:36) notes: 
...the colonial state was from the first characterised by a powerful executive 
backed by military force. Most executive and legislative functions were 
vested in the governor. There was thus little in the separation of powers. 
 
The organization and structuring of power relations in the colonial state was intensely 
authoritarian as clearly captured by Maloba (1995:7): 
Politically, colonialism was a dictatorship. It was imposed by violence and 
maintained by violence. Ruling with utter indifference to the opinions of the 
governed - the Africans - colonialism perfected a reign of terror by silencing 
its opponents through detentions, exile, even outright extermination. There is 
hardly an African country that does not have its list of martyrs of 
freedom....Colonial administrators were appointed and not elected. They 
owed their allegiance to foreign centres of power, represented in the 
colonies by governors. They were not accountable to Africans for their 
actions nor did they pretend to be constrained in their actions by local 
opinions. 
 
The colonial state instituted the politics of race and racism in Kenya. To this extent, legal 
political participation in the colonial system was determined by race. The African was more 
or less entirely excluded from political participation within the avenues created by the 
colonial state until towards the end of colonialism. The earliest facade created by the 
colonial state to serve as the forum through which the African voice could be heard was the 
Local Native Council (LNC) founded in 1924. Facade, because while touted as a 
representative body of African interests in the reserves, it was in reality a creation of the 
colonial state to control African politics within >responsible= limits by allowing them to 
>harmlessly let off steam= (Berman, 1990:216). In reality, the LNC institution could never be 
relied upon to represent the African voice since matters that were critical of official policy 
were not encouraged for discussion. Membership of the LNC was, in addition, determined 
by the Provincial Administration, thus effectively rendering it a tool of the colonial state. It 
was mischief to argue the way the state did that the LNC provided Africans with tutelary 
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experiences in the >responsible= conduct of their own affairs (Berman, 1990:216). 
Berman=s ( 1990:217-218 ) observation that AIn the councils the Provincial Administration 
found an instrument of political co-optation and of collaboration with  non-official elements 
of the emergent African bourgeoisie that helped to sustain the legitimacy of colonial 
administration...@ aptly captures the role of the LNCs as tools in the service of the imperial 
scheme. 
 
The rapid rise of African opposition to the political contradictions engendered by the 
colonial state was thus inevitable. Excluded from direct participation in the colonial state=s 
Legislative Council except through a European representative, protest movements became 
the order of the day in an attempt to force African representation in the institutions of the 
colonial state. The sole objective being to clamp down on abuses related to land alienation, 
taxation, poor working conditions and generally poor living standards. Early protest 
organizations included the East African Association (EAA), the Kikuyu Central Association 
(KCA), Kavirondo Tax Payers= Association (KTPA), Ukamba Members Association, and 
Taita Hills Association (Kanogo, 1989:113; Maloba, 1989:184; Maxon, 1989:97-105, 129-
133; Berman, 1990:237-246). The response of the colonial state to the emergence of such 
organizations was draconian, involving the harassment of their leaders, including detention 
and deportation and eventual banning and proscribing. 
 
More elaborate and articulate African political opposition to the colonial state was to occur 
after World War two with the formation of national-based organizations such as the Kenyan 
African Union (1944), and later the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya 
African Democratic Union (KADU) in 1960. In contrast to what has been described as 
constitutional nationalism, the Mau Mau movement, which emerged in the early 1950s, was 
violent and militant, targeting the colonial state and all that it stood for. The colonial state, 
finding itself besieged, resorted to the use of brutal and repressive counter-insurgency 
measures that it had always applied in the past in containing African protest. However, 
more dramatic this time, was the declaration of a state of emergency reflecting the 
adversity of the matter (Maloba, 1989:185-192; Berman, 1990:322-338; Maxon, 1994:47-
50; Atieno-Odhiambo, 1995:27-42). 
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The foregoing analysis provides indication of the regime nature of the colonial state in 
Kenya. In a nutshell, it was the anti-thesis of liberal and democratic thought and practice of 
which was to prove a major legacy in the post-colonial state. Crawford Young (1988:53) 
notes of the colonial state that Aprofoundly embedded in it was a command relationship 
with civil society, reflected in its laws, its routines, its mentalities, even its imagery.@ 
 
 
3.1.3 The nature of the colonial state=s apparatus 
 
The construction, institutionalization, and decolonization phases of the colonial state were 
crucial stages in the lifespan of the colonial state. However, little was it ever imagined by 
the colonial state that the decolonization phase would ultimately be part of the process. 
Young (1988:41-56) has argued that the three phases in the growth of the colonial state 
project all required the accomplishment of five major imperatives: hegemony, autonomy, 
legitimation, security, and revenue. To accomplish them, there was need to establish the 
state apparatus, the bureaucracy.  
 
The central element of the colonial state=s apparatus that constituted the bureaucracy was 
the Kenya Administration, that is, the central secretariat in Nairobi and the Provincial 
Administration (PA) consisting of  Provincial Commissioners and  District Commissioners. 
The Kenya Administration, considered as >generalists=, until 1945 possessed greater 
power and status than the various functional and technical departments of >specialists= 
(Berman, 1990:73). The salient function of the PA included exercising primary 
responsibility for the collection of taxes, the protection of property, the stimulation of 
production and trade, and more important, the maintenance of >public order=. In a sense 
then, the PA as an agent of the colonial state, was primarily in charge of the control function 
of law and order and only secondarily assumed the role of the development function 
(Berman, 1990:73). 
 
However, with the colonial state becoming more developmental in nature as from 1945, 
there was increased reliance on the technical >specialists= of the bureaucracy spread out in 
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the departments of Education, Agriculture, Health and others. In its initial phase of evolution 
of the colony, the technocracy had concerned itself more with settler development than with 
change in the African Reserves. Indeed, as noted by Berman (1990:85-86), the technocrats 
before World War two acted as Athe principal agents of intervention on behalf of the 
settlers.@ 
 
Throughout the colonial state=s enterprise, the central administration found it inevitably 
necessary to utilize the services of those Africans who were willing to collaborate in the 
domination and control of the colony. In Kenya, where direct administration was the norm, 
chieftaincy was created where it was lacking and became the core of African >contribution= 
to the colonial state=s administration. Caught in the overall contradictions of the colonial 
state=s edifice, the chieftaincy performed contradictory roles of acting as an agent of 
mobilizing African labour, taxes and maintaining disciplinary control of the reserves, while 
at the same time arrogating to itself the role of spokesman and representative of the 
Africans at the local level (Berman, 1990:209). No wonder, then, that the chiefs and the 
chieftaincy were more often than not disliked by the colonized, not only as the state=s 
collaborators, but also as a brutal and corrupt institution in matters related to taxation and 
mobilization of African labour. 
 
The bureaucracy was therefore reduced to being a tool in the service of the colonial state, 
facilitating the fulfilment of the dominant class interest of primitive accumulation through the 
various techniques of extraction. 
 
The colonial state: a conclusion 
1963 marked the demise of colonial rule in Kenya ending approximately sixty years of the 
colonial state project. Greenberg=s (1990:12-16) model of the >development of the state= 
has been utilized to evaluate the lifespan of the colonial state in Kenya in the perspectives 
of economic organization, regime forms and the state apparatus. Overall, the colonial state 
emerges as an enterprise of domination in the service of settler and metropolitan interests. 
It was essentially a parasitic and predatory state whose operations in the process 
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culminated in the rise of contradictory forces that ultimately contributed to its collapse and 
the handing over of power to the African petty bourgeoisie. The stage had now been set for 
the post-colonial period during which: 
...the state apparatus expanded in size, grew even more complex, and 
further developed the scope and intricate specialization of its interventions 
into the political economy of the country. The original prefectural core of the 
colonial political control apparatus was not abolished...but remained as the 
foundation of the state with restored and even augmented powers (Berman, 
1990:426-427). 
 
 
3.2 The post-colonial state 
The emergence of the post-colonial state in the early 1960s did not mark a radical break 
with the past in relation to the structure and functioning of the state (Hazlewood, 1979:13; 
Berman, 1990:427). The use of the state to further the growth of capitalism and its 
accompanying contradictions continued as official policy. However, unlike in the 
industrialized world, where capitalism is practised within the framework of >rationality=, 
Kenya=s capitalism has increasingly taken on a patrimonial form where the ruling class 
derive power from the control of state resources rather than production. In this system, 
rewards of public resources are linked to personal loyalty and service to the ruler. In turn, 
there has been increased mismanagement of public resources with the accompanying 
near collapse of key state institutions. Discussing the pitfalls of personal rule, an aspect he 
considers part of patrimonialism, Sandbrook (1991:100) notes: 
Personal rule is dangerous in that, while it provides a time-worn, albeit 
uncertain, formula for order under hostile conditions, it is potentially 
economically destructive. If unrestrained by an astute leadership, its short-
term political rationality of personal and regime survival may generate a 
variety of economic irrationalities that smother capitalism=s expansive 
dynamics. Clientelism and nepotism fill the ranks of the public sector with 
incompetent but politically loyal administrators. Maladministration contributes 
to a decline in essential services and the economic infrastructure. The 
privatisation of public office breeds capricious as well as incompetent 
administration; corruption, embezzlement, bottlenecks, favour to political 
 
 64 
insiders and clients destroy the calculability that investors require. 
 
3.2.1 The post-colonial state and property relations 
The legacy of continuity in terms of the colonial state=s structures and functions was, so to 
speak, bestowed on the emerging African petty bourgeoisie. Just released from detention 
in 1961, Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya=s first president thundered: 
The government of an independent Kenya will not be a gangster 
Government. Those who have been panicky about their property whether 
land or buildings or houses - can now rest assured that the future African 
Government, the Kenya Government, will not deprive them of their property 
or rights of ownership. We will encourage investors in various projects to 
come to Kenya and carry on their business peacefully, in order to bring 
prosperity to this country (Leys, 1976:62 citing Kenyatta, 1968:147). 
 
In the analysis of Kenya=s first independence decade, the thoughts of Tom Mboya are 
indispensable (see Goldsworthy, 1982 and Mboya, 1986). Being Minister for Economic 
Planning and Development, Mboya greatly influenced the drawing up of Sessional Paper 
No.10 of 1965 focussing on African socialism and its application to Kenya. Central to this 
document (Republic of Kenya,1965) was the declaration that the state would pursue both 
private and public investment in the pursuance of economic growth. However, as later 
developments in the Kenyan economy were to prove, implementation of African socialism 
was only rhetoric and a cloak for private investment and accumulation. In the defence of this 
seeming contradiction, Mboya argued that the critics of his capitalist-oriented policies 
failed to be pragmatic enough and accept that Kenya had no alternative but pursue a 
capitalist ideology since her colonially inherited infrastructure was basically capitalist. 
 
Where state investment occurred, it was basically through the establishment of public 
corporations, state companies and enterprises. They were created in virtually all sectors of 
the economy with the rationale of Africanizing the economy as well as giving the state a 
stake in what was considered to be areas of strategic importance to the government. 
However, as the 1980s approached, it became increasingly clear that these corporations 
were incapable of delivering their objectives and had indeed become a liability to the state. 
Among the reasons accounting for their poor performance was included the fact that their 
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top employees were political appointees who were never qualified to manage them. In 
addition, there was widespread misuse and embezzlement of these organizations= funds 
and resources such that they could no longer sustain their activities. Precisely for these 
reasons, the international finance institutions began calling for either divestiture or 
privatization of these state firms as part of the structural adjustment programme. 
 
However, the salient characteristic of the post-colonial state has been the use of state 
power to advance the interests of the African petty bourgeoisie in the accumulation of 
capital. In the early 1960s this was achieved through legislative means. For instance, the 
Trade Licensing Act of 1967 excluded non-citizens from trading in rural and non-central 
urban areas and specified a list of goods which were to be limited to citizen traders only 
(Swainson, 1980:187). In 1974, the Central Bank passed a directive restricting the amount 
of loans to be offered to non-resident (foreigners) individuals or companies to 20% of the 
investment, whereas locally owned firms were allowed to borrow up to 60% (Swainson, 
1980:189). In addition, the state created credit parastatals such as the Agricultural Finance 
Corporation (AFC) and the Industrial and Commercial Development  Corporation (ICDC) 
which became the main source of state finance to the local commercial and industrial 
sector (Swainson, 1980:190). In the agricultural sector, the state also assisted in the 
entrenchment of the African bourgeoisie through the transfer of European farms intact or in 
large acreage units to them (Leonard, 1984:148). Himbara (1994:85-93) and to some 
extent Leys (1980:109-113), have shown the various strategies through which the post-
colonial state attempted to prop up the African bourgeoisie as a capitalist force in Kenya. 
 
However, state support for capital accumulation by the African bourgeoisie has not 
succeeded in eclipsing the presence of foreign capital, especially in the fields of 
manufacturing and industry (Kaplinsky, 1980:83-105). The rise in foreign capital in Kenya 
accelerated in the post-1960 period largely through the establishment of foreign-controlled 
multinational corporations (MNCs) as well as joint venture and partnership firms (Swainson, 
1980:212-221). However, current trends starting from the mid-1980s, have witnessed 
foreign capital flight. This has been linked to high unprofitability margins due to the 
collapsing infrastructure, excessive corruption, and until recently, the lack of real 
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commitment to the economic reform process by the regime of Moi. Foreign Direct 
Investment levels, for instance, declined from $57 million in 1990 to just $11 million in 1998 
(Daily Nation, 18th April, 2000). 
 
Debate still looms as to whether Kenya=s post-colonial capitalism confers to it the neo-
colonial status arising from the role of the African bourgeoisie in the accumulation process 
and its linkages to foreign capital. In a revision of his past theoretical standing on the 
debate, Leys (1996:151-160), a key player in the Kenyan controversy, calls for a cease-fire 
between the dependecistas and the Marxists and the need to re-evaluate their extreme 
positions. His argument is that there is need for both schools of thought to move away from 
a universal approach and adopt a case study approach of Third World states in analysing 
development. Implicit in this case study approach is the assumption that factors that explain 
the nature of capitalism in a given state would be dependent on its unique or specific 
development environment surrounding it. In relation to Kenya, Leys (1996:153-154) revises 
his earlier thesis and acknowledges the presence of an African bourgeoisie whose roots 
can be traced to the pre-colonial period and whose organizational skills and productive 
capacity are increasingly shaping it into a >modern= and >autonomous= class. 
 
The acknowledgement of the existence of an African bourgeoisie in Kenya, however 
deformed and regardless of being comprador or nationalist, is important for the purpose of 
the impact of the development of capitalism on the emergence of a class society and the 
accompanying development contradictions and antagonisms. Leonard (1984:145-151) in 
his assessment of the class situation in Kenya, clearly captures the increasing 
consciousness of the class character in the categories of the matajiri or wabenzi (swahili 
for the very rich), the petty bourgeoisie, the workers and the peasants and the attendant 
conflicts. 
 
The convergence of class and ethnic consciousness captures the two most potent social 
forces in Kenya=s political economy, with the Kenyatta era having been characterised by 
Kikuyu monopoly and dominance of  state control. Through the formation of the Gikuyu 
Embu Meru Association (GEMA), the Kikuyu bourgeoisie in alliance with the other closely 
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related ethnic groups of the Embu and the Meru, managed to capture the state machinery 
to serve their accumulation interests. By July 1980, GEMA Holdings Ltd (by then no longer 
a mere welfare association) had accumulated assets estimated at a value of between 70 
and 90 million shillings (approximately 13,000 million US dollars) (Ogot, 1995a:196). By 
Kenyan standards, this was an astronomical amount clearly indicating the power of the 
Kikuyu bourgeoisie relative to capitalists from many other ethnic groups (also see 
Himbara, 1994:26-27). 
 
The post-Kenyatta era ushered in the rule of Moi in 1978 as Kenya=s second Head of state 
and government since independence. This change of leadership witnessed no fundamental 
break with the politics of ethnicity, the only variance being the substitution of Kikuyuism with 
Kalenjinization of state control, as Moi rushed to replace the Kikuyu monopoly with his own 
ethnic (Kalenjin) one (Himbara, 1994:27-28). In addition to utilising his long-term (12 years) 
experience as Kenyatta=s Vice President, Moi exploited the ethnic card in Kenya to capture 
and maintain political power. Whereas KANU had initially been controlled by the Kikuyu 
and Luo (by then Kenya=s biggest tribes), after capturing power in 1978, Moi built a 
precarious KANU alliance between his Kalenjin ethnic group and the other smaller tribes, 
notably the Luhya, that had been the core of KADU before it voluntarily dissolved itself in 
1964. This is what has been described by Southall (2000:4) as the capture of KANU from 
within by the ex-KADU elites. Equally significant, Moi manipulated the one-party KANU 
elections to purge it of the district party bosses that had been co-opted by Kenyatta and 
replaced them with unpopular individuals who lacked a strong base to challenge him 
(Southall and Wood, 1996:509). 
 
In Kenya, beside the fact that the power of the ruling class has been based on the control of 
the state rather than of production, patrimonialism is a defining feature of the state. Political 
leaders have sought to consolidate their power through access to state resources which 
are in turn allocated to the >politically correct= individuals and communities from whom the 
leader draws political support. This has led to the creation of an elaborate patron-client 
relationship. Barkan (1984:74-81), has argued that in Kenya, the patron-client network is a 
four-tiered structure running from the president as the top patron through the government 
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ministers, parliamentarians and local notables to the ordinary public. Every patron is 
expected to extract resources from the centre and distribute them to the periphery (also 
see Lonsdale, 1981:114). Haugerud (1995), in a fairly recent study on Kenya, confirms the 
usage of patron-client relations in influencing resource allocation and its impact: 
Patron politics (have been used to) sanction the diversion of state or public 
resources into private hands, and include exchange among members of the 
elite, as well as appropriation of public resources by ethno-regional or 
sectional interests. 
 
 
The politics of patrimonialism have functioned to entrench poverty in Kenya emanating from 
the fact that state resources have deliberately been diverted to satisfy the selfish needs of 
the ruling class, and the establishment of its needs and priorities at the expense of national 
development. Further aggravating the situation has been the convergence of class and 
ethnicity in Kenyan politics. Reliance on ethnic support by those in power, has meant the 
use of state power and resources to advance the accumulation interests of nearly whole 
ethnic groups at the expense of the entire nation. It is in this context that the Kikuyuisation 
and Kalenjinisation of Kenya=s political economy can be interpreted in the Kenyatta and 
Moi regimes respectively. Indeed, poverty in Kenya threatens to be a permanent feature 
resulting from the nature of the post-colonial state (Leys, 1976:258; Hazlewood, 
1979:198,202; Ochieng=, 1995:98-100; Ogot, 1995b:260). Industrial unrest has become 
the order of the day: for instance, the December 1997 nurses= strike demanding higher pay 
and better working conditions, and the on-and-off national teachers= strikes calling for 
better terms of service since October 1997 (Executive, Dec/Jan 1998; Southall, 1999:97). 
The government of Kenya (Republic of Kenya, 1997a:2) concurs that poverty alleviation is a 
major problem in noting that: 
Since the mid-1970s, the performance of the economy has indeed been very 
poor. The growth rate of GDP declined to an average of 5.2% per year 
between 1974 and 1979, and between 1980 and 1989 and 1990 and 1995, 
average growth rates for GDP were 4.1% and 2.5% per year respectively. 
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Table 3: Average annual growth rates of real Gross Domestic Product, 1964-1995 (%) 
 
 
 
 
1964- 
 
1974- 
 
1980- 
 
1990- 
 
Agriculture 
 
4.60 
 
3.90 
 
3.30 
 
0.40 
 
Manufacturing 
 
9.10 
 
10.00 
 
4.80 
 
3.00 
 
Private Household 
 
3.50 
 
14.50 
 
10.00 
 
10.50 
 
Government Services 
 
16.90 
 
6.50 
 
4.90 
 
2.60 
 
Financial, Real Estate, etc 
 
9.80 
 
12.40 
 
6.70 
 
6.60 
 
Other Services 
 
 
 
3.30 
 
4.20 
 
1.90 
 
GDP 
 
6.60 
 
5.20 
 
4.10 
 
2.50 
 
Source: Republic of Kenya, 1997a:3 
 
Equally declining has been the per capita income as evidenced by a fall from 0.4% 
between 1980 and 1989 to a paltry negative 0.3% per year between 1990 and 1995. 
The number of Kenyans living below the absolute poverty line has shot up dramatically 
(Republic of Kenya, 1997a:1). Employment rates have also declined from 4.2% between 
1974 and 1979, to 3.5% in the 1980s, to 1.9% in the 1990s, with the unemployment rate 
standing at 2.7 million (Republic of Kenya, 1997a:9). 
 
The poor economic performance is also reflected in the health sector where the gap 
between demand and supply of health services continues to widen. Government 
allocation to health in terms of recurrent expenditure was at its lowest in 1988/89 at 
7.35%. This has translated into low per capita health expenditure that has been 
declining from a high of US $9.82 in 1980/81 to $6.2 in 1995/96 reflecting a 36% drop 
(Republic of Kenya, 1997a:158). The latest statistics indicate a further decline in per 
capita health expenditure with only US $3 per person (Daily Nation, 18th April, 2000). 
Economic degeneration has not spared the agricultural and industrial sectors (see table 
3). While registering an average annual growth rate of 9.1% in manufacturing and 4.6% 
in agriculture during the period 1964 to 1973, the periods 1980 to 1989 and 1990 to 
1995, saw a dramatic drop of 4.8 and 3.0% for manufacturing respectively and 3.0 and 
0.4% respectively for agriculture (Republic of Kenya, 1997a:3). 
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In a surprisingly candid confession on the failure of the economy, the Government noted 
that, in addition to external factors, AKenya=s internal policies and structural rigidities 
were constraining the nation=s economic growth and development@ (Republic of Kenya, 
1997a:4). However, what was not explicitly mentioned is corruption and the devastating 
damage it has done to the economy. Corruption, embedded in and encouraged by the 
patron-client relations, has manifested itself in the looting of the economy at local, 
regional and national levels. Examples have included the frequent importation of 
agricultural commodities such as sugar and maize by powerful magnates in the 
government at the expense of locally produced crops. The Goldenberg scandal is yet 
another recent corruption saga that involved a $200 million rip-off from public coffers in 
a suspect gold export compensation scheme (Southall, 1999:96). The alleged 
involvement of very senior government officers in the Goldenberg scam has been a 
possible factor accounting for the long delay in the prosecution of the suspects. 
 
Corruption has also been rampant in the banking sector leading to a near fiscal crisis in 
the recent past. Several banks have collapsed due to malpractices and even the state 
owned banks such as the National Bank of Kenya only survived because of constant 
government intervention (Southall, 1999:105-106). Discussing institutional collapse, 
Himbara (1994:123-136) goes at length to show how key ministries such as the 
Ministries of Commerce and Industry and Finance were riddled with corruption and 
incompetence to a level of being unable to perform the most basic of functions. The 
same has extended to key state parastatals such as the Industrial and Commercial 
Development Corporation (ICDC), the Kenya Association of Manufacturers(KAM), the 
Kenya National Transport Company (KENATCO), and the Agricultural Finance 
Corporation (AFC) among others, some of which have already collapsed. 
 
Government response to widespread corruption has been lethargic and bordering on 
collusion. Establishing the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority  following pressure from  the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) to unravel and facilitate the 
prosecution of corrupt practices, the Government surprised many when in March 1999 it 
sacked the first ever director of the Authority, Mr Harun Mwau, ostensibly for taking to 
court top treasury officials without consulting the Finance Minister (by then Mr Nyachae 
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Simon) and the Attorney General. The Authority so far is yet to make its impression on 
Kenya (East African, 8th/14th September 1999). 
 
In an attempt to salvage the economy, the IMF and the WB intervened in the late 1980s 
imposing Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) (Himbara, 1994:152). The SAPs 
have called for accountability and transparency in the management of public affairs. In 
particular, SAP demands have included the trimming of public service personnel, the 
privatization of public parastatals, devaluation of the Kenyan shilling to reflect the true 
market value, liberalization of the market, and removal of exchange controls among 
others (Himbara, 1994:151; Southall, 1999:94-95). The Government response to SAPs 
implementation has been ambivalent, going through contradictory phases of 
indifference, acceptance and rejection at different times over the period. In response, 
the Bretton Woods institutions, unhappy with the Government progress, suspended 
foreign aid including the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) of $215 million 
in July 1997 (Himbara, 1994:151-154; Executive, December/January 1998; Southall, 
1999:94-95). One undeniable fact is that the suspension of aid further weakened the 
already emasculated state, forcing it to disengage from many of its traditional welfare 
responsibilities as well as denying the political elite access to resources for sustaining 
patron-client relations. 
 
3.2.2 Regime form in post-colonial Kenya 
For the better part of Kenya=s post-colonial history, the politics of authoritarianism have 
been the norm. Emerging from colonialism under a multi-party system dominated by the 
Kenya African National Union (KANU) and Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), 
the country became a de-facto one-party state by 1964. President Kenyatta through 
various machinations, convinced KADU to dissolve itself by 1964 leading to its entire 
leadership crossing over to KANU (Leys, 1976:212-214; Okumu, 1984:51-54; Oyugi, 
1994b:157-159). 
 
The dissolution of KADU, however, did not translate into a homogenous KANU. In 1966, 
the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU) was formed by radical elements within KANU who 
accused the Kenyatta government of being a tool in the service of neo-colonialism. But, 
 
 72 
as had been with KADU earlier, the Kenyatta government used the state=s coercive 
power to make the operations of KPU virtually impossible, ultimately banning it in 1969 
for the sake of Apublic security@, in the process bringing to a premature end the brief 
plural party politics era in Kenya (Oyugi, 1994b:160-163; Ochieng=, 1995:98-99). 
 
The Kenyatta regime, until his death in 1978, was marked by the concentration of power 
in the executive arm of the government through the many constitutional amendments 
such as: Act no. 28 of 1966 that vested more powers in the Head of State; Act no. 16 of 
1966 that increased powers vested in the presidency with regard to the civil service; Act 
no. 17 of 1966 that gave the president the powers of detention without trial under the 
Public Security Act; Act no. 45 of 1968 that changed the composition of the National 
Assembly by replacing the 12 specially elected members (elected by the 
parliamentarians) with 12 nominated members appointed by the president (see among 
others, Okumu,1984:59). It would thus not be far-fetched to argue that the Kenyatta 
regime was basically an authoritarian one anchored in the politics of personalization of 
power. However, the regime of president Moi beginning 1978, further entrenched the 
politics of authoritarianism and autocracy in Kenya. The years running into the early 
1990s were particularly marked by attempts to further consolidate executive power. For 
instance, the state became de-jure one-party in 1982 with the change of the constitution 
legally barring the formation of opposition parties (Okumu, 1984:65). As explained in 
chapter four, the regime to a large extent, could also be characterized as having been 
anti-civil society as witnessed by the draconian responses to civil society organizations 
and their activities especially in the pre-1990 period (Ogot, 1995b:196-200). 
 
External and internal pressure for change mounted on the Moi government as from the 
late 1980s. The regime eventually cracked in December 1991 with the repeal of section 
2A of the Kenya constitution allowing plural party politics. Earlier, the government had 
acceded to other demands including the restoration of the security of tenure of the 
Attorney General, the Chief Justice and other senior civil servants (Ogot, 1995b:243). 
 
Whereas the re-introduction of plural party politics appreciably expanded the state=s 
tolerance to civil liberties, for instance, the abolition of detention without trial and the 
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draconian and outdated Chiefs Act (Executive, Dec/Jan 1998), there is still a long way 
to go especially as concerns the taming of executive powers in relation to the other 
organs of the state. It is in this context that the political struggles have centred on 
constitutional change since the early 1990s (Southall, 1999:101-105). Realizing the 
potential for radical change implicit in constitutional reform as it relates to the dominant 
power of the KANU government, it has not been surprising that the state has resorted to 
the employment of frustrating delay tactics as the 2002 national elections approach. 
 
3.2.3 The nature of the state apparatus in post-colonial Kenya 
The state apparatus, as represented by the bureaucracy, has expanded considerably 
although retaining the structural and functional trappings of the colonial state. Relying 
on the state for accumulation purposes, the ruling class of the post-colonial state made 
deliberate efforts to control the bureaucracy, as was evidenced in the placement of the 
Provincial Administration (PA) in the Office of the President in the early years following 
independence (Swainson, 1980:183).  
 
Africanization of the bureaucracy constituted a key agenda for the newly independent 
state. However, Africanization, as observed by Himbara (1994:116-117), generated 
negative consequences for the young state as a result of the ejection of skilled foreign 
personnel and its replacement with  relatively young inexperienced officials. The state, 
was as a result, forced to rely on expatriate labour in services requiring highly skilled 
labour. 
 
The Ndegwa Commission of 1971 was constituted in an attempt to reform the 
bureaucracy from being an instrument of control to that of development. Among the 
recommendations made and adopted by the state was allowing civil servants to own 
private business along their public duties and responsibilities. As was to be proved later, 
this recommendation not only served to destroy the public work ethic of the bureaucracy 
but also culminated in major corruption scandals threatening the stability and functioning 
of the entire state apparatus (Hyden, 1984:116; Himbara, 1994:122-123). 
 
Anangwe (1994:83-85) has identified the various roles the bureaucracy is expected to 
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play. These have included: implementation of public policies, programmes and projects; 
the collection of public revenue; the maintenance of law and order; and mobilization of 
people to appreciate public services and goods. Referring to Kenya and the other East 
African sta tes, Anangwe (1994:93-94) argues some of the factors explaining poor 
performance by the bureaucracy have included: 
(a) The breakdown of the systems of control and discipline. 
(b) Poor work ethics, which sacrifice the public good at the alter of private interest. 
(c) Recruitment on the basis of ethnicity and patronage rather than on qualifications and 
skills. 
Anangwe (1994:93) concludes that, AThe principles of administrative efficiency and 
instrumental rationality may not be functioning; instead many of these organizations are 
in a chaotic state requiring surgical reforms if they have to become bureaucratized or 
else they will continue to symbolize a miscarriage of bureaucratization.@ 
 
But if the central government as represented by the bureaucracy has failed to perform 
adequately as a development tool, the same can be said of local authorities under the 
Ministry of Local Government. Local authorities in Kenya trace their history to the 
colonially-created Local Native Councils. Local authorities are meant to provide an array 
of basic services such as pre-primary and primary level education, health, housing, 
water and sewerage disposal and construction (ALGAK, June 1994). 
 
Many local authorities countrywide are in a near state of collapse. Political reasons have 
included the excessive control of local authorities by the central government thereby 
rendering them mere appendages. It has also been argued that erosion of local 
authorities= resource base has led them to be highly dependent upon grants and loans 
from central government. Other reasons given to account for the poor performance of 
local authorities include administrative ones such as their inability to levy a sufficient 
array of taxes, inability to effectively collect taxes, and overemployment of staff that 
more often than not is poorly qualified (Southall and Wood, 1996; Southall, 2000a). 
Wallis (1990, 1994) has argued that the implementation of the District Focus for Rural 
Development (DFRD) strategy in Kenya in the early 1980s served to further marginalise 
the role of local authorities. This was because the key player in the DFRD strategy is the 
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central bureaucracy consisting of the provincial administration and the technical 
ministries. By requiring that all local authorities= development project proposals be 
approved by the District Development Committee of the DFRD before any 
implementation, the central government had succeeded in further controlling local 
government and in the process eroding its autonomy (Wallis, 1990:443-449). The 
overall weakness and incapacity of local authorities to provide services at local level has 
in turn created more room for institutions such as NGOs to play in development. 
 
Summary and conclusion 
A critical examination of the Kenyan state points to a pattern of development with 
contradictions running through the imposition of the colonial state to the post-colonial 
period. The state, currently, seems to have fulfilled its historical mission of advancing 
and defending the interests of the political ruling class while subordinating the interests 
of the majority masses. 
 
Exploring the analysis of the state using Greenberg=s model of property relations, 
regime form and nature of state apparatus, the colonial state emerges as an agent of 
primitive capitalism sustained by primitive accumulation in the service of the 
metropolitan power in London and the settler economy. The politics of the colonial state 
were basically authoritarian to the extent that meaningful political participation was 
limited to the European community. Its establishment and consolidation had to rely on  
an elaborate state apparatus that was essentially coercive in nature to the extent that  it 
emphasized the function of law and order as a top priority. This mission of the colonial 
state=s bureaucracy does explain why it was more of a repressive organ other than 
developmental in nature. As a consequence, the Provincial Administration in charge of 
law and order, did overshadow the role of the technical branch of the bureaucracy in 
charge of development activities such as agriculture, health, education, among others. 
 
The eclipse of the colonial state in 1963 was facilitated by internal contradictions 
inherent in the state. Its development triggered the growth of a class society in Kenya 
essentially based on racial lines. Capital accumulation by the dominant white class 
increasingly occurred at the expense of the marginalized and impoverished indigenous 
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African community that eventually gave birth to the peasantry, the nascent proletariat 
and the petty bourgeoisie who eventually closed ranks in rejecting the colonial state 
project. 
 
However, as it were to turn out, this rejection of the colonial state was only as far as 
alien European rule was concerned. The emerging African petty bourgeoisie that 
eventually inherited the state project, retained in all entirety the structural framework of 
the colonial state in terms of property relations and the state apparatus. Although 
beginning with a heavy emphasis on statist economic strategies that gave the state a 
central role in the economy, eventually primitive accumulation of capital by the African 
bourgeoisie became the dominant mode. To facilitate its primitive accumulative role, the 
post-colonial state has increasingly relied on the state apparatus of the bureaucracy. 
And to defend the parasitic nature of the patrimonial ruling  class, the post-colonial state 
 developed extensive coercive and repressive institutions and thus the politics of 
authoritarianism. 
 
Kenya=s primitive capitalism has accelerated the decline of the state. Rather than rely on 
production for its accumulation, the political ruling class has utilized its control of the 
state to amass wealth. For a long time, over-dependent on foreign aid for its survival, 
the freezing of foreign aid in the 1990s by bilateral and multi-lateral organizations in 
protest at the corrupt nature of the ruling class, has accelerated the decline of the post-
colonial state. Desperate for survival, the dominant political class has reluctantly 
embraced the conditionalities of the donors in the hope of aid flow resumption. 
 
The weakening of the Kenyan state and the almost collapse of key institutions has 
rendered it virtually impotent in the delivery of social services even at its very bare 
minimum. With the declining state coffers, even the elaborate patron-client network 
developed over time, seems to be failing to deliver. In response, the state in many ways 
has chosen the path of withdrawal and disengagement from societal demands through 
the adoption of strategies that involve an overall shrinkage in terms of its intervention in 
development. The policy of cost-sharing, in place since 1988, where individuals and 
communities share the cost of development responsibilities with the government 
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(Republic of Kenya, 1997:135), is but an example of the state=s disengagement. The 
state=s gradual withdrawal and overall incapacity to spearhead the process of 
development, has in turn widened the development space for non-state actors. Equally 
important, a sizeable NGO and civil society sector has increasingly confronted the 
authoritarian state with a view of opening up the political space. This has especially 
occurred in the light of the fact that formal political organizations such as political parties 
that ought to challenge the authoritarian regime are thoroughly weakened and therefore 
incapable of meaningful opposition. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
4.0 THE DEVELOPMENT OF NGOs IN KENYA 
 
The modern roots of the NGO, and in general the voluntary sector in Kenya, can be 
traced to the early colonial period. Having modest beginnings largely in the form of 
missionary organizations, the voluntary sector gradually expanded to include African 
welfare organizations and protest movements. With the eclipse of the colonial state, the 
voluntary sector was to witness a rapid growth not only in terms of NGO membership 
but also functional diversity. 
 
4.1 NGOs, civil society, and the colonial state 
The establishment of mission-based organizations in Kenya in the early 20th century 
provided a strong basis for the  growth of the voluntary sector. Some of the earliest of 
such organizations included the Church Missionary Society (CMS), Africa Inland 
Mission (AIM), the Church of Scotland (CSM), and the United Methodist Mission (UMM) 
(Nottingham and Rosberg, 1966:106-107). The missions were established ostensibly for 
the evangelization of the >native=. In evangelizing the African, the mission-based 
organizations introduced Western education through the establishment of mission 
schools. In addition, the mission organizations set up small hospitals to administer 
health care, a good example being the CSM which established among others, mission 
hospitals in Kikuyuland at Tumutumu, Kikuyu, and Chogoria (Nottingham and Rosberg, 
1966:107). Sabar-Friedman (1997:28) has observed that on the eve of Kenya=s 
independence in 1963, 90% of the schools were connected to one or the other of the 
churches. He further argues that the same applied to health services, vocational training 
and welfare services. 
 
However, stiff opposition to African customs and generally, way of life, by some of the 
mission organizations, bred African resistance to what the missions stood for. 
Nottingham and Rosberg (1966:113) note: 
From 1923 onward, however, the Kikuyu increasingly began to question 
missionary motives and objectives, no longer taking this authority for 
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granted. The need to abandon Kikuyu customs, in particular the 
circumcision of girls, in order to become or remain a  true Christian, began 
to be challenged. The KCA stood as a champion of Kikuyu cultural 
nationalism; its members did not seek the rejection of Christianity, but the 
preservation of selected aspects of Kikuyu culture. Indeed, it seemed to 
them that it was not Christianity which was in danger but Kikuyu culture, 
as the process of modernization deepened and spread across their 
country. There was a growing demand by the Kikuyu for a more selective 
approach to social change. But such a demand implied a direct challenge 
to the cultural assumptions of the colonial state, which had always 
proclaimed as its mission the imposition of western Christian civilization in 
Kenya. 
 
The emergence of the Independent Schools Movement in Kenya from the late 1920s 
was indeed an open protest against mission dominance over education. Independent 
schools were to a large extent established to defend African culture and customs in the 
face of mission and state assaults. In pressurising for the establishment of such schools 
many African communities declined to enrol in mission schools. As argued by Tignor 
(1976:262), Amany of these schools (mission) had to be closed for lack of attendance 
since the dissident communities would not allow their children to be taught by mission 
teachers who had taken a vow against the practice of female circumcision.@ The 
independent schools were grouped into two organizations in Central Kenya by the mid-
1930s: the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association and the Kikuyu Karinga, founding 
schools such as Githunguri and Gakarara (Nottingham, 1966:126-127; Tignor, 
1976:270; Bogonko, 1992:6). However, the decision by Africans to start independent 
schools was reached long after their petition to the colonial state to establish  
government schools failed. Africans were convinced that the education offered by the 
mission schools was not only against African cultures but also inferior in quality. There 
was thus, a felt need for secular education that would be more relevant to African needs 
and customs ( Bogonko, 1992:6 ). 
 
In addition to independent schools, Africans established independent churches such as 
the African Orthodox Church, the African Independent Pentecostal Church, Dini Ya 
Musambwa, the Nomiya  Luo Church, the African Israeli Church Nineveh, the African 
Divine Church, the African Church of Holy Spirit and the African Interior Church (Tignor, 
1976:270; Amutabi, 1992:5-6). Just like the independent schools, independent churches 
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symbolised African resistance to alien culture and traditions while extolling the virtues of 
African customary practices. Long established African practices such as polygamy were 
at the heart of African rebellion to mission-based churches. For example, the founder of 
Dini Ya Musambwa in Western Kenya, Elijah Masinde, advocated a return to polygamy, 
and in rebelling against his mission church, married a second wife. Masinde later 
stormed the Kibabii Catholic Mission and demanded the expulsion of the white 
missionaries. For his rebellious actions, he was arrested in 1948 and deported to Lamu 
while his church was banned (Amutabi, 1992:7). However, it should be noted that  the 
independent churches also acted as African nationalism forums by articulating 
grievances of the colonized. In Central Province, the African Independent Pentecostal 
Church of Africa was essentially a protest organization decrying the Europeanization of 
education, land alienation and excessive taxation of the indigenous people (Nottingham 
and Rosberg, 1966). Commenting on the role of independent churches in Western 
Kenya, Lonsdale (1970:589) observes: 
Among the Luo and the Luyia people of the old Nyanza Province, western 
Kenya, memories of African resistance to the imposition of colonial rule 
have been the property not of the political associations but of the popular 
religious cults and independent churches. In preserving these legends the 
independent churches buttressed their prophetic and radical role by 
emphasizing the identity of the ordinary illiterate men and women of the 
countryside who had gained least from the colonial situation. 
 
The formation of  African welfare associations in virtually all corners of Kenya signified a 
further consolidation of African protest to colonialism. The Kikuyu Central Association 
(KCA) was among the earliest to be formed. Founded in 1924 under the leadership of 
Joseph Kang=ethe, it sought to champion the interests of the Kikuyu community. Among 
its demands were: the need to have African representation in the Legislative Council, 
safeguards for African land, the abolition of the Kipande, and greater government 
spending for African welfare (Tignor, 1976:238-240; Maxon, 1989:100). Jomo Kenyatta, 
Kenya=s first president, was later to become its secretary in 1928 and editor to its 
newspaper Mwigwithania. Published monthly, the newspaper detailed the KCA 
activities, including its members= grievances.  
 
The Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Association (KTWA) was yet another important 
organization formed initially in the early 1920s as the Young Kavirondo Association 
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(YKA). Operating largely in Nyanza, the KTWA demanded the colonial state improve the 
socio-economic status of Africans as well as having them represented on the legislative 
council (Lonsdale, 1970:599-637; Kanogo, 1989:130; Maxon, 1989:101-102). Other 
associations in the pre-World War two period included: the Ukamba Members 
Association (UMA) formed in 1938 to protest the colonial state=s policy of de-stocking 
the Akamba people=s cattle; the Taita Hills Association (THA); and the Young Nyika 
Association (YNA) (Kanogo, 1989:113; Maloba, 1989: 184). 
 
The Kenya African Union (KAU) emerged in 1944 as the successor of KCA and had 
clearly national political ambitions. It called for African political representation, land 
reform, improved economic opportunities, and ultimately political independence (Zeleza, 
1989:168). KAU was to be succeeded by the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and 
the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) in 1960 as national political organizations 
following the colonial state=s lifting of the ban upon the formation of African national 
political organizations. 
 
A close assessment of the colonial state would point to the fact that it had contradictory 
relations with civil society organizations. Whereas, for instance, it allied more with 
missionary organizations, it was extremely repressive in dealing with African 
organizations and social movements. This was essentially because the mission 
organizations tended to share with the colonial state a paternalistic attitude towards the 
colonized that depicted them as inferior beings incapable of self-organization and 
management. In challenging these flawed assumptions, it was inevitable that  Africans 
would attract the wrath of the colonial state and its allies. As early as 1922, the colonial 
state banned the East African Association (EAA) and detained its leader, Harry Thuku, 
for radical agitation against the colonial policies of forced labour, low wages and high 
taxation (Maxon, 1989:79-81). In 1940, the THA, UMA, and KCA were all proscribed, 
whilst in 1952, KAU was banned ostensibly for fanning unrest against the colonial state. 
This was to be followed by a declaration of a state of emergency with the arrest of 187 
KAU leaders including Kenyatta (Maloba, 1989:185-189; Zeleza, 1989:167-168).  It is 
important to note that despite the colonial state=s harassment, and in some situations, 
emasculation of these African organizations, nevertheless they constituted an important 
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stage in the making of the voluntary sector. 
  
4.2 NGOs and civil society in post-colonial Kenya 
Civil society, and in particular the NGO sector, has undergone fundamental changes in 
post-colonial Kenya. As in the period of colonialism, the state has played a central role 
in defining the direction of the voluntary sector especially as relates to its vibrancy. But 
one thing that is also certain is the fact that NGOs and civil society have increasingly 
taken on important tasks in society, and have in their own different ways equally 
influenced the nature and character of the post-colonial state. Emerging from 
colonialism, the young state was bedevilled with many development problems which 
could not be matched by its scarce resources. It is partly for this reason that NGOs and 
the voluntary sector, with the encouragement of the state, took on largely a 
developmental role during the greater period of the Kenyatta era (1964-1978). However, 
during the Moi regime, beginning from 1978, many NGOs and civil society movements 
have taken on an added role of political activism and advocacy. It can be argued that 
the excessive authoritarianism and personalization of power by the Moi regime partly 
explains the engagement of these organizations in oppositional politics and overall 
political advocacy. However, it is also significant to acknowledge the role of the 
international community in empowering civil society, through funding, to confront the 
Kenyan state on matters of political space.   
 
The involvement of NGOs in direct political confrontation with the state seems to be 
predicated on certain variables. These include: 
(a) The amount of resources an NGO can command in financial and material terms. The 
richer an NGO then the higher the chances of its mounting and sustaining a 
confrontation with the state. The assumption here is that such an NGO has an 
autonomous source of funding independent from state control. This is because 
autonomy from  state funding provides such an NGO the opportunity to escape the 
patron-client relationship network and therefore the possibilities of being compromised. 
In addition, well resourced NGOs have a greater option of diverting any extra funds to 
other areas that may not be core to their central functions, say for instance, 
development. 
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(b) The area of activity concentration, whether rural or urban. NGOs in urban areas are  
more exposed to sources of funding (mainly foreign) compared to those in rural areas. 
At the same time, urban NGOs, through the modern electronic media, tend to have a 
greater access to information pertaining to the daily state and government activities and 
therefore enabling them  keep pace with current affairs and develop a more politicised 
agenda in relation to the state. 
(c) The nature of NGO leadership. NGOs led by anti-establishment leaders as opposed 
to those that are pro-establishment tend to be more radical and oppositional to the state. 
Furthermore, NGOs led by the educational elite are more likely to take an oppositional 
stand to the state due to their higher ability and capacity to comprehend complex 
agendas including state propaganda. 
 
The characterization of NGOs in terms of their level of resources, area o f operation, and 
nature of leadership is likely to give a clue as to why NGOs involved actively with state 
confrontation, and generally political activism, have been concentrated in urban areas, 
especially Nairobi. On the contrary, NGOs that tend to play a politics of collaboration 
and are therefore pro-state and are more developmental are to be found largely in the 
rural areas. In the lead up to the 1997 General Elections, the Weekly Review (13th 
December, 1996) while commenting on NGOs= efforts to have a single opposition 
presidential candidate, made an interesting observation that would seem to support this 
study=s NGO typology: 
Most of the so-called organized civil society are no more than urban-
based NGOs....They are organizations that have been created to tap 
donor funds and which are consultancies but in name. Often referred to 
as the >human rights community=, they are run by a small clique of 
individuals, most of whom are lawyers operating as a cartel and serving 
on nearly all the boards of the so-called civil rights advocacy 
organizations. Indeed, Nairobi is today littered with these type of 
institutions. 
 
Although this depiction of NGOs is rather harsh in terms of how genuine they are in the 
process of change, for there are many examples in the analysis of NGOs genuinely 
involved in the political transformation of society, it is a useful guide in terms of NGO 
typology.  
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The next analysis focuses on the regimes of Kenyatta and Moi and how each one of 
them has influenced the growth and role of NGOs and civil society in Kenya. Within the 
discussion, it is hoped that a further elucidation of the NGO typology shall be done. 
 
 
4.2.1 The Kenyatta era: a period of relative expansion in the voluntary sector 
As earlier stated, the 1960s and 1970s represented a unique phase in Kenya=s history, 
for like many other African states emerging from colonialism, she had to grapple with 
the contradictions of development generated by the colonial state. Some of the burning 
development questions revolved around political equality, social justice, freedom from 
want, and the provision of equal economic opportunities as laid out in Sessional Paper 
No. 10 of 1965 (Republic of Kenya, 1965). Accepting the enormity of the development 
problem, the government actively encouraged self-help efforts in the generation of 
development noting that, AIn a country short of resources every method that increases 
the allocation of resources to development must be utilized. Self-help in Kenya has 
strong roots in African traditions and has therefore important potential for development@ 
(Republic of Kenya, 1965:36). This was to mark an important beginning in the role of 
harambee (Swahili word for self-help) in Kenya=s development process. Being  
voluntary, harambee became part and parcel of the voluntary sector activities in Kenya. 
 
Harambee literally implied the pulling together of resources such as cash, labour, and 
materials for community projects. Its significance can be gleaned from the fact that in 
the period 1970-74 peoples= harambee contributions in cash and kind amounted to K8.5 
million pounds rising to K28million pounds in the period 1979-83 (Republic of Kenya, in 
Nairobi  Law Monthly, January 1991:29). Total nominal value of harambee projects 
1965-84 was Ksh 160million, accounting for 11.8% of the gross fixed capital formation 
(Daily Nation, in, Nairobi Law Monthly, January, 1991:29). 
 
As a development strategy, harambee has been given varying interpretations. Seen in 
the light of patron-client relations, it acted as a forum through which the peasants could 
extract resources from the centre in exchange for providing the elite patrons with 
political support (Ng=ethe, 1979:344-345; Holmquist, 1984:174-179; Barkan and 
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Holmquist, 1986:1; Barkan, 1992:177). However, we have also had those interpretations 
that cast harambee as a state attempt to tax the peasants to support their own 
development (Barkan and Holmquist, 1986:4). Both interpretations  are credible. As for 
extracting resources from the centre, the peasants utilised the local elite in return for 
political support, for self-help gave the only viable opening for the local elite to compete 
and capture the scarce political positions. This, to some degree, explains why harambee 
activities were on the increase around general election periods. As for harambee being 
a form of tax on the peasants, this could be justified in the context of  a newly 
independent state facing a scarcity of resources for development. As aptly put by 
Holmquist (1984:177), ATo this extent the government of Kenya saw self-help as 
development >on the cheap=@. 
 
Despite its seeming success, harambee experienced a number of bottlenecks. It has 
been argued that recurrent expenditure implications were ignored with communities 
concentrating on the construction of projects rather than their maintenance leading to 
their collapse (Wallis, 1982:13; Holmquist, 1984:182). There was also the problem of 
over concentration by communities on social projects at the expense of productive 
capital investment in areas such as agriculture (Holmquist, 1984:177-178). The 
harambee movement was also, in some situations, subjected to abuse by mainly the 
Provincial Administration when it was made into a compulsory contribution, thus 
contradicting the constitutional requirement safeguarding private property (The Nairobi 
Law Monthly, January, 1991:30). Furthermore, there were several incidents of recorded 
mismanagement and embezzlement of harambee funds by the political and 
bureaucratic elite, thus negatively affecting the credibility of the movement (The Nairobi 
Law Monthly, January, 1991:29). 
 
In addition to the voluntary nature of self-help, many NGOs, both formal and community-
based organizations, were rapidly expanding their activities and numbers in the country. 
By 1978, there were over 135 formal NGOs increasing to 287 by 1988, representing a 
220% growth (KNCSS, in Kanyinga, 1990:109-110). Writing in 1994, Ndegwa showed 
the number had gone up further to approximately 400-600 (Ndegwa, 1994:23). By 1998, 
NGOs registered with the NGO Council were estimated to be over 1000 (Daily Nation, 
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November, 20th 1999). Community-based organizations (essentially self-help NGOs), 
have also been increasing rapidly and were estimated to number approximately 20,000 
- 25,000 by 1991  (Ng=ethe, 1991:14). Women=s groups, the main focus in the self-help 
NGO category, have had a steady rise increasing from 2,805 groups with a membership 
of 126,150 in 1972, to 8,225 groups with a membership of 326,375 in 1978, to over 
15,0000 groups with 550,000 members by 1985 (Chitere, 1994:148). 
 
The Kenyatta era (1964-1978) is thus credited with creating a strong base for the 
voluntary sector in Kenya through the government=s NGO open door policy (see among 
others, Barkan, 1992). However, it is important to note that most NGOs operating in 
Kenya were largely involved in development activities as opposed to political activism. 
Active criticism of the Kenyatta regime remained largely limited to university academics 
and the radical student body of the University of Nairobi (SONU). As earlier argued, the 
developmental role of NGOs and of the voluntary sector as a whole could be attributed 
to the deliberate attempt by the Kenyatta regime of encouraging them to act as 
supplements to his government in the development process. However, more important 
was the fact that his regime made no deliberate consistent effort to emasculate NGOs 
and civil society. 
 
4.2.2 The Moi regime: a turbulent era in state - civil society relations 
The death of Kenyatta in 1978 opened the way for Moi to take over as the President of 
Kenya. Exploiting his experience as a long-term  serving vice-president of Kenyatta, he 
was elected unopposed as the President in the 1979 one-party elections. From then 
onwards, Moi took all possible measures to entrench his regime, in the process 
transforming Kenya into a fully authoritarian state. 
 
The first major action of Moi=s regime in entrenching itself was through the 1982 
constitutional change that made the state a de jure one-party system and thus legally 
barring the formation of opposition political parties that could provide an alternative to 
KANU  (Okumu, 1984:65; Adar, 1998:79). This constitutional change passed rapidly 
through parliament in record time, for no member of parliament could dare oppose it 
without risking expulsion from the party and consequently from parliament. Yet it was to 
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a large extent a reflection of the insecurity of the regime. In 1979, for instance, Oginga 
Odinga and George Anyona, having been expelled from KANU, had threatened to form 
an opposition party, the Kenya National Socialist Alliance (KNSA) (Barkan, 1992:180; 
Adar, 1998:80). In 1982 there was an attempted military coup by the Kenya Air force 
which shook the regime to its knees resulting in a major crackdown on >dissidents=. 
 
The declaration of Kenya as a de jure one-party state was thus the initial step in the 
centralization of power by the Moi regime. Many acts of brutalization and abuse of 
power by the regime were soon to follow. The practice of detention without trial was 
perfected and utilized against those leaders seen as anti-Moi. No open criticism of the 
regime=s policies was allowed. The critical press was harassed into self-censorship, as 
noted by Barkan (1992:180). For all intents and purposes, Kenya had become virtually a 
police state. More constitutional changes were soon to follow with the implication of 
power consolidation in the hands of the regime. For instance, Act no.14 of 1986 had the 
effect of removing the security of tenure of the Attorney General and the Controller and 
Auditor General. This was to be followed by Act no.50 of 1988 that equally removed the 
security of tenure of judges and members of the Public Service Commission (Nairobi 
Law Monthly, April/May, 1991). Such tampering with the independence of the judiciary  
made nonsense of the constitutional requirement for the separation of the three 
branches of government, the executive, the judiciary, and the legislature. 
 
The introduction of the queue-voting electoral system in 1988, marked a radical 
departure from the established secret-ballot system. In this new system, voters were 
expected to line behind their choice of candidates (Barkan, 1992:182). This system was 
widely criticized for encouraging rigging and fraud in favour of the president=s 
candidates. As Adar (1998:80) notes,@The queue-voting system not only removed the 
independence and the rights of the electorates, but it also set the stage for greater 
interference in the elections by the presidency.@ This electoral system, was in a sense, 
the height of vulgarization of power by the Moi regime. 
 
4.2.2.1 The response of NGOs and civil society to the regime=s authoritarianism,    
          1978-1991  
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In view of the fact that the regime of Moi had become authoritarian and personalized, 
and there being no formal political organizations to provide checks and balances, NGOs 
and civil society became the only alternative voice. These included organizations such 
as the Law Society of Kenya (a professional lawyers= body),  the Students= Organization 
of Nairobi University (SONU), the University (of Nairobi) Staff Union, and the churches.  
However, equally harassed by the state, most of the NGOs ended up taking a low 
profile in the confrontation with the state. However, the most active of the NGOs in 
criticizing the state were the churches. 
 
If most of the churches ended up becoming the harshest and most fearless critics of the 
state during this period, it is because the regime found it difficult to crack down on them 
bearing in mind their large constituency and the fact that most of them had elaborate 
international and foreign links (Sabar-Friedman, 1997:29). Equally important in 
explaining the firm commitment of the churches to change was their strong belief in their 
social calling. As put by one cleric: 
The absence of other organizations of a political nature (eg. political 
parties) that can confront the excesses of the state means that the church 
is the only nationwide body which because of its institutional strength and 
its sense of obligation for public morals and social justice can speak and 
act in implicitly political ways. The social evils of our time (eg. corruption, 
political patronage in employment, interference of the state with basic 
human freedoms, electoral rigging, detention without trial, torture, gagging 
of the press etc.) are so great...that Christians with any compassion 
cannot be indifferent to or complacent about the effects of such evils upon 
human lives in Kenya. (The Nairobi Law Monthly, cited in, Sabar-
Friedman, 1997:30).  
 
Among the leading church organizations which criticized the state were the National 
Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), which is an umbrella body of protestant 
churches in Kenya, the Anglican Church (Church of the Province of Kenya-CPK), the 
Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA), and the Catholic Church. Through fora such 
as pulpit sermons, radio broadcasts, the daily national newspapers, newsletters and 
publications as well as national conferences, these churches confronted the state on 
wide-ranging issues including corruption, authoritarianism, state instigated violence and 
political assassinations of leading government critics. Salient examples where the 
church was in the forefront in challenging the state include its criticism of the 1986 
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queue-voting system. Teaming up, 1,200 Protestant and Catholic priests signed a press 
release strongly objecting to the new electoral system pointing out that it would not only 
diminish confidence in the rectitude of the electoral system but also expose voters to 
violence from powerful politicians. To wrap up their protest, they threatened to boycott 
the 1988 elections in case the new system was not called off by the state (Sabar-
Friedman, 1997:33-34). The churches also called for a national debate on the future of 
Kenya termed >The Kenya We Want=. This was essentially in response to the many ills 
confronting the society but attributed to the state, and in particular, the draconian nature 
of KANU, the ruling party (Sabar-Friedman, 1997:35). The use of state violence on 
unarmed citizens was a key example of these ills. The eviction of slum dwellers in 
Nairobi and Mombasa in 1990 by the government was one incident which attracted the 
wrath of the church following the excessive use of brutality by the Government (Sabar-
Friedman, 1997:37-38). These churches also played a pivotal role in criticizing and 
exposing the role of the state in what came to be known as ethnic clashes in the 
1991/1992 period. Accusing the government of being the instigator of these politically-
motivated clashes, the CPK, NCCK, the PCEA, and the Catholic churches called on the 
government to arrest and try the culprits responsible while threatening to resort to civil 
disobedience if the government failed to stop the massacres (Sabar-Friedman, 
1997:39). Many analysts were convinced the clashes were a government ploy to derail 
the 1992 multi-party General Elections and ensure that KANU remain in power (Adar, 
1998:83). This was especially so considering that the president, in opposing plural party 
politics, had initially argued multi-partyism would lead to ethnic wars. It is important to 
note that the leading churches that confronted the Government had very able 
leadership, not only highly educated in theology, but also very articulate on socio-
economic affairs. They included CPK Bishops such as Henry Okullu, Alexander Muge, 
and David Gitari as well as Rev. Timothy Njoya (Presbyterian) and Rt. Rev. Ndingi 
Mwana a=Nzeki (Roman Catholic). 
 
However, not all the churches were demanding change. A few of them retained very 
close ties with the regime and more often than not were used by the state to counter the 
critics of the Government. Examples of such churches included the African Inland 
Church and the Legio Maria (Sabar-Friedman, 1997:26). These pro-state churches, 
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unlike the radical churches, were: small in size in terms of both following and level of 
operations; mainly operational in rural areas as opposed to urban areas; and had a 
limited resource base as well as international connections. 
 
In the late 1980s, as domestic and international pressure increased on Moi=s regime to 
democratize and open up political space, other civil society organizations started joining 
the forces of change, and in the process solidifying the role of the church in confronting 
the state. Former vice-president Oginga Odinga, in a March 1991 solo move, while 
criticizing the state for authoritarianism, announced the formation of an opposition party, 
the National Democratic Party (NDP). This was in total disregard of the de jure one-
party state status of Kenya. Its objectives, according to Odinga, included the repeal of 
section 2A of the constitution making Kenya a de jure one-party state and the 
restoration of democracy and justice in Kenya. Surprised at this unprecedented show of 
defiance, the state adamantly refused to register the NDP (Nairobi Law Monthly, March, 
1991, December, 1991).   
 
But this was just the beginning of open challenges to the state by NGOs and other civil 
society organizations in addition to the church. The election of Paul Muite as the 
chairman of the Law Society of Kenya (LSK) in 1991 pushed the organization into a 
confrontational stance with the state. Interpreting the functions of the organization to be 
both legal and political, Muite appealed to the Government to register Odinga=s NDP: 
AUnder my chairmanship, your society will endeavour to work with the Government and 
the judiciary but not, and I repeat not, at the expense of compromising on issues of 
principle....Let us not live in the shackles of the past inhibited by views that speaking out 
on important public issues is politics. If it is, so be it. It is squarely within the objects of 
the Law Society as spelt out in the fairly wide language employed in the Law Society of 
Kenya Act....Let me conclude by calling on the Kenya Government ...to register 
Jaramogi Odinga=s National Democratic Party@ (Nairobi Law Monthly, March 1991). 
Previously, in the late 1980s, the LSK under the leadership of G. B. M. Kariuki, had also 
harshly criticised the state for the removal of the security of tenure of judges as 
unconstitutional and a threat to democracy (Nairobi Law Monthly, October 1991). 
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The formation of the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) in August 1991 
was yet another effort by civil society to respond to Moi=s authoritarianism. Spearheaded 
by Oginga and five other leading opposition politicians, FORD described itself as a 
pressure group rather than a political party. The catch was that at this time the 
Government was unwilling to register any other party apart from KANU, as had been in 
the case of the NDP. At the same time, not to risk the Government=s requirement of 
registration of groups as societies before they could operate legally (which would have 
been denied in the case of FORD for being anti-government), FORD deliberately 
insisted on a six-man membership instead of the minimum ten as required under the 
Societies= Act for a group to be registered as a society. Thus FORD began to operate 
neither as a political party nor a society but as a lobby of six government critics and thus 
managed to escape the state=s tentacles of control. Amongst its objectives were the 
review of the constitution to: abolish detention without trial, restore multi-party politics in 
Kenya, and limit the presidential tenure to two terms of five years each (Nairobi Law 
Monthly, August 1991, December, 1991). FORD, essentially a populist lobby group 
which had relied largely on the radical press to market its ideas in confronting the state, 
converted itself into a political party on the repeal of section 2A of the constitution in 
December 1991 allowing for the formation of opposition political parties. 
 
Even with the entry of other civil society organizations in the battle for democracy, the 
church continued to play a pivotal role. The Justice and Peace Convention - Kenya 
(JPC) came into existence in 1991 and was an alliance of the Justice and Peace 
Commission of the Church of the Province of Kenya, the Justice, Peace and 
Reconciliation Commission of the NCCK, and the LSK. The JPC, whose objective was 
to see to it that justice and peace is reestablished in a democratic Kenya, was led by a 
powerful steering committee consisting of Bishop Henry Okullu of the CPK and Muite, 
chairman of the LSK. Through sessions of prayers carried out nationally, the 
organization hoped to bring about change by enlightening people on their rights and 
responsibilities as free citizens. But these prayer sessions hardly took off with the state 
threatening severe consequences for those attending since in the government=s 
perception, the JPC had been converted into a vehicle of organized opposition (Nairobi 
Law Monthly, December, 1991). 
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Yet another contribution of the church to Kenya=s reform process was through the 
formation of the Moral Alliance for Peace (MAP). Launched in October 1991 by Rev. 
Njoya of the CPK, it was essentially a pressure group consisting of five members (once 
again an at attempt to escape state requirement for registration as in the case of FORD) 
identified with opposition politics. The chief objective of MAP was, according to Rev. 
Njoya, to unite the various groups involved in change into an alliance so that they could 
forge democratic change together (Nairobi Law Monthly, November 1991, December, 
1991). 
 
Thus, as illustrated through the discussion in this section, the period up to 1991 
constituted a major politicization of NGOs and civil society in response to the increased 
authoritarianism of the Moi regime. In the absence of opposition parties, civil society, 
and in particular religious organizations, started playing a leading role in the game of 
change. The increased pressure on the state eventually resulted in the Moi regime 
scrapping section 2A of the constitution in December 1991 and thereby allowing plural 
party politics. Did the new political climate allowing for plural party politics lead to 
fundamental democratic change in Kenya? With opposition parties free to form and 
operate, did this diminish the role of NGOs and civil society in the game of change? 
 
4.2.2.2 A weak opposition and the role of NGOs and civil society in the post-1992  
            period 
Whereas the registration of FORD as a political party gave much hope that for the first 
time KANU=s monopoly of power would be seriously challenged, this was soon to prove 
to have been just but a dream. The split in the opposition ranks in Kenya meant there 
were several opposition parties competing with KANU over the presidency and the 
parliamentary seats come the 1992 multi-party elections. The original FORD 
disintegrated into two parties, FORD Kenya led by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, and FORD 
Asili led by Ken Matiba. The other parties, although relatively insignificant, still took a toll 
on the already fragile opposition unity. These included the Democratic Party led by 
Mwai Kibaki, the Kenya National Congress (KNC), Kenya Socialist Congress (KSC), 
Kenya National Democratic Alliance (KENDA), and the Party of Independent 
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Candidates of Kenya (PICK). The results of the 1992 elections gave KANU a paltry 
26.6% vote but 93 seats. The divided opposition shared amongst themselves a 
combined 73.4% of the vote with seats distributed as follows: FORD Kenya (31), FORD 
Asili (29), the Democratic Party (23), and the KSC, PICK, and KNC each with one 
member of parliament (International Update, 1993; Southall and Wood, 1996; Weekly 
Review, 14th November, 1997).  
 
The power of the opposition parties to challenge KANU was thus rendered extremely 
weak. Divisions based on tribal rather than ideological lines continued to afflict the 
parties preventing them in the end, from fielding a single presidential candidate against 
Moi of KANU. Indeed, the original FORD=s split began over rivalry between Odinga and 
Matiba in relation to who would have been the party=s presidential candidate. The 
splinter parties that emerged were very much based on ethnic lines, with FORD Kenya 
gaining its support mainly from the Luo and a faction of the Luhya, while FORD Asili had 
an overwhelming Kikuyu base and a minority Luhya support. The other key opposition 
party, the Democratic Party (DP), was essentially Kikuyu-based, thus splitti ng the 
Kikuyu vote even further (see, Finance, 6th September, 1996; Weekly Review, October 
10th, 1997). In the run up to the 1997 General Elections, differences among the existing 
opposition parties became even worse with Raila Odinga disembarking with the Luo 
from FORD Kenya to form a new splinter party, the National Development Party of 
Kenya (NDPK), while Ken Matiba quit FORD Asili, in the process giving birth to FORD 
People, following a protracted power struggle with Martin Shikuku (Weekly Review, 10th 
October, 1997). 
  
Whereas protracted power struggles within the opposition parties largely based on 
ethnic and in some instances personality clashes could explain the opposition debacle 
in the 1992 elections, for they eventually failed to present one candidate for the 
presidency, lack of emphasis on the need to effect the relevant constitutional changes 
left the playing field much in favour of KANU. For instance, the Electoral Commission, 
charged with the responsibility for the organization and conduct of elections, remained 
essentially a KANU organ. In addition, there was a lot of violence aimed at disrupting 
campaign rallies of the opposition, and the public mass media was deliberately made to 
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cover KANU more positively than the opposition parties= activities (Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 1993). 
 
It was amidst this scenario of a much weakened opposition, riddled with ethnic divisions, 
that NGOs and civil society once again became very much involved in the politics of 
change in Kenya following the 1992 General Elections. In the absence of a united and 
agenda-driven formal opposition, the mainly urban-based NGOs and civil society, like in 
the pre-1992 period, were thus once again set to play the role of confronting the state in 
search of meaningful constitutional and overall political change. 
 
Following the 1992 elections the opposition parties acknowledged the fact that their 
inability to unite was a major explanation of their poor showing in the elections. But in 
spite of this, they none the less failed to come up with a viable solution in time for the 
1997 elections. Some of the earliest attempts to identify a single opposition candidate to 
vie for the presidency against Moi came in December 1995. Launching what was to be 
an Opposition Alliance, 73 opposition MPs converged in Nairobi to identify a single 
candidate to stand against Moi. However, nothing spectacular came out of the meeting 
to indicate that the opposition leaders were serious, and that this time around they had 
managed to bury their differences. As noted by the Weekly Review (8th December, 
1995), 
By failing to name the single presidential candidate, the promoters of the 
initiative had cleverly avoided the acrimonies and controversies which 
would have inevitably followed. But in the process they also missed the 
political mileage that they would have achieved had they come out to 
announce that they had reached an agreement on the matter. 
 
Whereas the opposition parties saw in their uniting the only avenue to power, civil 
society and NGOs argued differently. For them, unlike the opposition, the issue of 
constitutional change was fundamental, for without it the 1992 defeat of the opposition 
by KANU would be repeated. The theme of constitutional review was later given much 
support by SAFINA, a newly formed political party but by then denied registration by the 
Government. It has been argued, and with much credibility, that the Government=s 
reluctance to register SAFINA in time for the 1997 elections was based on the supposed 
national image it had (unlike the other opposition parties with typically ethnic 
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constituencies) and access to a greater resource base due to its links with Richard 
Leakey, an internationally respected conservationist (Weekly Review, 10th October, 
1997). SAFINA, unlike the older opposition parties, in participating in one of the 
Opposition Alliance meetings in January 1996, insisted on the creation of a mass 
democratic movement that would create the conditions for free elections. At the core of 
SAFINA=s contribution was the issue of constitutional change that would involve many 
more players, that is, NGOs and civil society (Inter-Press Third World News Agency, 
2nd February, 1995). 
 
But what later developed as an agreement between the Opposition Alliance and the 
NGO sector represented by an umbrella organization, the Citizens Coalition for 
Constitutional Change (CCCC), over the need for constitutional reform through the 
convening of a national constitutional conference, also experienced major obstacles. 
Whereas the CCCC was in favour of the idea that the conference should include all the 
political players including KANU, the Opposition Alliance wanted KANU excluded. 
Furthermore, the CCCC felt that the Opposition Alliance was not wholly representative 
of the entire opposition, for it left out the other splinter opposition faction led by Ken 
Matiba. The fact that the CCCC had promised to fund the conference put the Opposition 
Alliance in a quandary. At the same time taking advantage of the CCCC position, the 
other opposition faction led by Matiba announced its declaration to lead the conference 
talks. The bottom line was the feeling that whatever faction of the opposition that led the 
talks would have made a major step in the power struggle (Weekly Review, 17th May, 
1996; 24th May, 1996). 
 
Beside the efforts of the CCCC, the church continued to participate in the process of 
political change. In March 1996, retired Bishop Okullu of the Anglican Church together 
with Njoya (PCEA), and Otiende (retired politician) formed a lobby group, the Forum of 
Democracy (FoD), whose main objective was the formation of a broad-based and 
reform-oriented government through the fielding of a single opposition presidential 
candidate against Moi. Asked why he opted to form FoD, Okullu (cited in, Weekly 
Review, 21st June, 1996) replied, 
Opposition unity has failed to take off; the Alliance=s self-destructed talk of 
a constitutional convention raised hopes, but that, too, appears to have 
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been still born. Attempts to democratise political parties have ended in 
acrimony, with factional leaders being reaffirmed as being just that, 
leaders of cliques and special interests, falling into the trap of KANU=s 
philosophy of divide and rule. Attempts by NGOs to create a unified 
opposition voice have been thwarted, and suspicion and doubt 
characterise the responses to all current efforts to find common ground. 
 
Okullu was right on his claims about opposition weaknesses. But it was not lost on 
observers that the founding of FoD at this time was very much the outcome of foreign 
funding, just like the many other civil society organizations involved in the politics of 
change in Kenya. Throughout 1995, a number of church leaders and members of the 
NGO sector, under the sponsorship of a German NGO, the Friedrich Naumman 
Foundation, met in Tanzania and Germany to brainstorm over the issue of fielding one 
presidential candidate against Moi. It was alleged that the idea of FoD was born and 
sponsored in these series of meetings (Weekly Review, 13th December, 1996). 
 
However, the question of a convention to review the constitution never went away even 
though the opposition factions were seemingly irreconcilable. The National Convention 
Assembly, held in Limuru in April 1997, consisting of virtually all the parties interested in 
constitutional change (except KANU), led to the birth of the National Convention 
Executive Council (NCEC), an essentially umbrella body of NGOs and civil society 
organizations geared for constitutional reform (Weekly Review, 25th, July 1999). The 
NCEC, very much a radical body and ready to use mass action to force KANU to the 
discussion table (led by lawyer Kivutha Kibwana, Kamau Kuria, and Rev. Njoya of the 
PCEA), found itself in alliance with the equally radical opposition parties= wing 
spearheaded by Matiba (formerly of FORD Asili), Muite, Orengo (both of FORD Kenya), 
and Raila (chairman, NDPK), in opposition to the so-called moderate opposition 
consisting of Wamalwa (chairman of FORD Kenya), Shikuku (secretary general of 
FORD Asili), and Kibaki (chairman of DP). While the NCEC and the radical opposition 
wing favoured a wholesale review of the constitution through a meeting of all parties 
with KANU, the moderates agreed with KANU over a >piecemeal= formulae involving 
meetings between KANU and individual opposition parties= leaders without involving  
civil society forces under the NCEC. Argued the moderates in relation to the NCEC, AWe 
can not expect KANU or the Government to negotiate with an unregistered and 
temporary lobby group instead of legitimate opposition political parties with the mandate 
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to represent the wishes of the people@ (Weekly Review, 25th July, 1997). 
 
In spite of  these differences between the radical and moderate wings of the opposition 
movement, the very fact that they all shared in the need for constitutional reform, 
regardless of the means, was enough pressure to make the KANU establishment agree 
to enter into constitutional talks. But it also marked the beginning by the opposition 
parties, now in agreement with KANU, to isolate the NCEC from the ultimate  
constitutional talks. Whereas the NCEC had maintained that it was necessary for it to 
attend the constitutional talks for purposes of guarding against KANU=s manipulation of 
a weakened and squabbling opposition parties= movement, it now became more evident 
that most of the opposition parties were becoming increasingly jealous of the limelight 
being enjoyed by NCEC (Weekly Review, 5th September, 1997). 
 
A couple of meetings between KANU and the opposition parties gave birth to the Inter-
Parties Parliamentary Group phenomenon (IPPG), which in essence, boiled down to a 
negotiation between the contending parties over what to review in the constitution 
before the 1997 elections could take place. In opting for the Inter-Parties Parliamentary 
Group (IPPG) to discuss the changes, KANU had succeeded in locking out the radical 
segments of civil society from the ultimate process. The results of the IPPG talks only 
went some way in resolving the administrative and constitutional impasse while leaving 
unaddressed some crucial issues. For instance, the requirement for licences for public 
rallies and gatherings was abolished, thus widening the scope for political association; 
the Preservation of Public Security Act was amended, abolishing detention without trial; 
it was agreed that the Provincial Administration remain impartial in matters to do with 
elections; and that all political parties would have equal coverage in the state owned 
media, among other changes. However,  the IPPG failed to address major issues to do 
with the enormous Presidential powers and  the imperfect electoral system (see among 
others, Adar, 1998:87; Executive, Dec/Jan. 1998; Ndegwa, 1998:202-205). The NCEC, 
in particular, dismissed the IPPG administrative and political reforms as too mild and 
cosmetic to guarantee a level playing field for all the political parties and the aspiring 
presidential candidates (see Weekly Review, 19th September, 1997; Southall, 
1999:101). 
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The results of the 1997 national elections probably confirmed the fears of NCEC. As a 
result of the many weaknesses resulting from the imperfect constitution, opposition 
divisions and their inability to field one presidential candidate against Moi, Moi reclaimed 
the presidency with 40% of the vote, and returned KANU to power scooping more than 
half of the parliamentary seats, that is 104 out of a total of 197 (Adar, 1998:88; Southall, 
1999:98). 
 
The post-1997 period has been characterised by further calls for constitutional review. 
NGOs and civil society organizations, like in the post-1992 period, began fuelling the 
process of change. In February 1998, for instance, the major churches issued a circular 
calling for the convening of a conference to reform the flawed constitution. The NCEC 
too, has been deeply involved in the constitutional reform calls. Threatening to resort to 
mass mobilization and civil disobedience to force the Government to adhere to the call 
for constitutional reforms, NCEC managed to convince the Government to go back to 
the issue of reforming the constitution. This may explain the Government=s decision in 
1999 to revive the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission Act of 1997, initially 
through a 25 member inter-party parliamentary committee (IPPC) (Southall, 1999:102). 
 
The subsequent meetings of the IPPC held at Safari Park Hotel, following the Attorney 
General=s assurance that the membership of the Review Commission would be 
expanded, saw the inclusion of among others, civil society organizations. Among these 
was the controversial NCEC. At the same time, the Safari Park meetings (1 and 2) 
resolved to replace the original IPPC with a constitution draft committee consisting of 
both members of parliament (from KANU and the opposition) and representatives of civil 
society for purposes of reviewing the 1997 Act. But more important, it was agreed that 
the review of the constitution would proceed via a Constitutional Review Commission 
and not a national convention as earlier demanded by NCEC (Southall, 1999:103). 
There were soon to follow other meetings, largely characterised by controversy and 
suspicion of the draft committee in what came to be termed as Safari Park 3 and Safari 
Park 4. Safari Park 3 provided the basis for agreement that the Constitutional Review 
Commission should be composed of 25 members, all having at least a university degree 
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and chosen from both civil society and the political parties. Safari Park 3 and 4, in a 
sense, provided the final basis for a Constitution of Kenya Review Bill which passed 
through parliament in October 1998 (Southall, 1999:105). As observed by Southall 
(1999:105), the Act was important in one main way: KANU had been compelled, in a 
sense, to accept a process that would be society or people-driven rather than political 
elite propelled (also see Southall, 2000b). 
 
But later developments rendered ineffective all that seemed to have been achieved in 
relation to the constitutional review process. This concerned a fundamental 
disagreement over the composition (membership numbers) of the Review Commission 
with opposition parties and civil society battling amongst themselves on the one hand, 
and with KANU on the other hand. Eventually, taking advantage of the disagreement, 
the KANU hardliners contributed to the stalling of the process by insisting on handing 
back the entire review process to parliament. Stiff resistance from the opposition parties 
and civil society, in particular NCEC and the churches, made the Moi government 
change its attitude and instead advance the argument that only the Act would be 
returned to parliament for further deliberation (Southall, 2000b:205). 
 
Since then, the acrimony over the constitutional review process has revolved around the 
demand by civil society and opposition parties (except the NDPK) that it be people-
driven, while the KANU hardliners, including Moi, have insisted it be parliament 
propelled. NGOs and civil society have thus come up with what they call the 
Ufungamano Initiative (meant to draw up their own version of the people=s constitution) 
in opposition to the Government process being worked out through Raila=s 
Parliamentary Constitution Select Committee (Daily Nation, 16th April, 2000). It is 
important to note that Raila=s party (NDPK) has since then entered into a de facto 
alignment with KANU and therefore considerably boosting the strength of the ruling  
party in parliament. However, civil society and NGOs, in particular NCEC, have 
threatened to form a parallel government using civil disobedience in case the Moi 
government refuses to accept a people -driven constitutional process (Daily Nation, 16th 
April, 2000). 
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4.2.2.3 State response(s) to NGOs and civil society growth in Kenya 
The Moi regime, beginning from 1978, has had a fairly turbulent relationship with the 
NGO sector and civil society in general. As captured in the foregoing discussion, NGOs 
and civil society were largely reacting to the increasing state authoritarianism and 
personalization of power by the Moi regime. In doing this, NGOs, particularly those in 
urban areas and with international connections, became highly politicised in addition to 
their traditional function of development. But the state in its confrontation with the NGO 
sector has not just sat back and watched the situation unfold. The Moi regime over time 
has responded by putting in place several measures in an attempt to control and rein in 
the NGO and civil society sector. 
 
Alan Fowler (1990:25-33) identifies three basic strategies that states in Africa have used 
to control NGO growth and activities: legislation; administrative co-optation; and political 
appropriation. Legislation has been applied in situations where NGOs abuse their 
status, pursue unco-ordinated development, or in some cases, when seen to pose a 
security risk to the regime. As for administrative co-optation, it has been effected to 
draw NGOs into bureaucratic control mechanisms in order to ensure their activities fit 
into the development path set out by government. Lastly, political appropriation has 
involved the co-optation of NGOs by the state mainly with the aim of limiting the 
autonomy of these organizations. 
 
A more refined state response to the activities and growth of NGOs and civil society is 
provided by Mutahi Ngunyi and Kamau Gathiaka (cited in Ndegwa, 1996:26). Referring 
to Kenya, they have identified six modes of relationships which characterised the 
strained state-society relations at the height of the one-party state under Moi: 
deregistration or proscription; emasculation by forcing the removal of leaders or the 
withdrawal of resources and privileges; the reconstitution of organizations into new 
bodies by governmental fiat; diminishing contacts with the state to avoid antagonism; 
co-opting by the state; and open opposition to the single party. 
 
The descriptions by Fowler and Ngunyi and Gathiaka, in many ways, reinforce each 
other. This study shall adopt them as a framework for analysing the Kenyan state 
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response(s) to NGOs and civil society, not just during the one-party state, but also in the 
multi-party era. To this framework of state responses to NGOs, this analysis also adds 
the use of propaganda by the state in an attempt to diminish the role of these 
organizations through defamation. Equally important, as a state strategy and therefore a 
form of response, has been the mellowing of the state amidst intense pressure from 
NGOs and civil society leading to the institution of the demanded reforms. However, the 
strategies of diminishing contacts with the state and open opposition to the state, as 
identified by Ngunyi and Gathiaka, are treated in this work as part of NGOs= and not the 
state=s response to given situations. Furthermore, Fowler=s strategy of administrative co-
optation will become more relevant for illustration in the later discussion of NGOs as 
rural development actors in Kenya. 
 
Legislation 
Under legislation as a state response to NGOs and civil society, actual deregistration or 
proscribing, the threat of deregistration, refusal to grant registration, and the drawing of 
new legislation to control further the growth and activities of these organizations, are all 
examined. 
 
Among the very first casualties of the Moi regime in terms of being deregistered or 
proscribed were the ethnic welfare associations which had operated freely under the 
Kenyatta regime. These included among many others, the Akamba Union, the Abaluhya 
Union, the Luo Union, and the Gikuyu Embu Meru Association (GEMA), which were all 
banned in 1980 (Barkan, 1992:185; Matanga, 1995). It has been argued that GEMA 
was the actual target of this banning. As an organization of mainly the Kikuyu, GEMA 
had accumulated a lot of resources through the assistance of the Kenyatta government. 
By 1980, having acquired the status of a company, it is said to have had a capital base 
of approximately 70-90 million Kenya shillings (Ogot, 1995a:196). GEMA, was in reality 
then, a symbol of the power of the Kikuyu bourgeoisie in Kenya under the Kenyatta 
government (Himbara, 1994:26-27). What made GEMA more objectionable to the  
regime was the fact that by using its resources, it had played a central role in attempts 
to stop Moi from automatically succeeding Kenyatta as stipulated by the constitution. 
This was orchestrated through the so-called AChange the Constitution Group@ consisting 
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of Kenyatta=s inner circle of confidants such as Kihika Kimani, Njoroge Mungai, and 
Njenga Karume (Barkan, 1992:185; Matanga, 1995). As argued by Barkan (1992:185): 
ABecause these organizations tended to be vehicles of the bigs, the mobilized and the 
haves, their banning was intended to reduce the power of those ethno-regional interests 
that were never part of the old KADU-Moi coalition.@ 
 
Other civil society organizations deregistered as the Moi regime became more 
autocratic and authoritarian included the University (of Nairobi) Staff Union, the Student 
Organization of Nairobi University (SONU), the Matatu Vehicle Owners Association 
(MVOA), and the Public Service Club (Ndegwa, 1996:27). All these were banned for 
being harsh critics of the Moi regime=s policies through their constant attack on the 
Government using public lectures (in the case of University organizations) and street 
demonstrations and riots (in the case of SONU and MVOA). Many other organizations 
may not have been deregistered but have on several occasions been threatened with 
such a measure. These include the many church organizations and NCEC which have 
directly confronted the state on democratic abuses. In some situations, the state has 
deliberately refused to register organizations deemed to be anti-establishment:  
examples include, FORD (in its initial stages of founding) and SAFINA (also in its early 
stages of founding). 
 
However, the state=s most determined move to control the NGO sector as a whole 
through legislation, was  evidenced in 1990 with the passing of the NGO Act in 
parliament. The Act established the NGO Board, which in essence was the NGO 
Government arm, whose main function was to monitor the registration and activities of 
NGOs in the country. In its brochure, the Board (1990) details its functions as thus: to 
register, co-ordinate and facilitate the work of all national and international NGOs 
operating in Kenya; to maintain a register of national and international NGOs operating 
in Kenya, with their precise sectors, affiliations and locations of their activities; to receive 
and discuss, analyse and evaluate the annual reports of NGOs; to advise the  
Government on the activities of NGOs and on their role in development within Kenya; to 
conduct a regular review of the register, and to determine its consistency with reports 
submitted by the NGOs and the Council of NGOs; to provide policy guidelines for the 
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NGOs, for harmonizing their activities with the National Development Plan for the 
country, so that NGOs avoid activities which contradict national programmes; to receive, 
discuss and approve the regular reports of the Council, and to advise on strategies for 
efficient planning and co-ordination of the activities of NGOs in Kenya; and to receive, 
discuss and approve the code of conduct prepared by the Council for the self-regulation 
of NGOs and their activities. 
 
The 1990 NGO Act has been justifiably described as one of the most articulate and far 
reaching attempts by the state to control NGOs. It can be argued that the increased 
involvement of mostly urban NGOs (with a fairly substantial resource base and 
international connections) in the criticism of the Moi regime for its democratic abuses 
and their fervent agitation for political liberalization, did contribute to the 1990 legislation 
against the NGOs. Just around this time (1990), a number of NGOs= activities were 
extremely critical of the regime. For instance, in 1987, a number of NGOs, mainly the 
churches, had openly opposed the implementation of the new electoral system of 
queue-voting and thus directly challenged the authority of the regime. In another 
incident in 1989, the leader of the Green Belt Movement (an environmental 
organization), Professor Wangari Mathai, sought a court injunction to stop KANU, the 
ruling party, from building a sixty-storey building at Kenya=s famous Uhuru Park. Never 
before had an NGO challenged the state and the ruling party to the extent of suing it in a 
court of law (Ndegwa, 1994:24-25, 1996:28; Weekly Review, 11th April, 1997). No 
wonder that Moi, in the same year (1989), announced the intention of the Government 
to create a directorate to co-ordinate NGOs while making certain their activities were 
compatible with national interests. 
 
Yet in addition, it could be argued that the regime of Moi, used to employing the tactics 
of divide and rule as has been clearly evidenced in his relations with the opposition 
parties and his handling of the constitutional process, saw an opportunity of reining in 
NGOs through the 1990 Act, so as to cut them off from the by then other fast rising 
centres of political opposition such as radical politicians and their followers. This, if 
successful, would have had the effect of de-linking NGOs from politics and the other 
centres of opposition as well as pre-emptying and forestalling the development of a 
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mass opposition movement in the country under NGOs= leadership (for NGOs could at 
this time boast of having enormous development resources). The close linkages 
between the NGO sector and the anti-establishment politicians was expressed in many 
ways: for example, many of  the so-called dissidents were either directly employed by 
the NGOs or worked very closely with them (Weekly Review, 11th April, 1997). 
 
The NGO sector response to the new NGO Act of 1990 was of deep alarm in terms of 
its implications for their autonomy. In a meeting of NGOs that followed in February 
1991, the NGOs expressed their concerns to include the facts that (Ndegwa, 1993:18-
21):  
(a) The Government=s intention was suspect, in that rather than facilitate coordination, 
the Act seemed to be aimed at controlling and constraining NGOs. 
(b) The Act had bestowed enormous powers in the Minister in charge of NGO affairs in 
matters relating to registration and general operations. 
(c)  The Act demanded that NGOs renew their registration every five years, a matter 
that would negatively affect NGO stability in terms of planning and resource 
procurement. 
(d) The Act recommended an NGO be suspended or de-registered for the actions of its 
officers. This was seen as too draconian. 
(e) The Act provided for the establishment of the National Council of Voluntary Agencies 
which was in turn, to draft a code of conduct for the NGO community with an initial 
membership of 100 NGOs and report back to the Government. This was seen to be too 
limiting on the initial NGO membership to the Council and thus to be undemocratic. 
(f) The Act was not clear on the relations between the Board and the Council. 
(g) The Act was not clear on who would sponsor operations of the Bureau (the 
executive arm of the Board). 
(h) The act remained unclear on the previous privileges such as tax exemptions that 
had been enjoyed by the NGOs. 
(i) The Act was vague on the status of organizations, such as whether churches and 
self-help groups constituted NGOs. 
 
In pressurising the state to mellow its position on the NGO sector as per the NGO Act, 
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the NGO network through several meetings with and petitions to the Government 
between 1991 and early 1993, gradually succeeded in securing certain amendments to 
the Act. These included: the removal of the requirements that NGOs register every 5 
years; the changing of the name National Council of Voluntary Agencies to the NGO 
Council and that the first 100 NGOs to be registered by the Council only form an interim 
council; the Board=s powers of suspension were waived and only those of de-
registration remained; grant of recourse to the High Court as the highest arbiter of 
conflicts between NGOs on the one hand and the Minister and the Board on the other; 
and increased membership of NGO representation on the Board from 5 to 7 (which 
represented one-third of the maximum number of members including senior government 
officials)  (Ndegwa, 1993:21-35). In a sense this was a fundamental victory by the NGO 
sector in pressurising the state to retract on its powers of control. 
 
The objectives of the NGO Council are said to include: the empowering of NGOs to 
make the sector more democratic, efficient, effective and socially aware in the provision 
of services to the public; and making the NGO sector provide leadership in the creation 
of an enabling environment for development and relief activity that has a lasting impact 
(National Council of NGOs, 1994:1). To achieve these objectives, the Council defines its 
functions as including the provision of information and co-ordination around specific 
legal requirements arising from the NGO Act; establishing effective dialogue between 
the NGOs and the Government; providing support on fund-raising issues and 
establishing a base for local funding; and generally acting as spokesperson for the NGO 
community (National Council of NGOs, 1994:9). 
 
Employment of state propaganda to defame 
Over and over again the regime of Moi, in attempting to control its critics amongst the 
NGOs and civil society, has resorted to the use of state propaganda to tarnish the 
reputation and standing of these organizations with the hope of diminishing their 
influence in society. Accusations such as being tools of foreigners and therefore serving 
the interests of aliens rather than of the local citizens have been rampant, the aim of the 
state being to cut off the support of the local citizens for these organizations. For 
instance, in its criticism of the state for its excesses in the 1980s and beyond, the radical 
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church has been attacked by the Government and its functionaries for unnecessarily 
interfering in politics, an area that otherwise ought to be the preserve of the state 
(Sabar-Friedman, 1997:31). In the ensuing confrontation with the state, the church was 
accused of several things, such as serving foreign masters, by pro-establishment 
politicians (Sabar-Friedman, 1997:34). The LSK, following the election of Paul Muite as 
its chairman in the early 1990s, was also subject to name calling and severe state 
propaganda due to Muite=s confrontational stand in relation to the state (Nairobi Law 
Monthly, April/May, 1991). Even much earlier (1986-1988), with the radical G. B. M. 
Kariuki as its chairman, the LSK in criticising the Moi regime for removing the security of 
tenure of Judges and the Attorney General, had been accused by a senior government 
minister of not only being loyal to foreigners but also ignorant of history (Nairobi Law 
Monthly, October, 1991). FORD as a lobby group, in its initial years of formation was 
lambasted by government functionaries as >yet another clandestine movement started 
with the aim of destabilizing peace and causing chaos in the country=, as well as >agents 
of doom...propagating utopian and theoretical democracy which does not exist 
anywhere in the world= (Nairobi Law Monthly, August, 1991, October, 1991). 
 
Emasculation by removal of leaders 
Two outstanding examples are those involving the Friedrich Naumann Foundation 
(FNF), and the LSK. In the case of the FNF, a German organization, the Government 
expelled its director, Ms. Dorothee Von Brentano, from Kenya in July 1994 for allegedly 
involving herself in subversive activities including support for the opposition. The 
Director had thus to relocate to Dar-es-Salaam where she continued providing financial 
support to the opposition and the clerics. The FNF, was indeed crucial to the founding of 
organizations such as Okullu=s FoD (Weekly Review, 13th December, 1996). 
 
As for the LSK, the Government, alarmed by its then chairman=s (Muite) belief in the 
strong political role of the LSK, devised all means to frustrate the new leadership, and if 
possible, hound it out of office in favour  of a pro-establishment leadership. There was 
for instance, the use by the Government of pro-establishment lawyers within the LSK to 
file a suit of contempt against the Muite leadership. As put by one observer, AAlthough 
the Government gave the impression that it had no interest in the LSK wrangling it was 
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unable to conceal the fact that it saw itself as the beneficiary of the court orders....The 
Government wanted the irksome council (of the LSK) behind bars or at least quiet.@ 
(Nairobi Law Monthly, October, 1991, December, 1991). Government interference in the 
leadership of NGOs with a view of either retaining loyal leaders or ejecting anti-
establishment leadership has also been witnessed in the elections and affairs of the 
Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU), and the Maendeleo Ya Wanawake 
(MYW). 
 
Political appropriation 
The use of political appropriation by the state with the objective of co-opting NGOs has 
been tried in Kenya with COTU and MYW providing vivid examples. Both were co-opted 
by the state in 1989 and officially became more or less branches of the ruling party. This 
ended up undermining the autonomy of these organizations in terms of their actions and 
activities. The significance of this co-option lay in the fact that it would translate in KANU 
wooing over their members to support it politically. This was particularly important given 
that both were umbrella organizations, with COTU representing the various workers= 
unions, while MYW was the umbrella body for women=s groups nationally (see, Fowler, 
1990:32). Equally important, it would give KANU and the regime a sure control over the 
activities of these organizations. As noted by Barkan (1992:187), AAlthough neither of 
these organizations ever challenged the president, the fact that most of their leaders 
and members are from the bigs, the mobilized and the haves made them too large to 
function on an independent basis.@ The use of political patronage to buy off the support 
of leaders and their organizations by the state could also be seen as another form of co-
option. Sabar-Friedman (1997:26), gives the examples of churches such as the African 
Inland Church and the Legio Maria which for a long time have been pro-state even 
when the rest of the mainstream churches were confronting the state on its negative 
democratic record. 
 
Reconstitution into new bodies by the state 
Whereas the reconstitution of organizations into new bodies by the state has not been a 
common occurrence in Kenya, the two cases of the Kenya Farmers= Association (KFA) 
and the Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA) serve as fairly good examples. In 
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1983, the KFA was forced to reorganize as the Kenya Grain Growers Co-operative 
Union. It has been argued that the intention of the Moi regime was to reduce the 
influence of powerful Kikuyu landowners in the organization (see Barkan, 1992:187). 
The KTDA, an organization dealing with matters involving the growing and marketing of 
tea, was also much affected by state attempts to reorganize it through the establishment 
of the so-called Nyayo Tea Zones in Western Kenya. This reorganization of the KTDA, 
including the sacking of experienced staff for what was seen as ethnic politics, 
negatively affected the efficiency of the organization (Finance, 30th June, 1990; Barkan, 
1992:187; Ndegwa, 1996:27). 
 
The state and reforms 
In as much as the state=s responses to NGOs= and civil society=s calls for political 
change have mainly taken the form of resistance and repression, there have been 
instances of acceptance of political reforms. Confronted with pressure for change, the 
state has therefore been forced to retreat in some situations rather than face the 
likelihood of a breakdown in the political system. The institution of the KANU Review 
Committee in 1990 by the Moi regime was a response to increased pressure for political 
reform. The findings of the Committee, based on interviews with individuals and 
organizations countrywide, later led to the state=s scrapping the unpopular queue voting 
system and restoring of the security of tenure of the judges, the Attorney General and 
the Controller and Auditor General (Finance, 15th December, 1990, 1st February, 
1991). 
 
The removal of section 2A of the constitution in December 1991 that now allowed for a 
multi-party system was yet another state response to pressure to open up the political 
space. This change was fundamental since it ended KANU=s monopoly of political 
power. Equally important were the administrative and political changes brought about by 
the IPPG which had the effect of further consolidating the democratic gains in the 
country (see Adar, 1998:87; Executive, Dec/Jan, 1998; Ndegwa, 1998:202-205). To this 
extent then, it can be argued that in as much as the state has been reluctant to liberalize 
and democratize, it has in certain situations responded by reforming the political system. 
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4.3 NGOs as rural development actors in Kenya 
Whereas political activism has become a major concern for NGOs in Kenya in the post-
1980 period, many of them have continued to be active in the rural development sector. 
Robert Chambers (1989:147) defines rural development as A...a strategy to enable a 
specific group of people, poor rural women and men, to gain for themselves and their 
children more of what they want and need...(and) to demand and control more of the 
benefits of development.@ As a development strategy, rural development, emerged near 
the top of the development agenda for the Third World countries in the early 1970s and 
was a response to the failures inherent in the earlier development strategies that were 
lopsided in favour of industrialization and urbanization (Alila, 1988:1). 
 
Concern for rural development in Kenya has been expressed in the many government 
documents such as the national development plans. This concern emanates from the 
fact that Kenya is basically a rural economy with 82% (19.43 million) of the total 
population residing in the rural areas by the early 1990s. This figure is expected to rise 
to approximately 24.36 million by the early 2000s (Republic of Kenya, 1997a:75). 
Agriculture plays an important role in the overall economy and its contribution to real 
GDP has been higher compared to the other sectors of the economy. In the period 
1964-74, it contributed 36.6% of the GDP, 33.2% in 1974-79, 29.8% in 1980-89, and 
26.2% in 1990-95 (Republic of Kenya, 1997a:50). 
 
Rural development programmes implemented in Kenya over the years have included 
the Special Rural Development Programme (SRDP), and the District Focus for Rural 
Development (DFRD). The SRDP grew out of the 1966 Kericho International 
Conference convened to discuss development problems in Kenya. The SRDP 
implemented between 1970-76, selected 14 pilot areas of which 6 were to be 
experimented with during the first phase of the programme. The six were Migori 
(Nyanza ), Vihiga (Western), Kapenguria (Rift Valley), Tetu (Central), Mbeere (Eastern), 
and Kwale (Coast). Livingstone (1976:2), citing the 1970-74 development plan, identifies 
three guiding principles of SRDP: experimentation so as to provide experience in 
conception, design and execution of comprehensive rural development; replication in 
other areas of projects and methods proven successful in the pilot areas; and use of the 
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existing resources in terms of staff and finance so as to be in essence a large-scale self-
help project. The objectives of the SRDP were: increasing rural income and employment 
opportunities; improving the capacities of Kenyan civil servants in the rural areas; and 
developing regional planning technique appropriate to the Kenyan context (Alila, 
1988:152). 
 
SRDP was co-ordinated and supervised by the Ministry of Finance through the National 
Rural Development Committee comprising of senior government officials. Each ministry, 
since the SRDP was an integrated programme, provided a representative while every 
project was managed by a member of the Provincial Administration (Alila, 1988:152-
153). 
 
The success of the SRDP was extremely limited for it never went beyond the first phase 
consisting of the 6 pilot areas. The programme was incapacitated by various factors 
(Livingstone, 1976:18-19; Alila, 1988:153): 
(a) Lack of well trained and committed officers in the ministries and in the district 
administration. 
(b) Poor inter-ministerial co-ordination of activities and an inability of government to 
prepare integrated area-specific plans. 
(c) Mis-allocation of SRDP resources, which were directed to other programmes not 
initially budgeted for; and 
(d) The tendency of donors to shape the plans to fit their own funding. 
 
The DFRD strategy became operational in 1983 and closely resembled the SRDP in 
terms of structure and the governing ideology of decentralized planning. It had the main 
objective of broadening the base of rural development and encouraging local 
participation in order to improve problem identification, resource mobilization, and 
project design and implementation (Republic of Kenya, 1987:1; Alila, 1988:159). It 
aimed at decentralizing planning by shifting the rural development planning and 
implementation responsibility from the Ministry headquarters to the Districts. The  District 
is responsible for the planning and implementation of District-specific rural development 
projects such as rural access roads and rural health centres, while the management of 
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national programmes that cut across various districts remains with the particular 
ministries. 
 
In DFRD, the District Development Committee (DDC) is the government co-ordinating 
body for rural development at the district level. Chaired by the District Commissioner, 
the DDC is composed of three main groups: District heads of all the major operating 
ministerial departments; elected officials consisting of the district members of parliament 
plus two officials from each local authority; and Aunofficial@ members invited by the 
District Commissioner such as the NGOs= representatives, managers of parastatals, and 
women groups= representatives etc (Alila, 1988:157-158). 
 
The DDC, which has a District Executive Committee (DEC) to provide technical support, 
discusses and funds projects submitted to it by grassroots committees including the 
Sub-location, Location and Division Development Committees. The DDC has several 
special sub-committees such as the District Education Board, District Social 
Development Committee, and District Agricultural Committee, among others (Alila, 
1988:158). 
 
The increased role of the NGO sector in development led to its official recognition by the 
government in the mid-1980s (Republic of Kenya, 1989a; Ng=ethe, Mitullah and Ngunyi, 
1990:131). NGOs, it has been noted, provide between 45-50% of all health-care 
services and over 50% of all family planning services in the country (Daily Nation, 
November 20th, 1999). However, as early as the 1960s and 1970s, NGOs in the form of 
church organizations were already contributing enormously in the fields of education, 
health services, and social welfare among other services (Sabar-Friedman, 1997:28). It 
is in this context that the government has sought to incorporate NGOs in the national 
development framework by insisting that their development programs and projects be 
vetted for approval by the DDCs under the DFRD strategy. Whereas the official 
government reason for co-ordinating the work of NGOs in development has some 
validity in that it streamlines NGO sector activities to reduce duplication and wastage of 
resources (Ng=ethe, Mitullah & Ngunyi, 1990:135; Ndegwa, 1993:10), many critical 
analysts have argued it has been geared towards controlling the enormous NGO 
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influence and thus effectively checking the growth of the sector as a rival power centre 
to the weak state (Ndegwa, 1993:11; Njuguna, Mitullah, and Ngunyi, 1990: 143-144). 
This is especially applicable in situations where NGOs critically question and challenge 
the prevailing status-quo policies that are seen to favour the haves while further 
disadvantaging the poor.  
 
4.4 NGOs and the politics of rural development in Western Province 
Western is one of the seven administrative Provinces in Kenya, beside Nyanza, Rift 
Valley, Central, Eastern, Coast, and North Eastern. Nairobi is classified as an extra-
Provincial District. The Province has a total of seven Districts, that is Kakamega, 
Bungoma, Busia, Vihiga, Mount Elgon, Teso, and Butere/Mumias (recently hived off 
from Kakamega). Linguistically and ethnically, the Province is inhabited primarily by the 
Luhya peoples and a minority of Iteso occupying the newly created Teso District. The 
Luhya community consists of several clans and have the Luo (who occupy Nyanza 
Province) as neighbours. As per the population census of 1989, the Province had the 
fourth largest  population of 2,544,329 (in millions) compared to the other Provinces in 
Kenya (Republic of Kenya, 1995:20). The latest census for 1999 indicate it has a total 
population of 3.3 million, making it the second largest (Daily Nation, March 1st, 2000). 
 
In terms of social amenities, in the area of health, by 1994 the Province had only a total 
of 126 health institutions in spite of its huge population. Compared to the other 
Provinces, it came  second last (Republic of Kenya, 1995:241). In the field of education, 
the Province had the fifth largest primary school enrolment rate of 778,676 pupils by 
1994 (Republic of Kenya, 1995:227). 
 
Economically, agriculture is the mainstay of the Province. Kakamega District relies on 
maize and beans as food crops and sugarcane as a cash crop. Busia District 
specialises in the growing of maize, tobacco and cotton. As for Vihiga, beans, maize 
and tea are common crops. There is a slim manufacturing sector consisting of a tobacco 
and paper factory in Bungoma, a sugar factory in Kakamega, and a tea factory in Vihiga 
(see the 1994 and 1997 District Development Plans). However, the Province 
experiences some significant development bottlenecks such as: poor road infrastructure 
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that is largely characterised by dirt roads that become impassable during the rain 
season; low agricultural productivity, due to inadequate inputs such as chemicals and 
extension services;  generally poor access to credit facilities; and below average water 
and sanitation facilities (see the District Development Plans of 1994 and 1997). 
 
The three Districts of Kakamega, Busia and Vihiga have a vibrant NGO presence of 
approximately 35 formal NGOs that cover not only the area of relief and welfare but also 
development. These are the Amukura Orphanage, the Christian Children Fund, CARE 
Kenya, the Family Planning Association of Kenya, the Kenya Water for Health 
Organization, the Kenya Women Finance, the Mazingira Institute, the National School 
Feeding Council, Partnership for Productivity, Compassion International, Catholic Relief 
Services, the Friends World Committee, Heifer International, the Institute of Cultural 
Affairs, the Kenya Wood Fuel Development Programme, the Kenya Young Men=s 
Christian Association, Oxfam, the National Council of Churches of Kenya, the Red 
Cross, the Rural Industrial Development Trust, Action Aid, the Aga Khan Foundation, 
the Promotion of Rural Initiatives and Development Enterprise, the Kenya United 
Independent Churches, the Kenya Union of the Blind, the World Vision, Community 
Education and Economic Development Assistance, the Adventist Development for Rural 
Areas, the Christian Health Association of Kenya, Improve Your Business, the Business 
Development Society of Kenya, Vihiga Emuhaya Sabatia Tiriki, the Kenya Energy and 
Environment Organization, Christian Partners Development Agency, and Africa Now 
(Lekyo and Mirikau, 1988; the 1994 and 1997 District Development Plans, and field 
interviews). 
 
Self-help NGOs, women=s groups in particular, have had a long history of establishment 
in the Province and many are members of the giant Maendeleo Ya Wanawake 
organization, an umbrella organization for women=s groups that came into being in the 
colonial period but whose membership became Africanised in the post-colonial period. 
Utilising field spot checks,  the District Development Plans of 1994-97 and 1997-2001 
as well as the records of the Ministry of Culture and Social Services, it was established 
that the three Districts in the study sample had a total of over 1000 groups with 
Kakamega leading with more than 600. However, this number is likely to be much 
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higher considering that a number of the groups operate without formal registration. 
 
As a Province, Western has become incorporated into the pattern of patron-client 
politics that have characterised Kenya since independence. With the exception of a few 
individuals such as Martin Shikuku, the fiery member of parliament for Butere 
constituency until 1997 when he was defeated in the elections, in the main, the Luhya 
political leadership has been pro-establishment  in an attempt to extract development 
resources from the centre. The generally pro-regime stance of the Luhya leadership can 
be partly contexualised within the  harambee political philosophy which required goodwill 
towards the state for purposes of extracting resources from the centre. This was even 
more of an imperative considering the various regions and communities vying for scarce 
state resources. As noted by Holmquist (1984:177-178), with the government promise to 
>assist those communities that assist themselves=, communities indulged in intense 
competition to launch development projects so as to have a head start in garnering 
scarce government resources. The communities, Holmquist further observes, knew that 
politics determined who got what, and thus usually mobilized the rural petty bourgeoisie 
for the role of extracting outside aid. Colin Leys (1976:204) adds weight to this thinking 
in his argument that, during the Kenyatta era, politics were conducted in terms of tribal 
consciousness in that areas of the country that opposed the regime were threatened 
and to some extent actually punished with reduced levels of public spending, while loyal 
areas including Kikuyu Districts were relatively favoured. It could have been with this 
realization that the Luhya and the other so-called small tribes agreed to dissolve KADU 
and join KANU in 1964 and thus make Kenya a de facto one-party state (Leys, 
1976:212-214; Okumu and Holmquist, 1984:51-54; Oyugi, 1994b:157-159). 
The Moi era, following Kenyatta=s death in 1978, has in the main been characterized by 
intensified authoritarianism and personalization of power. As discussed earlier, civil 
society and NGOs also became the regime=s target in terms of limiting their autonomy. 
Among the first casualties of the regime in its early years were voluntary associations 
such as ethnic organizations which were disbanded. As stated elsewhere, the 
disbanding of ethnic associations, in particular GEMA, was aimed at weakening the 
Kikuyu economic and political power base. Being a Kalenjin by tribe, Moi sought to 
Kalenjinize the state through the promotion of Kalenjin economic and political interests 
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while dismantling the Kikuyu influence that had been established by Kenyatta. In this 
context then, whereas the Moi regime continued to rely on patron-client networks just 
like the Kenyatta regime, the core actors changed in favour of the Kalenjin community.  
 
The politics of patron-client relationships in the Moi era was even further extended when 
the regime went out of its way to reward certain communities for loyalty through the 
adoption of certain policies that emphasised a redistribution of resources towards 
Kenya=s have-nots who were, incidentally, those residing in regions that were once the 
core of the old KADU coalition of which Moi had been leader. KADU, before its 
dissolution in 1964, was regarded as the party of the small tribes allied together against 
KANU that was monopolised by the Kikuyu and the Luo. Southall (1999:94) has argued 
that the dissolution of KADU was a step in the process towards the capture of KANU 
from within by the Kalenjin ex-KADU elements under Moi, a claim that can be verified 
when it is realized that since his (Moi) capture of power in 1978, KANU has come under 
the strong control of the Kalenjin as well as the Luhya  and the other so-called small 
tribes. Southall (1998:101; 1999:93-94) concludes that by the late 1980s, Moi had 
succeeded in displacing the Kikuyu-centred state while constructing a new alliance of 
minority ethnic elites whose survival depended on control of the state to enable the 
accumulation and dispensation of resources. Further, Moi sought to capture the 
Harambee movement by personally involving himself through the Office of the President 
in raising funds for selected favoured Districts. In this sense Moi became the overall 
chief patron upon whom communities had to depend for development (Barkan, 
1992:186). 
 
In what might be termed the politics of survival, the Luhya community has largely 
remained politically supportive of the Moi regime. This support for the regime can be 
attributed, partly, to the patron-client politics whereby it has been proffered in 
anticipation of political and economic rewards. However, the Luhya collaboration with 
the regime can be seen as a two way relationship since the Moi regime, faced with a 
hostile and well organized opposition from the Kikuyu and Luo communities, needed the 
Luhya among other so-called small ethnic groups for its political survival. This again 
takes the analysis back to the KADU-KANU politics of ethnic rivalry in the 1960. 
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Hornsby and Throup (1992:175) have for instance noted, during his reign via the one-
party system, while isolating the Kikuyu, Moi sought to build Aa new Kalenjin-centric 
state based upon a precarious alliance between the President=s Kalenjin and Moses 
Mudavadi=s Abaluhya (Luhya)@. The late Mudavadi, a Luhya and regarded as a Luhya 
spokesman, was by then one of the most powerful ministers in Moi=s government as 
well as being Moi=s close personal confidant. His power can be attested to by  the fact 
that his son Musalia Mudavadi, on inheriting his father=s parliamentary seat, became 
one of Kenya=s youngest ministers through Moi=s appointment and has ever since held 
very powerful ministerial portfolios including that of Minister of Finance. The  
appointment of Luhya people to such powerful political positions in Moi=s government 
may be viewed as part of the rewards for being pro-establishment. 
 
An illustration of the Province=s (Western) voting pattern in the past two multi-party 
elections attest to its fairly strong support for the Moi regime.  During the 1992 General 
Elections, the ruling party, KANU, won the largest number (10) of parliamentary seats 
from the Province compared to the opposition parties (Throup and Hornsby, 1998). This 
number was to rise further when over 5 parliamentarians, initially elected on opposition 
party tickets, defected to join KANU, thus effectively sealing the Province as a KANU 
zone. In the same election, among the 8 presidential candidates, Moi garnered the 
highest number of votes (219,187) in the Province which was approximately 39% of the 
total votes cast for all the aspirants (Ajulu, in Adar, 1998:84; also see National Elections 
Monitoring Unit - NEMU, 1993). The political support of the Luhya for KANU in 1992 
should, in addition, be extended to the role and contribution of Youth for KANU 1992 
(YK 92), a youth organization that was founded basically for the purpose of campaigning 
for KANU. Led by Cyrus Jirongo (a Luhya), the organization played a fundamental role 
in helping KANU win the elections. Following the election results, many of those elected 
on opposition party tickets were later convinced by the organization to defect to KANU 
(Weekly Review, 10th May, 1996). 
 
 
 
 
Western Province: 1992 Parliamentary Election Results by Party 
KANU 
FORD-Asili 
FORD-Kenya 
SLA.YA 
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Source: Throup and Hornsby, 1998: 511. 
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Table 4: 1992 election results by Province 
 
 
PROVIN-
CE 
 
KIBAKI 
(DP) 
 
MATIBA 
(FORD-A) 
 
MOI 
(KANU) 
 
ODINGA 
(FORD-K) 
 
OTHERS 
 
TOTAL 
VOTES 
 
NAIROBI 
 
69,715 
(18%) 
0seats 
 
165,553 
(44%)  
6 seats 
 
62,410 
(16%)  
1 seat 
 
75,888 
(20%) 
1 seat 
 
7,588 
(2%) 
0 seat 
 
100% 
 
COAST 
 
32,201 
(10%) 
1 seat 
 
33,999 
(11%) 
0 seat 
 
188,296 
(62%) 
17 seats 
 
42,420 
(14%) 
2 seats 
 
9,660 
(3%) 
0 seat 
 
100% 
 
NORTH 
EASTERN 
 
3,259 
(5%) 
0 seat 
 
7,188 
(11%) 
0 seat 
 
46,420 
(72%) 
8 seats 
 
5,084 
(8%) 
1 seat 
 
3,082 
(4%) 
1 seat 
 
100% 
 
EASTERN 
 
392,481 
(50%) 
9 seats 
 
79,436 
(10%) 
0 seats 
 
290,372 
(37%) 
21 seats 
 
13,673 
(2%) 
1 seat 
 
7,849 
(1%) 
1 seat 
 
 
100% 
 
CENTRAL 
 
373,147 
(35%) 
10 seats 
 
630,194 
(60%) 
14 seats 
 
21,918 
(2%) 
0 seat 
 
10,688 
(1%) 
1 seat 
 
2,320 
(2%) 
0 seat 
 
 
100% 
 
RIFT 
VALLEY 
 
98,302 
(7%) 
2 seats 
 
214,727 
(16%) 
4 seats 
 
918,488 
(71%) 
36 seats 
 
75,465 
(5%) 
2 seats 
 
1,509 
(1%) 
0 seat 
 
 
100% 
 
WESTERN 
 
14,404 
(2%) 
0 seat 
 
214,060 
(38%) 
7 seats 
 
219,187 
(39%) 
10 seats 
 
98,822 
(17%) 
3 seats 
 
28,808 
(4%) 
0 seat 
 
 
100% 
 
NYANZA 
 
51,988 
(6%) 
1 seat 
 
10,299 
(1%) 
0 seat 
 
117,554 
(15%) 
7 seats 
 
581,490 
(75%) 
20 seats 
 
25,894 
(3%) 
1 seat 
 
100% 
 
TOTAL 
VOTES 
 
1,035,507 
 
1,354,856 
 
1,927,640 
 
903,886 
 
60,650 
 
5,232,734 
Source: Adar, 1998:84 citing Ajulu; Throup and Hornby, 1998:443; NEMU, 1993 
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In the 1997 multi-party elections, KANU performed even much better, capturing a total 
number of 15 parliamentary seats, the highest in the Province (Adar, 1998; also see 
Steeves, 1999). Moi as a presidential candidate, won the second highest number of 
votes (44.6%), although he was narrowly beaten by Wamalwa Kijana of FORD-K who 
captured 48% of the vote (Adar, 1998:89 citing Weekly Review; Steeves, 1999:81). 
Wamalwa=s FORD-K was later convinced by Moi to enter into some sort of collaboration 
with KANU. However, this experiment was shortlived with Wamalwa pulling out to seek 
some loose partnership with the DP. In what may be viewed as a reward for supporting 
KANU, Moi appointed 5 Ministers from Western, the third highest from all the different 
Provinces (Steeves, 1999: 82). In addition, the two powerful civil service positions of 
Attorney General and Chief Justice, were filled by Luhya members. 
 
Table 5: Parliamentary seats by Province: the 1997 Kenya Elections 
 
 
PROVINCE 
 
KANU 
 
DP 
 
NDP(K) 
 
FORD-K 
 
SDP 
 
Nairobi 
 
1 
 
5 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Coast 
 
18 
 
2 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
North Eastern 
 
9 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Eastern 
 
14 
 
8 
 
0 
 
1 
 
10 
 
Central 
 
0 
 
17 
 
1 
 
0 
 
5 
 
Rift Valley 
 
39 
 
7 
 
0 
 
3 
 
0 
 
Western 
 
15 
 
0 
 
0 
 
9 
 
0 
 
Nyanza 
 
8 
 
0 
 
19 
 
4 
 
0 
 
TOTAL 
 
104 
 
39 
 
21 
 
17 
 
16 
 
Source: Adar, 1998:88 citing Electoral Commission of Kenya 
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Table 6: Presidential voting pattern by Province, 1997 Elections 
 
 
PROVINCE 
 
MOI (KANU) 
 
KIBAKI (DP) 
 
ODINGA 
(NDP) 
 
WAMALWA 
(FORD-K) 
 
NGILU (SDP) 
 
Nairobi 
 
75,272 
20.56% 
 
160,124 
44% 
 
59,415 
16.23% 
 
24,971 
6.82% 
 
39,707 
10.85% 
 
Coast 
 
229,084 
61.05% 
 
50,540 
13.4% 
 
22,794 
6.07% 
 
11,156 
2.97% 
 
37,707 
10.85% 
 
North Eastern 
 
46,121 
73.08% 
 
11,741 
18.6% 
 
210 
0.33% 
 
4,418 
7% 
 
466 
0.58% 
 
Eastern 
 
368,801 
35.87% 
 
296,262 
28.81% 
 
7,755 
0.75% 
 
7,009 
0.68% 
 
332,578 
32.35% 
 
Central 
 
55,822 
5.5% 
 
885,382 
88.73% 
 
6,812 
0.68% 
 
3,067 
0.31% 
 
29,473 
2.95% 
 
Rift Valley 
 
1,140,10 
69% 
 
343,529 
20.9% 
 
36,022 
2.19% 
 
102,178 
6.22% 
 
11,345 
0.69% 
 
Western 
 
314,669 
44.67% 
 
9,755 
1.38% 
 
13,458 
1.91% 
 
338,120 
48% 
 
3,222 
0.49% 
 
Nyanza 
 
215,923 
23.52% 
 
138,194 
15.05% 
 
 
519,259 
56.55% 
 
14,623 
1.59% 
 
15,309 
1.57% 
 
TOTAL 
 
2,445,801 
 
1,895,527 
 
665,725 
 
505,542 
 
469,807 
 
Source: Adar, 1998:89 citing Weekly Review 
 
The return of multi-party politics in Kenya also translated into inter-party competition at 
local government level. KANU now had to jockey for power with the other newly 
registered opposition parties. However, the fact that the Minister for Local Government 
had the overwhelming power to nominate up to a third of members on each and every 
council, guaranteed KANU a major advantage in securing its representation on local 
authorities (see Southall and Wood, 1996:511). 
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The 1992 multi-party election pattern of results at presidential and parliamentary levels 
tended to be repeated at local government level in the election of councillors. In 
Western Province, KANU remained dominant with the majority of councillors being 
elected on a KANU ticket especially in Vihiga and Busia Districts. However, the 
opposition gained substantial victories in Kakamega District (FORD-A) and Bungoma 
District (FORD-K) (Southall and Wood, 1996:512). FORD-K=s dominance in Bungoma 
District could be attributed to the fact of clannism where, the Bukusu (a Luhya sub-
tribe), largely voted opposition because of Wamalwa Kijana (also Bukusu) who was a 
senior official of the party. The same explanation applied to FORD-A=s Kakamega 
strong showing which was attributable to Martin Shikuku, again a senior official of the 
party. However, even this strong showing by the opposition parties in these two Districts 
was short-lived. In addition to the Minister of Local Government nominating several 
councillors on the KANU ticket (and therefore diluting the strength of FORD-A and 
FORD-K), many opposition councillors were soon to defect to KANU induced by 
promises of material gain (Southall and Wood, 1996:512-515). In practical terms, out of 
a total of 158 councillors elected in all the Western Province wards, KANU, through the 
nomination powers of the Minister, was able to gain approximately 50 nominated 
councillors in addition to those elected (Republic of Kenya, 1993a, 1993b). 
 
KANU posted a bigger victory in Western Province in the 1997 local government 
elections. Having captured most of Kakamega District from the opposition, only 
Bungoma District remained a key opposition (FORD-K) zone in the Province, once 
again because of the influence of Kijana Wamalwa, a 1997 presidential aspirant. All in 
all, KANU captured a total of 162 wards in the Province, which was the highest number 
compared to that of all opposition parties combined (Southall, 2000a:13). However, 
unlike in the aftermath of the 1992 elections, following the IPPG reforms, government 
nominations would now be made to councils from political parties in proportion to the 
vote that they had received in the local elections concerned. Southall (2000a:17) has 
observed that the effect of this new change was to further protect elected majorities, in 
the process extending rather than ameliorating local one-party dominance in areas 
dominated by a single party. For Western Province where KANU was the dominant 
party, it then translated into a further entrenchment of the party at the expense of 
opposition parties. With an almost extinct FORD-A, and a weakened FORD-K, KANU 
members of parliament and councillors dominate almost in entirety activities of local 
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government and organs of central government such as the DDCs in Western Province. 
 
Table 7: Results of Kenyan Civic Elections, 1997: Councillors elected by Province 
 
 
 
 
Nairobi 
 
Coast 
 
North 
Easte-
rn 
 
Easte-
rn 
 
Central 
 
Rift 
Valley 
 
Weste-
rn 
 
Nyan-
za 
 
Total 
 
KANU 
 
14 
 
197 
 
201 
 
281 
 
9 
 
763 
 
162 
 
129 
 
1756 
 
DP 
 
28 
 
8 
 
4 
 
111 
 
164 
 
94 
 
1 
 
17 
 
427 
 
NDPK 
 
5 
 
7 
 
1 
 
8 
 
4 
 
7 
 
12 
 
251 
 
295 
 
FORD 
 (K) 
 
1 
 
1 
 
4 
 
11 
 
1 
 
36 
 
122 
 
11 
 
187 
 
SDP 
 
3 
 
5 
 
0 
 
97 
 
23 
 
0 
 
0 
 
10 
 
138 
 
SAFI-
NA 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
27 
 
1 
 
0 
 
2 
 
37 
 
FORD 
 (P) 
 
2 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
28 
 
0 
 
0 
 
3 
 
33 
 
FORD 
(A) 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
2 
 
7 
 
3 
 
6 
 
1 
 
19 
 
KSC 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
4 
 
7 
 
LPK 
 
0 
 
0 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
6 
 
LPD 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
4 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
4 
 
SPK 
 
0 
 
4 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
4 
 
UPPK 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
 
KEN-
DA 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
KNC 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
 
Totals 
 
54 
 
224 
 
216 
 
515 
 
270 
 
906 
 
303 
 
430 
 
2918 
 
Vacant 
 
1 
 
5 
 
11 
 
4 
 
2 
 
13 
 
0 
 
1 
 
38 
Source: Southall, 2000a:13-14, citing Electoral Commission of Kenya 
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The dominance of KANU in the region has also meant a close affinity between the 
KANU elected leaders and the regime. The leaders have tended to support the Moi 
regime=s political position on various issues. For instance, in a significant >no-
confidence=  motion in the government (Kenya=s only second since independence) 
brought to parliament in October, 1998 by Mr. Orengo of FORD-K, virtually all the Luhya 
KANU parliamentarians (MPs) voted against it. Wamalwa=s FORD-K was equally a 
disappointment in as much as the motion had been moved by one of his party=s MPs. Of 
the 10 FORD-K Luhya MPs who participated in the voting, 6 supported the motion, while 
4 abstained including Wamalwa himself, thus in the process directly lending support to 
the continued existence of the Moi regime (Daily Nation, 17th October, 1998). The 
Luhya MPs, particularly KANU ones, have also been active in supporting the regime=s 
insistence that the Kenyan constitution be minimally changed (to retain the status quo) 
and that the process be implemented by Parliament (where KANU with the support of 
the National Development Party of Kenya - NDPK, has a majority that can successfully 
defend its position) rather than a radical overhaul undertaken outside parliament (a 
mode favoured by the oppositional elements of a majority of politicians and civil society). 
This could explain the active  support for the recent government sponsored Raila 
Parliamentary Constitution Select Committee (that favours a parliament propelled 
constitutional review process) by leading Luhya politicians such as Minister Musalia 
Mudavadi (see Republic of Kenya, April 2000). 
 
As it shall be shown in chapter five, most NGOs in the sample proved to be more 
developmental and less politically opposed to the state. Unlike their urban counterparts 
in Nairobi and other big towns, the rural NGOs in Western Kenya played collaboratory 
politics with the state and at best shied off matters to do with high level politics that 
could be interpreted as a direct challenge to the state. The case study of PfP (chapter 
eight) serves as a clear representative of the typical Western Province=s NGO which 
would rather support the status quo than challenge it. Virtually all the annual reports and 
brochures of the NGOs studied tended to be very much silent on matters to do with 
active oppositional politics and instead dwelt on purely developmental agendas. 
 
For instance, the Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU) has been unable to 
offer a credible challenge to the authoritarian state in spite of its immense potential to do 
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so. This is especially the case considering that it has control over the entire workers= 
movement in Kenya. COTU has remained on the periphery throughout the struggle for 
political change during the Moi regime. Part of the explanation has been that COTU=s 
top leadership is appointed by the president. This has meant that COTU is therefore 
directly responsible and accountable to the president and thus subject to patronage. Its 
highest ranking official, the Secretary General, has been Mr. Joseph Mugalla who is 
been in office for a long period. The fact that Mr. Mugalla is Luhya, whose home 
Province is Western, could further explain COTU=s strong allegiance to the Moi regime. 
This is precisely so considering that the Province and its leaders have for a long period 
been pro-KANU. Mugalla is the current member of parliament of Ikolomani constituency 
on a KANU ticket. While criticising COTU=s pro-regime stance during the on-going 
Kenya=s constitutional reform calls, Nowrojee (1995:6), a leading pro-reform lawyer 
observed: 
And trade unions too have forgotten their own history. Why have trade 
unions forgotten that it was the trade union movement that was the proud 
carrier of the freedom struggle in the final years when detention and killing 
had curtailed other freedom fighters?....And what were the trade unions 
fighting for if not constitutional change? 
 
A rare example of an NGO with a fairly politicised agenda was the Christian Partners 
Development Agency (CPDA). Although registered in 1993, it launched its development 
activities in 1999 in Vihiga District and had therefore not made its impact felt in the 
District. CPDA=s sponsors have included the Community Development Trust Fund of the 
European Union, Lutheran World Federation, and the British Council. Although not in 
the initial study=s sample due to its recent entry into Vihiga, its unique and fairly radical 
agenda makes it necessary to briefly discuss it. At the time of its establishment in 
Vihiga, CPDA was being led by among others, Nancy Kahera Lidubwi, a University of 
Nairobi Bachelor of Arts (Sociology) graduate. Lidubwi became famous in the District for 
having been courageous enough to challenge the then very powerful Minister of 
Finance (now Minister of Communication) and member of parliament for Sabatia 
constituency, Musalia Mudavadi, in the 1997 multi-party elections. Vying on a FORD-K 
party ticket, she was worry enough for President Moi=s Western Province political 
spokesman. Although she eventually lost heavily in the elections (polling 2,563 against 
the Minister=s 26,305 votes) (see Electoral Commission of Kenya, 1998:48), many 
political observers believed that the results were not quite representative. 
 CPDA (1999a:1, 1999b:1) has its main objectives as follows: 
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(a) To facilitate promotion of development education among needy communities as an 
empowering strategy. 
(b) To promote participatory skills for developmental and improvement purposes. 
(c) To serve as a bridge between funding organizations and recipient communities. 
(d) To facilitate the implementation of community projects. 
(e) Advocate for the disadvantaged groups, cadres and communities for fair treatment, 
resource distribution, equal opportunities etc. 
 
In pursuing its advocacy goal aimed at empowering the disadvantaged groups and  
communities in society, CPDA focuses on two main issues which happen to be at the 
core of high politics in Kenya: the empowerment of women, and the provision of civic 
education in relation to the Constitutional Review Process. As concerns the 
empowerment of women, CPDA (1999a:4) observes that the subordination of women in 
Africa is largely a function of cultural biases reinforced by the legal framework in many 
countries. For instance, in Kenya, it argues, women are not allowed to inherit land and 
this is supported by the legal system. This skewed land allocation practice, CPDA 
argues, adversely affect women=s economic security and productivity and that it must be 
changed. So far, CPDA had organized one districtwide workshop to promote awareness 
for women=s collective action in demanding for their rights, including equal employment 
opportunities and freedom to participate in micro and macro economic activities. 
 
In relation to the Constitutional Review Process, CPDA (1999a:4-5) notes that the 
ordinary Kenyan is generally not well versed in matters to do with his constitutional 
rights and the importance of the constitution in his well-being. This shortcoming, argues 
 CPDA, can only be corrected through extensive civic education. To this extent, CPDA 
had organized three workshops in Vihiga on democratization. In discussing its role in 
the democratization process, CPDA (p.5) observes: 
In undertaking this activity, CPDA was guided by the general need to 
educate, inform and empower Kenyans to participate in the constitutional 
process of their country. Kenya=s constitutional review comes at a time 
when majority of Kenyans genuinely want change. Most of them, 
however, are not informed about their participatory roles in the exercise. 
They too need to know and understand the significance of a country=s 
constitution and their inalienable responsibility to uphold it. Kenyans 
unfortunately suffer the disadvantage of not having gone through an 
exercise as this one before. It is the first time ever, the entire Kenyan 
population is being involved because the first (colonial) and the second 
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(independence) constitutions were drafted outside Kenya albeit with 
minimal inputs from outstanding Kenyan politicians in the latter one. 
 
CPDA=s agenda of active politics that carry the possibilities of confronting and 
challenging the state (for it questions the status quo) is not yet common practice 
amongst Western Province rural NGOs. It is a new development politics in a region 
acclimatised to collaboratory politics. Whether CPDA will manage to survive political 
pressure (from the predominantly KANU politicians and the state) targeted at 
compromising its evidently oppositional political agenda remains to be seen. But one 
thing is clear: if successful, CPDA may serve as a forerunner of a new development 
politics in the region.  
 
Although CPDA is not so much of an urban NGO (it has been argued elsewhere in this 
work that being urban provides certain advantages to NGOs), it has managed to 
develop a fairly radical development agenda. Among the possible factors that account 
for the posture CPDA is taking in Vihiga include the fact that it has a leadership that is 
relatively well educated and radical. This type of leadership has the potential to critically 
evaluate  as well as comprehend local and national issues. And not being closely allied 
to KANU, the CPDA leadership has no obligation to be pro-establishment. CPDA=s 
radical leadership is clearly epitomised in Nancy Lidubwi who remains a FORD-K 
member in as much as she lost to KANU=s Musalia in the 1997 parliamentary elections. 
Another factor that can explain CPDA=s nature of development politics is the fact that it 
has a fairly stable resource (financial) base arising from connections with international 
donor organizations such as the Community Development Trust of the European Union. 
This financial stability has enabled CPDA to be relatively autonomous from state control. 
Autonomy has in turn translated into CPDA being able to draw development agendas 
that are a reflection of independent thought rather than of patronage. These facilitative 
factors are to a large extent absent in the operations of the many rural NGOs studied in 
Western Province.  
 
For most of the NGOs in Western Province, especially self-help NGOs, the levels of 
their financial and material resource base were extremely poor or low, to the extent that 
they have been made dependent on external sources of funding. This fact, has in turn, 
facilitated the capture of these NGOs by the state into the patron-client network. Further, 
Western Province being mainly a KANU zone, and since KANU forms the Government 
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and therefore has more access to state resources (compared to opposition parties), the 
NGOs found it prudent to take a low profile in relating with the state with the sole 
objective of extracting development resources. This picture becomes even clearer 
considering that in Kenya, it has been the ruling party and its leaders (unlike the 
opposition parties), including the president himself, that have been able to mobilize and 
raise the highest amounts of monies in harambees (public fund-raisings) due to their 
control of state resources. Thus, close association and support for the regime, is viewed 
by the cash-starved NGOs as a possible way towards boosting their resources. 
 
Secondly, the factor that the NGOs were basically rural-based is significant. This has 
had implications for their prioritization of functions. Meeting of basic development needs 
as a short-term  goal is seen as a more relevant and urgent requirement compared to 
political activism with its long-term objectives and means. The sharp divide between 
urban NGOs that tend to involve themselves in oppositional politics and rural NGOs that 
are basically developmental is also reflected in the schism between on the one hand, 
the so-called governance and democracy NGOs, and on the other, development NGOs. 
Mutunga (1999:99) has observed that these differences have even affected the 
contribution of the NGO Council (the national NGO umbrella body in Kenya) to the 
constitutional review process: 
The divisions in the NGO sector between development NGOs and 
governance and democracy NGOs were clearly reflected in the Executive 
Committee of the National Council of NGOs. The governance and 
democracy NGOs were derogatorily called Apolitical 
NGOs@....Development NGOs tended to see the governance and 
democracy NGOs as radical, confrontational and unpragmatic. The 
governance and democracy NGOs, on the other hand have accused 
development NGOs of entrenching the culture of dependence in the 
country and supporting the status quo so that they carry on with their 
work. 
 
Thirdly, unlike their urban counterparts, rural NGOs are less exposed to the high politics 
of the day and therefore less politicized and less confrontational with the state. There is 
a need to bridge the gap between rural and urban NGOs by building close linkages 
between them. As argued by Ndegwa (1999:296), 
...reform NGOs need to break away from regional concentration, 
especially Nairobi and nearby environs. This concentration has had the 
effect of making the reform movement seem as an ethnic and/or urban 
concern, and has not reached out to communities outside the cities. A 
significant effect of this concentration is that marginal areas remain 
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marginalized and their governance issues which may infact be 
fundamentally different than the Nairobi based, remain unaddressed. 
Moreover, their capacity to analyse and articulate their own concerns 
remains underdeveloped. 
 
Fourthly, the type of the NGOs= leadership is significant in shaping their rela tions with 
the state. Virtually all the Self-help NGOs had leaders who were KANU members. This 
could be explained by the long legacy of the one-party state, where Maendeleo Ya 
Wanawake and its women=s groups members were expected to affiliate with KANU and 
therefore become channels of mobilization for the party. Association with the ruling party 
was equated with development and thus the reference to the chairladies of women=s 
groups as Mama Maendeleo (Swahili word for progressive woman). Many of the 
chairladies of the women=s groups remain members of the ruling party, KANU. The 
same applied to the leadership of at least three of the formal NGOs which had KANU 
functionaries that at one time or the other had vied for competitive political positions on 
the party=s ticket. The point, therefore, is that there are all the possibilities that the 
leadership of most of the NGOs being pro-KANU and therefore pro-establishment, may 
have influenced the behaviour and posture of these organizations towards being less 
confrontational with the state and more involved with development rather than political 
activism. 
 
Summary and conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to trace the nature and growth of the NGO movement in 
Kenya from its colonial roots noting that mission-based organizations, and later African 
welfare associations, dominated the scene during this period. Overall, the colonial state 
was anti-civil society to the extent that it repressed organizations that tended to 
challenge its policies and practices. Pressure for political independence, it can be 
argued, had its beginnings in the formation of these associations which took on a 
protest function against the injustices of the colonial state. 
 
The post-colonial state has been characterised largely by authoritarianism emanating 
from the long period of one-partyism. Authoritarianism in both the Kenyatta and Moi 
regimes tended to limit the space of civil society. However, the Kenyatta period is still 
credited for the Harambee movement, which acted as a stimulus to the promotion of the 
voluntary sector. The Moi era, beginning from 1978, was in the main an attempt to 
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personalize political power, accompanied by the declaration of Kenya as a de jure one-
party state. In the absence of opposition political parties, NGOs and other civil society 
organizations became more or less the only viable channel through which the 
oppressive state could be challenged. These efforts, with the assistance of international 
pressure, bore fruit with the re-establishment of a multi-party political system in late 
1991. However, it has been contended that in spite of returning Kenya to a multi-party 
state, opposition parties have continued to be riddled with divisions based on ethnicity 
and personal ambitions to the extent that this has weakened their ability and capacity to 
challenge the Moi regime. The deep weaknesses of the opposition parties have in turn 
meant continued involvement of mostly urban NGOs and civil society in the politics of 
change, especially constitutional reform. However, this is not to deny the fact that some 
NGOs, for patronage reasons, have solidly supported the regime in power. 
 
But as illustrated in the discussion, the state has developed many forms of responses 
towards the activities of NGOs and civil society. These have included legislation, 
administrative co-optation, political appropriation, resort to propaganda to tarnish NGOs= 
reputation, emasculation by the removal of leaders deemed to be anti-regime, and 
reconstitution of NGOs into new organizations through governmental fiat. However, the 
state has not always remained adamant to the demands by NGOs. There are examples 
where the state has given in, albeit grudgingly, to NGOs= demands for political reform as 
in the cases of the KANU Review Committee that reinstated the security of tenure for 
the judges and the Attorney General, and the scrapping of the unpopular queue-voting 
system. Other examples include the removal of section 2A of the constitution that 
returned Kenya to being a multi-party state, and the IPPG constitutional negotiations 
that introduced some minimal desired constitutional and administrative reforms. 
 
Beside involvement in politics, NGOs have continued to participate in development. To 
this extent, the Government has recognised the contribution of NGOs to the 
development process. NGOs are expected to fit their development programmes within 
the national framework and thus the Government requirement that they work under the 
DFRD strategy based on the District as the core planning unit. 
 
Western Province, the study=s focus, has experienced a number of development 
bottlenecks which to some extent has occasioned the in-flow of NGOs to the area. 
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Politically, the Province has tended to closely identify with KANU, the ruling party, since 
Kenya=s independence in the early 1960s. Support for opposition politics has been 
minimal as illustrated by the overwhelming votes President Moi and KANU 
parliamentary aspirants have garnered in the two past multi-party elections of 1992 and 
1997. The same pattern has been repeated at local government level where, local 
authorities are controlled and dominated by KANU councillors. A likely reason for the 
region=s support for the regime could be captured in the explanations provided by 
patron-client politics in terms of giving political support in exchange for the ever scarce 
development resources at the disposal of the state. NGOs in the area have tended to be 
less confrontational and more developmental in nature. This could be partly explained 
by their poor resource base, the fact that they are essentially rural NGOs, and their pro-
KANU and pro-establishment leadership. All in all, the NGOs as a consequence, have 
been incorporated into the patron-client networks involving the state and its 
functionaries. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5.0 NGOs AND THE STATE: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THEIR RELATIONS  
      AND IMPACT ON RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN WESTERN PROVINCE 
 
The contribution of NGOs to the promotion of rural development, as earlier noted, has 
been publicly acknowledged by the state in various government documents. This 
increased role of the NGO sector in development has been occasioned by the shrinking 
capacity of the Kenyan state to intervene in development. The declining role of the state 
has been a function of both internal and external factors. Internally, the fact that the 
capturing and consolidation of state power by the political elite is based on the control of 
state resources rather than genuine production has given birth to the patron-client 
networks which, in turn, have encouraged the plunder of development resources 
through mismanagement, mis-allocation and extensive corruption perpetrated by both 
the political and bureaucratic elite. Externally, the state, depending on one=s perception, 
has been seen as either the victim or the culprit of the >New Development Agenda= that 
places focus on the private sector and market forces in the process of development, 
thus bypassing the state while strengthening the role of NGOs in development. 
 
The seeming disengagement of the state from the development space whether A...by 
choice or by necessity...@ to quote Taylor (1992:31), then leads to the question of  the 
relevance of the state to the process of development. The Kenyan state through fora 
such as the District Development Committees (DDCs), has established a mechanism of 
not only attempting to control but also co-ordinate NGO activities at local level. In 
addition to NGO-state interaction at the DDC forums, the Provincial Administration 
network of Sub-Chiefs, Chiefs, and District Officers is expected to act as a link between 
 NGOs and local communities at the grassroots. Further NGO-state relations are to be 
found within the workings of NGOs and the respective ministries of the government that 
ought to provide certain guidelines and technical support to NGOs. Sandberg (1994:22-
27), in his analysis of NGO-state relations, gives a model that depicts the various ways 
that characterise these relationships in Africa: 
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(a) A model where there are no formal relations between the state and the NGO sector 
in terms of control and co-ordination of activities via institutionalized meetings etc based 
on the assumption that the state has no functional role vis-a-vis the NGOs. 
(b) A model where a state establishes a single government office to centrally co-
ordinate NGO activities countrywide. 
(c) Co-ordination of NGO - state relations by each ministry within its sectoral jurisdiction. 
(d) Co-ordination at the level of decentralized local government, where the co-ordination 
of NGO activities is by local government. 
(e) A stratified, multi-focussed institutional arrangement which is essentially a 
synthesized model advocating for stratified, multi-focussed NGO -state relations. 
As per the analysis of the Kenyan situation, Sandberg=s fifth model seems to be the 
most applicable considering that in addition to the local level co-ordination, NGOs are 
also required to register with the NGO Board and the NGO Council at the national level. 
 
5.1 Patterns of interaction and influence between Formal NGOs and the state 
Literature on NGO-state relations, beside the format of interaction, has mainly focussed 
on the nature of the relationship in terms of conflict and co-operation (Bratton, 1987; 
Fowler, 1990; Ndegwa, 1996; Opoku-Mensah, 1996; Clark, 1997; Edwards and Hulme, 
1997; Dicklitch, 1998; Gariyo, 1998). Among factors accounting for the particular 
prevailing relations are: the type of NGO, its objectives and activities (Clark, 1997:36-52; 
Dicklitch, 1998:6-8); the level of and intensity at which the NGO has taken on the state=s 
development role and therefore impact on its legitimacy (Gariyo, 1998:135-136); and, 
the nature and types of organizational forms and approaches to development vis-a-vis 
the NGO and the state (Bratton, 1987; Opoku-Mensah, 1996; Edwards and Hulme, 
1997:16).  
 
In the effort to understand the role of the state vis-a-vis NGOs in rural development in 
Western Kenya, government officers in charge of rural development projects and 
programmes at District level were interviewed. There was a general consensus that 
unlike the NGOs= emphasis on micro-projects, the State=s concern has been with 
relatively macro-projects such as rural access roads, electrification programmes, and 
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rural health centres with clientele beyond sub-locational level, among others. As put by 
a District Commissioner (DC) in an opening speech to his junior government officers: 
The Government is expected to confine itself mainly to providing the 
enabling environment to investors by providing and maintaining essential 
infrastructure, investing in human resource development and basic 
welfare and where necessary putting in place regulatory mechanism to 
guard against human exploitation and environmental degradation (DDC, 
1998a: 2). 
 
These observations from government officials concur with the stated policies of the 
Government of Kenya as concerns rural development (see the District and National 
Development Plans). Whereas in some instances the Government projects rely for 
implementation on joint efforts of the would-be beneficiaries and the Government 
personnel (technical ministries and the provincial administration), as in harambee 
projects where the Government steps in to bolster local community efforts, the common 
practice has been for the Government to initiate rural development projects without the 
direct involvement of the communities. Such a development approach on the part of the 
Government could easily be held responsible for the dependent attitudes that tend to be 
widespread in the rural areas. Bratton (1987:11), commenting on the role of the African 
State in development, has argued that ABecause they distrust independent initiative, 
African governments have too often fallen back on regulation as a mechanism for 
propelling change in the countryside...Far from capitalizing on rural folks= genuine desire 
to develop themselves, the African state has usually relied on standardized regulations 
that have discouraged voluntary initiative and led to popular disillusionment.@   
 
Information gathered from the Government officers interviewed, minutes of DDC 
meetings and special reports, and from field observations indicated that most rural 
projects initiated by the Government lay incomplete for long periods and in some 
instances had been neglected and abandoned. Examples of such projects included:  
rural access roads such as the Stand-Kisa to Khumusalaba road among many others;  
rural health centres and even the Mbale District Hospital that has been more or less 
abandoned halfway through ten years since its construction began; and piped-water 
supply projects such as the Emuhaya constituency one that had been ear-marked in the 
1970s. A critical analysis of the Government projects= implementation record in two 
sectors based on Vihiga District, as an example, points towards a higher completion 
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rate record in the cases where the Government has collaborated with say a foreign 
donor as opposed to the situation of the Government handling the project singly. For 
instance, the Ministry of Public Works, out of a total of thirteen projects, had managed to 
complete only five, of which one was a joint venture with the Chinese Government. The 
remaining eight projects, all fully undertaken by the Government, were incomplete (DDC 
 Report, 1997). In yet another example from the Ministry of Health, there was a higher 
success rate in project completion just because most of the projects undertaken (fifteen) 
were joint ventures between the Government of Kenya and either foreign donors or 
NGOs (DDC Report, 1997).  
 
 
Table 8: Ministry of Health Projects in Vihiga District, 1992-1997 
 
 
Division 
 
Name of 
project 
 
Nature of 
project 
 
Anticip-
ated 
period 
of 
comple-
tion 
 
Total 
cost in 
millions 
and 
hundre- 
ds of 
Ksh. 
 
Finan- 
cier 
 
Current 
status 
 
Sabatia 
 
Bukina Health 
Centre 
 
Provision of 
health services 
and facilities 
 
1995 
 
9.7 m 
 
Govt. 
Of 
Kenya 
(GOK) 
 
Not 
complete. 
 
 
 
Kegondi 
 
Health services 
and facilities 
 
1995 
 
9.8 m 
 
GOK 
 
Complete 
 
 
 
Nadanya 
dispensary 
 
Health services 
and facilities 
 
1997 
 
1.8m 
 
IFAD & 
GOK 
 
Complete 
 
 
 
Sabatia 
Health Centre 
 
Health services 
and facilities 
 
1995 
 
1.5m 
 
KEN-
AFYA & 
GOK 
 
Complete 
 
 
 
Sabatia Eye 
Hospital 
 
Optical health 
services 
 
1994 
 
30m. 
 
Lions 
Club  
 
Complete 
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Emuhaya 
 
Emuhaya 
Health Centre 
 
Renovation 
and expansion 
 
1993 
 
1.0m 
 
KEN-
AFYA & 
GOK 
 
Complete 
 
 
 
Esirambats 
Health Centre 
 
Renovation 
and expansion 
 
1995 
 
963985 
 
KEN-
AFYA 
and 
GOK 
 
Complete 
 
 
 
Ebusiratsi 
Health Centre 
 
Renovation 
and expansion 
 
1995 
 
912351 
 
KEN-
AFYA 
and 
GOK 
 
Complete 
 
 
 
Ekwanda 
Heath Centre 
 
Health services 
and facilities 
 
1994 
 
3.9 
 
KEN- 
AFYA, 
GOK  & 
IFAD 
 
Complete 
 
 
 
Musitinyi 
Health Centre 
 
Health services 
and facilities 
 
1996 
 
1.6m 
 
IFAD 
FGCS 
& GOK 
 
Complete 
 
Tiriki West 
 
Tigoi Health 
Centre 
 
Renovation 
and expansion 
 
1994 
 
903116 
 
KEN-
AFYA 
and 
GOK 
 
Complete 
 
 
 
Banja Health 
Centre 
 
Renovation 
and expansion 
 
1994 
 
689116 
 
KEN-
AFYA 
and 
GOK 
 
Complete 
 
 
 
Likindu Health 
Centre 
 
Health services 
and facilities 
 
1995 
 
2.4m 
 
IFAD 
and 
GOK 
 
Complete 
 
Tiriki East 
 
Serem 
Dispensary 
 
Health services 
and Facilities 
 
1995 
 
1.9 
 
IFAD 
and 
GOK 
 
Complete 
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 Shiru 
Dispensary 
Renovation 
and expansion 
1994 503000 KEN-
AFYA 
and 
GOK 
Complete 
 
Vihiga 
 
Enzaro Health 
Centre Phase 
1 
 
Health services 
and facilities 
 
1993 
 
2.3 
 
JIKA 
and 
GOK 
 
Complete 
 
 
 
Enzaro Health 
Centre Phase 
2 
 
Construction of 
sceptic water 
tanks and 
generator 
house 
 
1994 
 
1.2 
 
GOK 
 
Complete 
 
 
 
Lyanaginga 
Health Centre 
 
Renovation 
 
1995 
 
983000 
 
KEN-
AFYA 
and 
GOK 
 
Complete 
 
Source : DDC Report, 1997. 
 
Table 9: Ministry of Public Works projects in Vihiga District, 1992-1997 
 
 
Division 
 
Project 
 
Nature of 
project 
 
Anticip-
ated 
period 
of 
comple-
tion 
 
Cost of 
project in 
millions 
and 
hundre- 
ds of 
Ksh. 
 
Finan- 
cier 
 
Status 
 
Emuhaya 
 
Stand-Kisa-
Khumusal- 
aba road 
 
Construction of 
road 
 
1993 
 
243m 
 
GOK 
 
Not 
complete 
 
 
 
Kima-Ematsi 
road 
 
Construction of 
road 
 
1993 
 
18m 
 
GOK 
 
Not 
complete 
  
Waluka 
Bridge 
 
Construction of 
bridge 
    
Not 
complete 
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 Bridge bridge 1993 600000 GOK complete 
 
 
 
Atsaya Bridge 
 
Construction of 
bridge 
 
1993 
 
243000 
 
GOK 
 
Not 
complete 
 
 
 
Ebusubi 
bridge 
 
Construction of 
bridge 
 
1993 
 
not 
availab- 
le 
 
GOK 
 
Complete 
 
Tiriki West 
 
Serem-
Gambogi  
 
Construction of 
road 
 
1994 
 
394m 
 
GOK 
and 
China 
Govt. 
 
Complete 
 
 
 
Sungura 
bridge 
 
Construction of 
bridge 
 
 
 
1.3m 
 
GOK 
 
Complete 
 
Vihiga 
 
Bukura-
Mwilonje 
 
Construction of 
road 
 
 
 
25m 
 
GOK 
 
Not 
complete 
 
 
 
Mbihi bridge 
 
Construction of 
bridge 
 
1993 
 
400000 
 
GOK 
 
Not 
complete 
 
 
 
Mugogo 
bridge 
 
Construction of 
bridge 
 
1997 
 
1.0 m 
 
GOK 
 
Not 
complete 
 
 
 
Angoya Drift 
 
 
 
1996 
 
 
 
GOK 
 
Complete 
 
Sabatia 
 
Wandede 
bridge 
 
 
 
 
 
1.3m 
 
GOK 
 
Complete 
 
 
 
Wasundi 
bridge 
 
 
 
 
 
4.5m 
 
GOK 
 
Not 
complete 
 
Source: DDC Special Report, 1997. 
 
Asked to point out the reasons responsible for the many incomplete Government 
projects, shortage and misuse of development funds was pointed out by the 
Government officers as the most serious obstacle followed by inadequate qualified 
personnel who are also lethargic when it comes to  implementation of projects, and 
thirdly, indifference to government initiated development projects by some would-be 
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beneficiaries. Misuse of development funds in the form of embezzlement was quite clear 
especially at local government level where, like in Vihiga Municipality, senior officers 
had been implicated and placed on forced leave pending thorough investigations. The 
DC of Kakamega, in one of the DDC meetings while calling for the eradication of the 
vice of corruption amongst government officers, lamented that even government 
vehicles had been cited ferrying illegally, private goods such as charcoal, and that in 
another incident Municipal Council Officers had given out land meant for a cemetery to 
a private developer (DDC, 1998a:3). Himbara=s observation that the post-colonial period 
in Kenya has witnessed A...incompetence of severe proportions...financial indiscipline, 
failure to regulate and maintain economic infrastructure, and inability to implement 
development goals....@, is closely mirrored in these findings. 
 
The issue of red tape and general lethargy within the public bureaucracy seems to be 
real and therefore acting as a major constraint to the successful implementation of 
government sponsored projects. Visits to government offices and project sites (eg. 
agricultural and veterinary extension services to farmers) revealed a lack of commitment 
on the part of government officers in charge of certain tasks. Incidents of either late 
reporting to work or total absence were common, leaving many tasks ill-performed. In 
one of the Vihiga District Executive Committee (DEC) meetings it was thus recorded: 
The committee noted that complaints had been received from members of 
the public on poor service delivery despite government voting funds for 
provision of services. Heads of Departments were advised to be vigilant 
and improve on this as time was running out for culprits (DEC, 1995a:5). 
 
However, non-commitment to work should not conceal the serious lack of adequate 
human, material, and financial resources which impinges on the effectiveness and 
ability of the Government to play its development roles. There was a lot of evidence to 
verify this point. One of the departments under the Ministry of Culture and Social 
Services, while endeavouring to do a good job in terms of mobilization of communities 
into groups for purposes of benefiting from a water project sponsored by an inter-
governmental organization, and in training leaders of group projects, reported an acute 
shortage of personnel as well as vehicles to handle the tasks (DEC, 1995b:2-4). In 
Kakamega District, the Medical Officer of Health (MOH) lamented, for instance, that one 
of the health centres (Iguhu Hospital), while the top priority of the District, had been 
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getting only a fraction of what was requested for and that the project had stalled since 
1986 (DDC, 1998b:5). Field observations were even more revealing whereby 
government vehicle parking yards were full of broken down motor vehicles that were 
simply not being repaired, some with very minor faults. Public offices lacked simple 
basics such as stationary to ensure that work goes on. In a telling statement of a 
frustrated government officer, one of the District Development Officers (DDOs) charged: 
The aim of DFRD was to decentralize. However decentralization has 
never been complete from the headquarters to the district level for lack of 
resources....Inadequate human and material resources have led the 
Government to almost withdraw from the development process (Interview 
with Kakamega DDO, 10th December 1999,Kakamega). 
 
Reluctance to give full support and to identify with government projects by the 
wanaanchi (Swahili word for ordinary citizens) was also common. The use and 
maintenance of government projects such as government hospitals and other amenities 
had been totally run-down or left to decay. All these could be captured in the commonly 
used Swahili term of maliyauma, which means that, being government or public property 
it belonged to none and therefore required no special attention or care. Chaiken 
(1987:9), conducting a study on the implementation of Primary Health Care in Mbita 
division, South Nyanza, similarly came across such an attitude from the wanaanchi and 
proceeded to observe, AFor the people of Mbita division it seems to make little difference 
whether the new programme originates with the central government or at the district 
level. In either case, their perception remains the same, that this is a government 
programme for which the  government should take management responsibility@. 
 
Some of these factors hindering the delivery of goods and services to the rural poor by 
the African State have been listed elsewhere as responsible for the failure of several 
rural development programmes, in the case of Kenya a good example being that of the 
Special Rural Development Programme implemented in the 1970s (see Livingstone, 
1976; Alila, 1988). Taylor (1992:23, citing Beckman) has for instance noted, 
State structures in the Third World are widely regarded as rigid, inefficient, 
overstaffed and corrupt, systematically exploiting their privileged status to 
provide minimal services to the public and extract monopoly rents from 
their clients while conducting their business in secret to defend their 
activities from public scrutiny and control. 
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The intervention of NGOs in rural development in Western province of Kenya could  
thus be partly explained by the failures of the state in development. While publicly 
acknowledging the role of NGOs in view of the fact that the state is faced with several 
problems such as of scarce resources, from interviews with government officers as well 
as minutes of DDC meetings, it was clear that the state interpreted the role of NGOs in 
development as being a supplementary one. This viewpoint could be captured in the 
state theme of >Partnership, Networking, and Collaboration= in its relations with NGOs 
and local communities. It is also this thinking on the part of the state that could explain 
the insistence that NGOs participate in government forums such as the DDC to obtain 
approval for their development proposals. Asked to explain the need for NGOs to 
participate in DDCs, the government officers argued it enables the government to vet 
their proposals to make them relevant to local development needs, as well as giving a 
chance to both the NGOs and the Government to learn from each other. Such 
collaboration is expected to minimize duplication of effort, and in some cases, wastage 
of resources. This thinking underpins Bratton=s (1987:21) assertion that , AIf NGOs are 
permitted to start development activities by whim or fancy, there is a danger that scarce 
development resources will be wasted. Rational planning through a formal framework, 
co-ordinated from a central vantage point, holds out the promise of even service 
coverage and the avoidance of duplication.@ However, in as much as such 
rationalisation of NGO-state relations has some credibility, certain statements uttered by 
government officials seem to hide the other real objective of such >co-ordination= which 
is driven by fear and suspicion on the part of either party. In several DDC and DEC 
meetings, government officials expressed fear and doubt on the real intentions of 
NGOs. In one of the incidents, DEC members were advised by the DC to be vigilant 
whenever invited by the NGOs to their functions and seminars, and always to be in 
charge to ensure that the topics were for the benefit of the participants and the sector 
concerned, as it had been noted that NGOs elsewhere had in the past used such 
forums negatively (DEC, 1995a:5). ANegative@ in this context could be extended to mean 
>incitement= of local communities to stand up to claim and defend their rights from  state 
abuse. Such a warning from the DC, who chairs the DDC and DEC meetings, is 
significant in reflecting the view of the state considering that the DC is part of the 
Provincial Administration system in charge of law and order, and he is actually the direct 
 
 141 
representative of the President at District level. Further confirming the suspect relations 
between NGOs and the state was the Kakamega DDO who when asked to comment on 
NGO-state relations argued, 
The relationship is not yet well developed. Neither actor fully appreciates 
the role of the other as equal and important actors. Accusations and witch 
hunting continue due to incomplete networking and suspicion. When it 
comes to funding, NGOs are very closed. Most are corrupt and only 
operate as private businesses, and most do not operate on the ground 
although they claim to do so (Interview with Kakamega DDO, 10th 
December 1999, Kakamega).  
 
The Vihiga DDO, also shared a similar sentiment on NGO funding and operations in 
observing that, ANGOs do not indicate sources o f funding nor monies available to them. 
Most are absentee NGOs which are registered but do not undertake any projects@ 
(Interview with Vihiga DDO, 30th November 1999, Mbale). 
 
Whereas NGOs are expected to attend all DDC meetings when scheduled, available 
evidence indicated that very few of them did so. On several occasions the DDC 
Chairmen lambasted NGOs for not attending the meetings without any apologies (DDC, 
1998c:2; DDC, 1998d:3; DDC, 1999a:2). Even some specific meetings for NGOs alone 
had been called by the DDC without any success (DDC, 1998d:2). The DDC (1998c:2) 
meeting=s minute on NGO non-attendance of meetings for instance reads as follows: AIn 
his opening remarks the chairman welcomed the members and commended them for 
coming on time. However, he took issue with NGOs which failed to attend DDC 
meetings. He felt that all NGOs in the district should be represented at all DDC 
meetings and requested the DDO to take action by writing to them and informing the 
chairman if there was a problem.@ NGO general failure to attend such meetings has 
caused irritation and embarrassment to the government, leading to the feeling that 
NGOs tend to hold government officials in low esteem. For example, in one DDC 
meeting (1999b:6), it was recorded: 
The chairman noted that although the government appreciated the 
supplementary role NGOs were playing in development it was not happy 
with some of them who failed to consult it and other development 
agencies as required to ensure effective partnership and collaboration. 
 
This widespread failure by NGOs to attend the Government DDC meetings required an 
explanation. Whereas most NGO managers interviewed cited the factor of being too 
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busy to attend such meetings and that on some occasions it was the Government to 
blame for not sending out invitation letters on time, it would appear that there was also 
fear and suspicion of the intentions of the Government and hence NGO non-attendance 
of meetings was chosen as the easy way out. These fears could be prompted by the 
already mentioned habit of NGOs wanting to keep secret their sources of funding and 
the actual amounts at their disposal lest the Government interferes by demanding too 
much from them in terms of sponsoring development projects. Alternatively, it has been 
suspected that a number of NGOs are just as corrupt as the state and thus avoid as 
much any transparency and accountability that may expose their malpractices. A recent 
article in the Daily Nation (1999) supports this suggestion: 
NGOs in Kenya have come under heavy criticism over utilisation, 
management and accountability of resources. While NGOs have often 
criticized mismanagement in government, some of them may just be as 
guilty of the same vices as the government....To many NGOs, 
accountability and transparency have been narrowly interpreted to mean 
periodically furnishing donors with narrative and financial statements. 
However, the question is whether NGOs should seek to only satisfy the 
requirements of those who fund them and not those on whose behalf they 
accept funds. 
 
 
A third likely explanation was the fear by NGOs of the Government changing or 
influencing their development priority plans to suit its own. Ng=ethe, Mitullah and Ngunyi 
(1990:136), have for example posed the question: AWhereas the idea of integrating 
NGOs into the DFRD seems appropriate,....How, for instance, does the Government 
convince an NGO that the priority of a certain area is water and not a health centre, if 
both are felt needs in the area and the NGO=s preference is the health centre?@ They 
continue that, AFor the most part, the NGO will opt for its preference and in the event of 
further conflict over an area=s priority, the NGO will even threaten to withdraw....The 
potential source of the conflict lies in the fact that, more often than not, NGOs are likely 
to fund only those projects, or remaining priorities which they consider important.@ 
 
Whereas Western Kenya has provided no strong evidence of outright hostility between 
the state and the NGOs, leading to harsh measures such as banning or deregistration, 
(confirmed by interviews with both government officers and NGO project managers), the 
state of suspicion between the two actors persists especially in relation to development 
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goals and approaches.  
 
However, there were also several areas of collaboration between NGOs and the state. 
These included:  
(a) The provision of technical expertise by Government Ministries to help in the 
formulation, implementation and evaluation of NGO projects among the communities. 
CHAK for instance, had forged working relations with the Ministry of Health in the 
implementation of its Family Planning and Community-Based Health Care programmes. 
KENGO and KWAP, operating in the sector of the environment, consulted with 
Ministries of Energy and Environment on matters to do with the training of beneficiaries 
on environmental issues, as well as in having relevant government officers to help 
farmers implement and sustain, through monitoring, the established projects. These 
consultations between NGOs and the Government, tend to take the form of joint field 
demonstrations and seminars. Some NGOs had also sponsored a number of seminars 
and workshops for Government officers. Most of these seminars and workshops were 
aimed at exchanging ideas on various aspects of development. As observed by the 
Kakamega DDO: 
NGOs occasionally invite government officers to seminars to tap 
important development information especially related to matters to do with 
policy and statistics. In most cases NGOs tend to lack human resources 
necessary for implementing technical projects and thus rely on 
government officers (Interview with Kakamega DDO, 10th December 
1999, Kakamega). 
 
(b) The mobilization of local communities by the Provincial Administration to create 
awareness of NGOs= activities in their areas of operation. In particular, the Office of the 
Sub-Chief at sub-location level, and that of the Chief at location level, were very 
significant in that they are literally the closest a mwanaanchi comes to interacting with 
the Government. Their authority as symbols of the Government made it easier for them 
to mobilize the communities through barazas (Swahili word for local meetings organized 
by the Office of the Chief) to welcome and participate in new NGO development 
activities. Indeed, as illustrated in the interviews with NGO officials, this lower cadre of 
the Provincial Administration was a significant link between them and the grassroots 
and that they had to strive to keep good working relations with the Office. 
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(c)The extension of financial assistance by the state, however meagre, in the form of 
grants to some of the national NGOs. Whereas this might sound a contradiction in that, 
for the greater part, it is the state that is resource deprived, two NGOs gave evidence of 
having benefited from state grants. CEEDA, an NGO based in Kakamega and largely 
concerned with local capacity building of women=s groups, had been one of such 
beneficiaries. PRIDE Kenya provided a second example of an NGO that had also been 
a recipient of a state grant to facilitate its activities. These two NGOs, in a sense, 
provide a rare example of a patron-client relationship between them as formal NGOs on 
the one hand, and the state on the other, with the state acting as the patron. This 
peculiar relation impacted on the nature of relationship forged between these NGOs and 
the state in that they tended to be overtly pro-state and avoided any >sensitive= issues 
that would put them on a confrontational path with the state. CEEDA=s case was even 
more interesting considering that its manager who also served as the director of the 
organization, was a member of the Provincial Administration in the capacity of Chief. 
Being part of the Government arm by virtue of his employment, it can be convincingly 
argued that, CEEDA then, had to follow policies in support of the regime. As argued by 
Ndegwa (1996:112), personal leadership of an organization in terms of the leader=s 
political predisposition can very much influence the direction the organization takes in its 
relations with the state. The closer an organization=s association with the establishment 
figures, the less the possibility of direct (oppositional) political action by the organization. 
 
Overall, when synthesized, relations between formal NGOs and the state in Western  
Province constitute a mixed bag of fear and mistrust as well as collaboration in certain 
situations. Fear and mistrust of the state, where it did occur, seems to be prompted by 
NGOs= desire to keep the state at length in an attempt to conceal sources of funding 
and the financial resources at their disposal. Equally important is the desire by NGOs to 
determine, to a large measure, their development priority areas with little if any state 
interference. On its part, the state=s driving motive in its relations with the NGO sector 
seems to be the desire to control NGO development activities to fit its own development 
agenda. However, to some extent, as illustrated by the findings, the state was 
apprehensive of the use the NGO sector can put its resources to without being closely 
monitored. Possibilities of NGOs, if left to >roam=, using their resources to destabilize the 
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state by indulging in >negative= activities remains a major concern of the state through its 
Provincial Administration. But there are also areas of collaboration between the state 
and the NGOs. The NGOs need the Provincial Administration to be able to mobilize the 
grassroots. Also, the NGOs require the Government technical Ministries on issues to do 
with technical expertise and in scaling -up their development projects. The state, 
wherever possible, relies on the larger and richer NGOs for funding in training its 
government officers in areas that touch on new development thinking. 
 
5.2 Relations between Self-help NGOs and the state 
The concept of self-help NGO, as discussed earlier, connotes a voluntary organization 
whose main purpose is to serve the interests of its members. It is basically a 
community-based organization that is local in nature. Women=s groups, one of the most 
popular forms of self-help NGOs in Kenya, are essentially female organizations in 
membership and leadership and whose modern history dates back to the colonial 
period. 
 
The earliest forms of the women=s groups can be traced to Central and Eastern 
Provinces of Kenya where groups of women came together for social welfare purposes 
and individual advancement through contributing money on a merry-go-round basis 
(Feldman, 1984:68; Chitere, 1994:147-148). However, it has been argued, these efforts 
by the local communities to form women=s groups were independent of the colonial 
state=s efforts to build a formal women=s groups movement in the country. These  
consisted of the so-called Maendeleo Clubs, which were basically urban-based and 
European in membership (Heasman, in Chitere, 1994:148). 
 
The independent Government of Kenya, relying on harambee to mobilize and extract 
resources from the communities for development purposes (Mutiso, 1975 : 268-270), 
encouraged the consolidation of the women=s groups phenomenon which became 
known as Maendeleo Ya Wanawake (a national umbrella organization for women=s 
groups). It inherited the structure of the colonial women=s organization - the Maendeleo 
Clubs. Government efforts to co-ordinate the women=s groups movement was witnessed 
in 1975 through the formation of the Women=s Bureau, which in itself was a division of 
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the Department of Social Services under the Ministry of Culture and Social Services. 
The main role of the Bureau was to allocate funds to groups (Maas, 1991:10). With 
increased financial assistance to women=s groups from both the Government and non-
governmental agencies, their focus (groups) increasingly shifted to economically-
oriented or income-generating activities (Chitere, 1994:149). 
 
The incorporation of the women=s groups into the harambee ideology largely ended up 
politicising the movement. While the regimes of the Kenyatta and Moi governments 
extended financial and material assistance to these groups in an attempt to capture their 
backing, local politicians vying for positions such as those of member of parliament (MP) 
and local government councillor have also extended resources to these groups in 
exchange for political support and clout (see Mutiso, 1975:270-271; Chitere, 1994:148; 
Haugerud, 1995:46). Indeed, the move by the Moi regime to co-opt Maendeleo Ya 
Wanawake as part of the ruling party (KANU) in 1989, was a clear message of the 
significance the regime placed on women=s groups as a political force (Barkan, 
1992:187; Wipper, 1995:174;  Hunt, 1999:6). 
 
In attempting to trace the nature of relations between the state and self-help NGOs in 
Western Province, the eight chairpersons of the groups in the sample were asked to 
describe their relations with the state. By state, we included the Provincial 
Administration, the Government technical Ministries, and local politicians. The role of the 
Provincial Administration, especially the ranks of Chief and Sub-chief, came out largely 
as that one of linkage between the groups and their would-be patrons. The women=s 
groups being mainly small (on average 20-25 members), local and rural-based 
organizations, regarded Chiefs and Sub-chiefs as actors that could successfully link 
them to the local power elites of politicians whom they met occasionally in meetings 
such as the Sub-location and Location Development Committees. But even more 
important, was the role of the local administration and local politicians in forwarding the 
funding needs of these women=s groups to the various Development Committees. The 
funds were mainly sourced from the Rural Development Fund (RDF), which was 
established in 1975. These funds, in the form of District Development Grants (DDG), 
and Appropriation in Aid, are directed respectively towards the purchase of project in-
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puts, and training of groups mainly in managerial skills. However, to qualify, groups 
must be duly registered with the Ministry of Culture and Social Services and have the 
three office bearers of chairperson, secretary and treasurer. Three of the groups 
(Esabalu, Nziwa, and Kitenge) in the sample had been beneficiaries of RDF in one way 
or another. For instance, Nziwa and Esabalu groups had benefited from training 
sponsored by the Government. Nziwa had further been assisted by a Government grant 
to purchase a maizemill for commercial purposes. These findings of assistance, 
however minimal,  to women=s groups by the Government have been confirmed in other 
studies. Maas (1991:58-59), in a study on women=s groups at the Kenyan Coast, found 
that at least one group in ten (in Kilifi District) over a two year period, had benefited from 
such funding while at least 11% of registered groups in Kwale District had similarly 
received such funding. Chitere (1994:154), in a study on women=s groups in Kakamega, 
Nyeri and Machakos, reported evidence of accessibility to such funds.  
 
But funding of women=s groups was not limited to the RDF under the DDC. As earlier 
noted, harambee was yet another significant means through which groups raised further 
funds considering that Government funds were minimal. In this instance, the ability to 
have political connections with some of the local elite mattered much. In one example, a 
parliamentarian had managed to raise a substantial amount of money (approximately 
200,000 Kenya Shillings) for two of the groups through fund raising in 1991, just a year 
prior to the 1992 multi-party general elections. These monies, while aimed at benefiting 
the women=s groups by buying posho mills that could be used to generate income, were 
also meant to promote the political image of the concerned politician. Reliance on 
harambee funds encouraged stiff competition amongst groups in their search for local 
patrons who could be influential enough to bring along other patrons to be able to raise 
substantial money. Commenting on the politicization of contributions to women=s 
groups, Chitere (1994:157), in an earlier study elsewhere noted, AIn some cases, visiting 
Government ministers and senior civil servants have had to commit themselves to assist 
groups which under normal circumstances would never qualify for such assistance. In a 
number of cases, politicians and a number of influential individuals, depending on their 
own interests, may give such groups cash handouts to be shared among members.@ On 
her part, Maas (1991:59) lamented, ASince there are already relatively many groups (in 
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her case, Kwale and Kilifi Districts), and their number is only expected to increase, the 
Government will not be able to assist all these groups...funds are scarce and the 
women=s groups find themselves in competition with each other@. She adds, ATo get 
access to private organizations for funding and assistance is, it seems, largely a matter 
of knowing someone who can introduce the group to a particular organization, and of 
group members who are actively promoting the group=s progress.@ The politicization of 
harambee to raise funds for groups in exchange for political support for the elite, should 
however, not be seen as an entirely new phenomenon, but rather a continuation of a 
political practice with its roots in the late 1960s. Mutiso (1975: 271), commenting on the 
activities of Mbai sya Eitu, a women=s group in Ukambani, observed a similar pattern 
where a local member of parliament manipulated the group to provide what he calls a 
public forum in exchange for a harambee contribution. 
 
While the regime in power and local politicians exploit women=s groups to secure 
political support through the established patron-client networks, the operations of these 
groups also benefit the state in many other ways. The interviews revealed that these 
groups serve as important community entry points. Government related development  
policies in the areas of agriculture, environmental conservation, family planning and 
community health care, and even political propaganda aimed at keeping the 
Government in power, have to some extent been directed to the grassroots 
communities in the rural areas through women=s groups. Thus, the groups serve both as 
community entry points and community mobilization channels. This facilitates the state=s 
penetrative mechanism in the rural areas. This is no doubt, a supplementary function to 
that of the state=s bureaucracy, especially in areas where it is thin on the ground. 
Emulundu women=s group, one of the largest in the sample, had for instance, effectively 
played the role of disseminating knowledge on family planning and community health 
care to the local community through training and demonstrations. The members of this 
group had in turn been exposed to this specialized knowledge through intensive 
seminars and workshops sponsored by NGOs and the Government. In her study of 
women=s groups at the Kenyan Coast, Maas (1991:44-46) established (as in this study) 
that these groups performed certain roles on behalf of their communities in areas as far 
ranging as community health care, adult literacy, provision of clean water etc. and were 
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therefore complementing government efforts. To this extent, this study may want to 
agree with Gooneratne=s and Mbilinyi=s (1992:265) conclusion that ALocal institutions 
form the bedrock of local development. They co-ordinate the energies and skills of local 
people in organizing society and making use of its resources.@ However, with such close 
contact with the Government, local organizations run the risk of being co-opted or 
captured by the state and thus surrendering  their acclaimed self-directing posture in 
development. This is particularly so in situations where the state is determined to use 
them for political gain and ends. It is probably for this reason that Taylor (1992:34) has 
stated, 
There is an increasing danger of local initiatives and organizations being 
captured or co-opted by government....As the support of local initiatives 
and participation becomes increasingly more fashionable in development 
circles, autonomous organizations of the rural poor may be overwhelmed 
by outside influences and support, and in the process, radically changed 
in character. 
 
5.3 Inter-NGO relations 
In as much as interactions between NGOs and the state constitute a fundamental 
concern in the evaluation of the development process, relations among the NGOs 
themselves is significant in influencing their contributions to development. This in 
particular concerns the level and nature of co-ordination and the attendant resource 
exchange. Cleobury (2000:120) has pointed out that NGOs= linkages and networks 
serve two fundamental roles: as a vital component of a vibrant pluralist civil society, and 
for NGO effectiveness and efficient working practices. The formation of Maendeleo Ya 
Wanawake in the 1950s, and the NGO Council in the early 1990s, was partly a 
response to this felt need of networking NGOs= activities nationally. 
 
It was however, surprising that a number of NGOs, when asked to describe the activities 
of the NGO Council, understood little of its mission and objectives. Describing its basic 
mission, the NGO Council (1994:1) points out that it Aexists to promote and support the 
work of its members and the voluntary sector as a whole, through training, policy 
formulation, advocacy, documentation, networking and resourcing.@ To achieve this, the 
NGO Council (1994) has established a code of conduct governing the operations of 
member NGOs. If breached, would invite either a fine or a recommendation to the NGO 
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Board that the NGOs= certificate of registration be suspended or cancelled. On probity, 
the NGO Council (1994:3) code of conduct, among other things, states that a member 
NGO shall perform its duties incorruptibly and that it shall Anot solicit or accept gifts, 
rewards or any advantage, whether pecuniary or otherwise, from any person as an 
inducement to do anything in its official capacity or to grant any favour to any person.@ 
Further, on the issue of justice, the NGO Council (1994:4) observes that an organization 
shall not only recognize and uphold the rights of all (especially the disadvantaged), but 
also practice fairness and equality in all its operations while ensuring equality of 
opportunity for all regardless of nationality, ethnicity, gender, religion or creed. 
 
The NGO Council (1994:4) also gives close attention to the issue of co-operation 
amongst its membership. In particular, it notes that an organization shall: 
(a) share information and experiences; 
(b) encourage the sharing of activities and co-ordination through participation; 
(c) promote the sharing of resources with other organizations; 
(d) strive for unity, collaboration, reciprocity and teamwork; 
(e) resolve conflicts amicably; and 
(f) avoid unproductive duplication of activities. 
It could be argued,  partly, that because of  being centralised in Nairobi, the role of the 
NGO Council is yet to be effectively felt at the grassroots. But if the NGO Council has 
been deemed to be weak, this could also be attributed to the lack of a clear mechanism 
within it to enforce disciplinary measures on errant NGOs without necessarily having to 
refer the matter to the NGO Co-ordination Board, the Government arm of the NGO Act. 
An extremely large membership (over 1000 NGOs), has also created problems in terms 
of the NGO Council=s ability and capacity to co-ordinate the sector. Summing up some 
of these weaknesses, the Daily Nation (20th November, 1999), has argued: 
The enforcement of this code has been hampered by several reasons, 
one of them being lack of a provision for punitive measures, which makes 
the NGO Council a toothless dog. So while the Regulatory Committee 
may find an NGO guilty of an offence, it does not have real powers to 
punish the said NGO. Secondly, the size and diversity of the sector brings 
into question the capacity of the Council to police this fast-growing sector. 
Also the Council=s own internal problems cast serious doubt on its moral 
authority to question members over any misconduct. 
 
 
 151 
Formal NGOs= project managers were interviewed also on whether they consult and co-
ordinate with other NGOs in their development programmes. Six of the eight NGOs 
indicated that they did consult and co-operate with other NGOs in development, 
especially NGOs that share similar objectives and projects. Such consultation, facilitated 
by the District Development Committees= forums, also occurred in NGO-organised 
seminars and field demonstrations. KWAP and KENGO (in Busia District), which are in 
the area of environment and energy, provided a good example of such NGO co-
operation in terms of exchange of development experiences. This was particularly on 
issues of sustainable land-use management, afforestation programmes, and the 
production and dissemination of energy conserving technology. CHAK also had close 
co-operative relations with the Family Planning Association of Kenya over family 
planning and community health care matters. A key objective of inter-NGO consultations 
was to help prevent duplication in development projects among the communities. This 
finding on inter-NGOs= co-ordination and the attendant benefits is reflected in Ng=ethe et 
al=s (1990a:138) observation that key aspects of co-ordination should involve 
information gathering and appropriate utilization of available resources. Such 
information gathering, he adds, exposes either party to the programmes of the other and 
the chief advantage gained from such a strategy is reduction of resource wastage 
arising from duplication and the enabling of the replication of useful micro-strategies as 
well as programmes and projects. So far, Vihiga District provided the most ambitious 
experiment in building an environment suitable for inter-NGO cooperation and 
harmonization of their activities through the DDC mechanism. This has involved the 
formation of an NGO Consultative Committee (1998) whose objectives and functions 
include: 
(a) NGO collaboration in order to harmonize their activities. 
(b) Having a quarterly NGOs= meeting to report on the progress to be filed to the DDC.  
(c) Monitoring of NGOs= operations within the District. 
(d) Preparing an inventory of NGOs and their activities in the District. 
 
With the exception of a few NGOs (in this case, CEEDA and BDS), the fieldwork 
findings supported the thesis that NGOs collaborate in the field of development. 
However, as for the contrary findings provided by CEEDA and BDS, the interviews 
 
 152 
revealed that both were faced with severe financial problems to the extent that their 
development projects had been put on hold. CEEDA=s case was even worse, 
considering that it operated more or less as a family venture with its top management 
hailing from one family. The implication of this second factor was that CEEDA=s financial 
predicament could have been a result of embezzlement of donor funds redirected to 
selfish family use. CEEDA=s, and to some extent the BDS scenario, could be reflective 
of what the Daily Nation (20th November, 1999) reported thus: 
The lack of institutional structures has contributed to mismanagement and 
irregularities. It is not uncommon to find NGOs that are run like private 
business concerns or family enterprises or that are plagued by what has 
become known as the Founder Member Syndrome (FMS)....FMS often 
leads to mismanagement of funds, nepotism, cronyism and can disrupt 
the normal functioning of an organization. 
 
Other factors have also been cited to explain poor relations among NGOs. They  include 
the attempts to Aown@ certain communities by keeping out other relevant NGOs from 
intervening. As argued by Holmen and Jirstrom (1994:30) A...many NGOs find it very 
difficult to withdraw from initiated projects.  For many of those engaged in NGOs it is an 
end in itself to remain in business - not to end it.@ They continue to explain, AIn many 
cases, >being there= appears to be the prime objective.@ An equally significant factor that 
can explain hostility between NGOs despite similarities in functional activities and 
therefore need for co-operation, is the burning desire to guard from other NGOs 
information pertaining to sources of donor funding lest they compete for the same funds. 
Korten (1987:156-7) has for instance, observed that in some instances of inter-NGO co-
operation Ajealousies among them are often intense, and efforts at collaboration all too 
often break down into internecine warfare that paralyses efforts to work together 
towards achievement of shared purposes.@ Cleobury (2000:115-118) has added the 
factor of NGO leadership in terms of personalities and characteristics as influencing the 
extent and nature of NGOs to collaborate and co-ordinate. Authoritarian and dictatorial 
NGO leadership, he argues, impacts negatively on the capacity of an NGO to network 
with others. 
 
Beyond interactions between and among formal NGOs, the study had interest in 
possible relations between formal NGOs and self-help NGOs (women=s groups) as well 
as inter-self-help groups= interactions. The formation of Maendeleo Ya Wanawake, as 
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noted earlier, was aimed at creating a women=s groups umbrella organization for co-
ordination purposes. However, as observed by Chitere (1994:154), being essentially 
urban and elitist, Maendeleo Ya Wanawake has had little impact in helping rural women. 
There are many fora that facilitate interactions between and among self-help NGOs. 
These included joint inter-group membership gatherings as during community-based 
welfare functions; and government/formal NGOs= sponsored seminars, workshops and 
field demonstrations. Several reasons were given by chairpersons to explain the 
rationale for such interactions. These were: 
(a) Economies of scale: being essentially small organizations with an average 
membership of 20-30, women=s groups found it prudent to join efforts in the production 
and marketing of goods such as basketry, pottery, dairy farming, among others. In this 
way, groups could at once meet a fairly large market demand for a product and later 
share amongst themselves the proceeds. Elizabeth Chogo, the chairlady of Nziwa 
Women=s Group, was forthright on this issue: 
Our groups tend to be small both in size and resources. The only way we 
can compete with bigger organizations is for us to team up in the 
production and marketing of goods so as to meet a sudden large market 
demand in good time. Otherwise we can not sell. My own group together 
with others has thus been successful in selling products such as basketry, 
 pottery, and poultry. 
 
The issue of inability by small women=s groups to successfully compete for big markets 
in supplying goods would seem to be a long standing one. In her study, Feldman 
(1984:82) argued, AWhilst, there may be scope within rural Kenya for an expansion of 
local industry, women=s groups are not the only ones involved in the harsh competition 
to corner a small section of a limited market.@ She proceeded to give examples of 
groups that had lost out due to inability to compete with more established organizations. 
 Maas (1991), in her study on women=s groups at the Coast also reached a similar 
conclusion that because of their limited resources, many women=s groups were unable 
to market their goods successfully and thus ended up folding their activities. 
(b) The need to exchange ideas, and experiences about group dynamics and certain 
relevant skills and knowledge related to both welfare and income-generating activities. 
This could be seen in farm and non-farm income-generating activities as well as in 
welfare matters such as community-based health care and family planning. Government 
officers in charge of such programmes and NGOs that work through these groups 
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favoured the most experienced ones eg. Nziwa and Esabalu in the dissemination of 
their experiences to other groups. Anyanga, a committee member of Esabalu Group, 
could thus proudly proclaim, AWe have a very good working relationship with other 
groups and since a lot of our members are community health workers, we have helped 
train them (the other groups) in matters to do with family planning and community-based 
health-care.@ 
(c) To help avoid instances of duplication in the production of goods and services 
especially in situations where the market demand is already saturated. This factor was 
important considering that two or more nearby groups could end up competing, say in 
poultry, and thus saturating the small local market for eggs. It must be for this very 
reason that Ondiege (1992:186), in his research on women=s groups in Machakos 
District of Kenya, found it necessary to recommend that the state help regulate, as 
appropriate, those activities that may have over-mushroomed and created unnecessary 
competition and eventual collapse of groups (also see, Maas, 1991). 
 
In their interactions with formal NGOs, self-help NGOs, and in this case, women=s 
groups, tend to play a subordinate role emerging as junior partners in the relationship.  
This is especially so considering that virtually all the women=s groups in the sample 
were dependent on formal NGOs for development resources. Whereas, the initial 
founding of the groups was basically from the members= initiatives, their growth and 
consolidation depended much on formal NGOs= intervention.  Formal NGO intervention 
manifested itself in terms of provision of financial and material resources as well as 
training opportunities. CHAK, for instance, had been responsible for the training of 
Esabalu groups= members in community health care;  Partnership for Productivity had 
been responsible for accessing women=s groups with loan facilities and entrepreneurial 
training;  CEEDA had involved itself with local capacity building among women=s groups 
through training workshops;  KENGO had provided seed for multipurpose trees as well 
as training on several aspects of environmental conservation.  This role of formal NGOs 
towards self-help NGOs and their members has been noted in other studies (Feldman, 
1984; Cernea, 1988; Maas, 1991; Ng=ethe and Kanyinga, 1992;  Chitere, 1994;  
Ondiege, 1992;  Ndegwa, 1996). Ondiege (1992:183), in his Machakos study, noted that 
during the 1986/87 financial year, NGOs contributed the largest amount of financial 
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assistance (Kshs.3.6 million) to women=s groups, followed by the Central Government 
(Kshs.155,387) and Local Government (Kshs.64,370). With this kind of evidence it 
becomes very difficult to escape making the conclusion that, in a sense, this then, is a 
patron-client relationship, however subtle. To alter this pattern of relationship, it can only 
be hoped that the role of formal NGOs will be to truly empower these groups so that in 
the final analysis they can be self-reliant and self-supporting in the mobilization and use 
of resources. 
 
5.4 NGOs and equitable development 
Policies governing resource allocation(s) by organisations, whether public or private, 
have been known to have fundamental implications in terms of either accentuating or 
reducing existing socio-economic inequalities at both community and individual levels. 
Indeed, for the developing states, it may be argued that the nature of development 
policies pursued by organizations could be  a core explanation to the nature and levels 
of existing poverty. The African state, in recent times, has faced the wrath of 
international donors who strongly believe she is a chief culprit in the struggle to resolve 
the poverty crisis for reasons that basically centre on lack of transparency and 
accountability in the management and allocation of resources. In its place, NGOs and 
generally the private sector, have been floated as the best alternatives. This faith in the 
role of NGOs explains the increased funding being channelled through them to support 
Africa=s development experiment. But are NGOs equal to the task? Are they helping 
bridge the poverty gap between the have and the have-nots? What criteria do they use 
to identify the >deserving= individuals and communities? These are some of the issues  
discussed in this section basing on data generated from Western Kenya. 
 
The beginning point of inquiry was to ask NGO project managers to explain the criteria 
used in identifying communities that deserved rural development assistance. This 
assistance was defined in terms of financial and material resources, and generally 
empowerment through training programmes.  While all the eight NGOs argued that the 
determining factor was the level of poverty in a given community as relates to access to 
basic needs such as clean drinking water, health services, formal education and 
income, they seemed to differ in their operationalization of the  poverty concept.  NGOs 
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in the sector of promotion of small-scale enterprises such as PRIDE Kenya, PfP and 
BDS of Kenya, targeted individuals and groups that were already in some form of 
business activity, and thus by implication, already having access to some income, 
however minimal. For instance, PRIDE Kenya (1996:3) demanded that for an applicant 
to qualify for a loan facility, he or she had to fulfil certain conditions amongst them, 
having taken the initiative to start an income -generating activity and employing at least 
some people. However, NGOs such as KWAP and KENGO, involved in energy and 
environmental programmes, did not have substantial financial preconditions for the 
beneficiaries to benefit from their established seed banks and tree nurseries as well as 
knowledge on land use management. The whole idea seemed to be dependent on 
farmers= willingness to participate in the sponsored projects and thus in essence having 
a more open door policy to beneficiaries= participation. 
 
The policies pursued by NGOs in the field of small-scale enterprises, it can be argued,  
have the influence of excluding the very poor (that is, those who may be unable to 
initially raise capital to have an on-going income-generating project) from accessing 
NGO assistance in the form of credit facilities. This observation is reflected in  Burbank=s 
 (1994:53) study on small business development agencies in Kenya where he noted that 
Avery few respondents believe that their agencies are targeting or actually working with 
the very poorest elements of society who need the most economic assistance. Most 
agencies are working with existing small and micro-business operators who may be 
poor but are not the most vulnerable.@  Asked to justify why their NGOs provided access 
to loans mainly to individuals and groups that were already in business, the most 
common explanation was that NGOs= main objective was to empower beneficiaries by 
emphasising on improvement of already available local resources rather than 
encouraging growth of dependent relations with the beneficiaries. The local resources 
mentioned included the possession of capital in the form of an on-going enterprise. 
However, it was also argued that the survival and sustainability of such NGOs 
depended on service fees and the repayment of the loans (both the principal and 
accumulated interest) and thus the requirement that beneficiaries of loans ought to be in 
a >secure= position to pay-back. CARE Kenya, for instance, did not give any grace period 
to loanees and charged a flat rate of 24% interest per annum, while PRIDE Kenya 
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charged a 20% interest rate per year with hardly no grace period. 
 
Other criteria, beside income-security, also seemed to influence some NGOs= resource 
allocation. Among these were ethnic and religious variables. In its mission of improving  
water and sanitary systems through the construction of roof-catchment ferro-cement 
water tanks and V.I.P pit latrines, VEST of Vihiga District, over the last three years of its 
existence had entirely concentrated on Vihiga Division at the expense of the other 
Divisions of Emuhaya, Sabatia and Tiriki as its name initials. This intriguing finding of 
imbalanced distribution of resources among the District=s Divisions, which was contrary 
to VEST=s stated mission, required an explanation. While the NGO officials argued that 
this lopsided pattern of resource allocation was as a result of disinterest and apathy on 
the part of the disadvantaged Divisions, personal field visits and interviews with 
individuals and some of the schools= heads revealed the contrary. The heads of these 
institutions argued that they had made application proposals for water and sanitation 
projects and forwarded them to VEST with the necessary motivations. However, as one 
secondary school headmistress explained, these proposals had failed to elicit positive 
responses from VEST for unexplained reasons. This was in spite of the fact that these 
institutions had even met VEST=s financial pre-condition for a down payment of 25% of 
the total cost of the water project:  
We have done all that VEST requires of us as an application for the water 
project, but nothing has been implemented and yet more recent 
applications in Maragoli area have been met. 
 
The mention of >Maragoli= by this headmistress suggested the possibility of clannism at 
work in influencing VEST=s resource allocation criteria. This was particularly so 
considering that most of VEST=s leaders were Maragoli by clan and hailed from Vihiga 
Division which had received the largest share of VEST=s projects.  
 
In yet another incident, religious factors seemed to determine the nature and level of 
resource allocation by NGOs. CHAK, essentially a Christian and Protestant-based 
NGO, basically concentrated on assisting Protestant Mission Hospitals as opposed to 
the Catholic ones. Indeed, all the health units (Kima Mission Hospital, Maseno Mission 
Hospital, Kilingili Health Centre and Ingotse) visited in evaluating CHAK=s role in the 
medical sector were all attached to Protestant Churches. This has serious implications 
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considering that out of an estimated 40% of the total health services provided in Kenya 
by NGOs, CHAK and Kenya Catholic contribute a whole 30% of this 40% (CHAK, 
1995). The implications become more serious considering the expansive medical 
sectors CHAK covers: the rehabilitation of health units programme; an information and 
education programme for responsible adulthood; a family planning extension 
programme; a community-based health care; the training of trainers programme; and an 
Aids-prevention programme (CHAK, 1995). Whereas, there is no deliberate attempt to 
exclude non-Protestants from using CHAK=s services, the message is clear: the 
services are first and foremost meant for Protestant adherents. The history of CHAK 
(1995) does not hide its Protestant leanings with the NCCK and its original roots, 
PCMA: 
CHAK had its beginnings as early as 1930s when a Hospital Committee 
was formed as part of the establishment of the NCCK. In 1946, in 
response to the growing interest, scope and membership of the 
Committee, a separate organization, the Protestant Churches Medical 
Association (PCMA) was formed, later changing its name to CHAK. 
 
However, the use of religion as a criteria for resource allocation does not seem unique 
to CHAK. In his study based in Tanzania, Kiondo (1994:79, 84-85) found out that NGOs 
were predominantly using religious factors in resource allocation such that Islamic 
organizations tended to act as patrons to Muslim communities with the consequence of 
reproducing or even enlarging existing inequalities. 
 
But even politics may influence NGOs= allocation criteria for resources. This is especially 
so considering the Government requirement that NGOs work within the set guidelines of 
the DDC under the DFRD strategy. DDCs are not devoid of politics, if anything, they  
provide an avenue where competing interests are thrashed out within the wide array of 
membership of politicians, bureaucrats and other interest groups. As observed by 
Ng=ethe, Mitullah, and Ngunyi (1990:136): 
The other problem with integrating NGOs into the DFRD has to do with 
the suspicion that politicians and other powerful members of the DDC 
might, for their own political ends, >hijack= projects proposed by 
NGOs...within it (the DDC) competing interests are naturally to be found. 
 
All in all, this study=s findings indicate that in their attempts to reach the poor, NGOs are 
influenced by many factors that include ethnic, religious and even economic ones.  
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Whether these factors exist as official policy or mere unwritten agreements, they have a 
significant influence on resource allocation and therefore inequitable rural development 
between and among individuals and communities (Burbank, 1994;  Bratton, 1987). 
 
Summary and conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to analyse the nature and level of interaction between 
NGOs and the state. These relations occur in a multi-focussed institutional model in that 
there are many avenues that act as fora for the interactions. These include the DDC 
under the DFRD, the NGO Board, and the NGO Council. The entry of NGOs into the 
development space has been prompted by the inability and incapacity of the state to 
sponsor development. The state=s development record has generally been 
unsatisfactory with many incomplete and stalled projects due to factors such as 
shortage of development funds, misuse and embezzlement of the available resources 
among other factors. 
 
Overall, relations between the state and NGOs is marked by both co-operation and 
mistrust. Co-operation, when it occurs, is in terms of the Government extending its 
technical staff to NGOs as well as in mobilizing communities for NGOs through, for 
instance, Chiefs= barazas. However, mistrust and fear often characterize NGO-state 
relations. In wanting to protect their autonomy, NGOs have tended to keep the state at 
arms length fearing possibilities of state interference in their development priorities. B ut 
the state, too, jealously guards against the possibilities of NGOs using their resources to 
discredit the Government. It is precisely for this reason that the state has developed 
widespread mechanisms to monitor the NGO sector. 
 
In its relations with self-help NGOs, the state has tended to patronize them through 
provision of funds via fora such as the Rural Development Fund. The state has also 
tended to use women=s groups to penetrate the rural areas in terms of mobilization of 
communities for purposes of implementing certain policies. To a large extent, the 
women=s groups movement has been politicised considering that politicians and other 
local notables exploit it for political gain. This has occurred mainly when it comes to 
raising funds for these groups.  
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NGOs co-operate in their interactions for various reasons. These include the need to 
share resources and development experiences. However, as noted, there are also 
instances of non-co-operation. In relating to self-help NGOs, it is argued that formal 
NGOs tend to dictate the pace considering that they have the advantage of resources 
relative to self-help NGOs. In a sense then, this constitutes another form of patron-client 
relationship. 
 
This study also revealed that NGOs use various criteria to allocate development 
resources. These include the factors of religion, ethnicity, and political influence. The 
negative application of these factors has in some instances led to socio-economic 
inequality between and among individuals and communities. NGOs in the sector of 
small-scale enterprises are a case in point where the poorest of the poor are excluded 
from the process of development, since as a condition to qualify for credit, they are 
expected to be already having some form of business activity, a requirement that is 
beyond most of them. The ability of NGOs to challenge and change the poverty levels in 
the rural areas will depend much on how objective their criteria is for resource 
allocation. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
6.0 NGOs= ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITIES AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN           
   WESTERN PROVINCE 
 
The level of human and material resources in organizations has been considered a 
crucial element in determining the abilities and capacities of organizations to achieve 
their objectives and goals. Burbank (1994:45), in elaborating on this theme, identifies 
three factors necessary in the starting and maintenance of any development 
organization, that is, people, information, and money. It is expected that to continue 
being relevant to changing societal needs and goals, organizations will make the 
necessary progressive changes in their human and material resources. This brings into 
focus the concept of organizational development (OD) that ideally refers to Aa 
systematic, integrated and planned approach to improve the effectiveness of people and 
groups in an enterprise@ (Koontz, 1984:436). This has become more pertinent for NGOs 
as they are taking on greater responsibilities. This is particularly so for NGOs seeking to 
represent the voice of the weak by organizing them into more powerful institutions that 
can effectively articulate their development demands. Clark (1997:43) argues that such 
NGOs A...are moving beyond a >supply-side= approach, concentrating on the delivery of 
services or development projects, to a >demand-side= emphasis, helping communities 
articulate their preferences and concerns so as to become active participants in the 
development process.@ According to Clark (1997:45), these new approach has its 
implications in that, 
The moving beyond the development >supply-side= to >demand-side= 
activities requires that NGOs develop new skills, partnerships and ways of 
working in order to help communities articulate their concerns and 
preferences, to manoeuvre into a negotiating position with official bodies, 
and to mix technical operational skills with >information age= 
communication, advocacy and networking skills. 
 
In the analysis of the levels of human resources in NGOs, focus was placed on project 
managers and technical field staff for formal NGOs, while for self-help NGOs, the status 
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of the leadership (chairpersons, secretaries and treasurers) and the general 
membership was studied. 
 
6.1 Human and material resources in formal NGOs 
In  attempting to understand the internal capacities of NGOs, inquiries were made to 
establish the nature of staff establishment and the accompanying authority 
relationships. The most common pattern was of a staff structure whose top executive 
was a Board of Directors which had overall power and authority over Managerial staff 
consisting of Project Managers and Field Development Officers. Whereas the key role 
of the Board of Directors, in virtually all the NGOs, consisted of the formulation of overall 
organizational policy as well as the hiring and firing of staff, the Management was more 
involved in the actual management and administration of development projects at the 
grassroots. 
 
Project managers were in charge of the overall administration of field projects and more 
often than not, reported directly to the Board of Directors. Asked to define their roles in 
greater detail, many of them pointed out that they were expected to co-ordinate project 
identification, implementation, and on occasion, evaluation of projects. Project 
identification and planning involved interactions with the target communities/groups, 
local politicians and public administrators with the objective of initiating development 
projects relevant to local needs. For instance, PRIDE Kenya=s project manager 
emphasised the importance of  educating PRIDE=s potential clients on its credit policy 
before the allocation of actual development loans. One of the field trips revealed that 
during its initial stage of acquiring clients, PRIDE Kenya required them to form groups of 
five each for purposes of constituting an Enterprise Group (EG) that was expected to 
serve as  a group guarantee to PRIDE=s loans. At a more advanced level, the clients 
were expected to graduate into a bigger group of fifty members called the Market 
Enterprise Committee (MEC), which was in essence ten EGs combined. Members of the 
MEC were required to meet weekly, where prior to applying for a PRIDE loan, they 
would undergo an eight week training on overall PRIDE policies as well as the 
management of credit and small-scale business.  
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In addition to what amounts to community/group mobilization of NGO clients, project 
managers were expected to act as a link between the local level state authorities and 
their NGOs. As public relation officers, project managers had to constantly interact with 
the Local Government authorities, Provincial Administration, and local politicians to 
update them on their NGOs= activities. Asked why such an interaction was necessary, 
many noted it was aimed at securing the goodwill of local leaders and the local 
community for their NGOs. This in itself, was a pointer to the fact that NGOs recognized 
the facilitative role of the state in the development process, even if this was merely 
limited to state positive recognition of them. 
 
Besides the project managers, NGOs had varying staff that they term field officers. Field 
officers were expected to play a supportive role to the project managers in terms of the 
technical implementation and management of actual field projects. NGOs in the sectors 
of small-scale business, environment and afforestation, agriculture, community health 
care and family planning had such field officers who were expected to move around to 
supervise the implementation of their respective NGOs= activities. This supervision 
entailed provision of basic training to the beneficiaries in the specialised technical areas 
as well as a confirmation of proper implementation of projects. A good example would 
be the Business Development Officers (BDOs) belonging to NGOs involved in the 
promotion of small-scale enterprises, that provided business education and credit 
facilities to clients. The BDOs of NGOs such as PfP and PRIDE were themselves 
trained in business management skills and their main task was to impart the basics of 
the same to their NGOs= clients and the monitoring of credit-supported beneficiary 
projects to ensure efficient and effective repayment of the loans. 
 
Project managers being the overall administrators at the grassroots where NGO 
projects are actually implemented, the study was interested in establishing their levels of 
education and training in an attempt to measure their ability and capacity to effectively 
perform the task. Out of the eight managers interviewed, the following was the 
distribution of formal education levels: one had only primary education; two had 
secondary school education level; one had a post-secondary school education diploma 
qualification; and four of them had university degree level of education. In sum, 
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approximately half of the project managers interviewed did not possess post-secondary 
school education. 
 
A number of NGOs, in particular, PfP, PRIDE, KENGO, CEEDA and KWAP, had made 
efforts to further train their project managers and field officers in their respective 
development areas. This was through refresher courses as well as advanced ones. 
Whereas refresher courses took the form of seminars and workshops, advanced 
training leading to possible award of certificates took the form of long-term training 
largely in government institutions. The fact that NGOs provided training to their 
managers was confirmed by PRIDE=s manager who observed that: 
PRIDE sponsored me for a credit and entrepreneurship course which 
focussed on identification of target group procedures, business 
management skills, and book-keeping. This course has proven invaluable 
in my day to day tasks of recruiting and training of our prospective clients. 
 
KENGO=s manager had undergone training in courses on staff development, agro-
forestry and land-use management, and bio-mass energy with the objective of up-
grading his staff=s knowledge on current land-use technologies. He was certain that 
having trained his officers on these courses, their performance had improved. For the 
PfP manager, new courses covered included project management, accounts and the 
role of law in development, all at the Government=s Kenya Institute of Administration. 
According to the PfP manager, the courses had improved his job performance in 
relation to efficient and effective project management, better utilization of funds, and the 
administration of staff under him. CEEDA=s manager provided evidence of having 
undergone a variety of courses which included community education technics, 
community project development, financial management, and project monitoring and 
evaluation. In a far ranging study on NGOs and poverty alleviation in various countries, 
Riddell et al (1995:71) argued the quality of management and staffing of NGOs was 
essential to NGOs= efforts to successfully tackle the poverty crisis: 
The quality and effectiveness of management and project staff constitute 
one of the key clusters of factors identified as playing a major role in 
project impact....Well trained field staff, motivated by a reasonable level of 
remuneration and committed to the goals of the organization, clearly play 
a critical role in successful (poverty) interventions. 
 
Beside the human resource factor in formal NGOs, the level of finances and materials 
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constituted yet another important dimension in the analysis of NGOs= organizational 
capacity. The study=s initial interest concerned the various  sources involved in funding  
NGOs. Data gathered from a combination of interviews with NGO officials and NGO 
prepared documents such as development projects= proposals revealed three main 
sources of funding: 
(a) Public organizations including government bodies and inter-governmental                 
organizations. 
(b) Private organizations. 
(c) NGO internally-generated funds. 
Of the three funding sources, public organizations, largely foreign, and  private 
organizations were the most dominant, in the sense that they appeared most frequently 
on the funding lists of the NGOs.  
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Table 10:  Funding sources for NGOs with some examples from each category. 
 
 
PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS 
 
PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS 
 
NGO INTERNALLY 
GENERATED FUNDS 
 
1. Swedish International       
Development Agency      
(SIDA). 
2. Norwegian Agency for      
International Development 
(NORAD) 
3. Danish International      
Development Agency     
(DANIDA) 
4. United States Agency       
for International      
Development (USAID) 
5. Overseas Development      
Assistance (ODA) 
6. United Nations Children 
Fund     (UNICEF) 
7. Food Agricultural      
Organization (FAO) 
8. Government of Kenya,       
Belgium and others. 
9. Canadian International       
Development Agency        
(CIDA). 
 
 
1. Ford Foundation 
2. African Development      
Foundation of USA 
3. Africa Now 
4. Kenya Rural Enterprise      
Programme (KREP) 
5. ICO-Germany 
6. Reformed Church of      
Netherlands 
7. Commercial Banks      (KCB, 
Barclays etc). 
 
1. Service fee 
2. Consultancy fee 
3. Income-generating      
activities such as sale of NGO 
produced goods. 
 
Source: NGO documents and interviews with NGO officials. 
 
In evaluating the sources of formal NGOs= funds, it was also important to understand the 
various uses such funds are put to by the NGOs. Burbank (1994: 46) has a useful 
guideline for NGO usage of funds. In his four categories, he included: 
(a) Recurrent Expenditures: the use of funds for recurrent, everyday operations. 
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(b) Replacement Capital: funds used to replace capital items used in normal             
operations. 
(c) Start-up Capital: funds used to start up new operations including the original             
 organizational start. 
(d) Expansion of Replication Expenditure: funds necessary for expansion of existing       
operations and/or to move into new geographic areas with the same programme. 
If only recurrent expenditure and replacement capital is considered as the most 
important in determining financial self-sufficiency of an NGO the way Burbank (1994:47) 
does, then it can be argued that all NGOs in the study sample are yet to be self-
sufficient. This is precisely because as established from interviews with both project 
managers and project beneficiaries, demand for the NGOs= goods and services was 
much greater than their ability to supply especially as concerns recurrent expenditure.  
For instance,  NGOs in the area of promotion of small-scale enterprises found it virtually 
impossible to fund satisfactorily many of the relevant business management courses to 
the many clients as well as satisfying credit demands. Even an NGO like CHAK in the 
area of health, which had key links with international donors, still found it difficult to 
adequately meet the demands for drugs, vehicles and medical equipments for its 
various health units. 
 
Project managers were asked to explain what strategies, if any, they had in place to 
make their NGOs self-sufficient in funds. Their responses, in order of preference can be 
summarised as follows: 
(a) Re-engaging their traditional donors to scale-up the funding levels. 
(b) Deliberate efforts to market their NGOs in order to access new donors. To this           
  extent, a number of NGOs had compiled or were in the process of doing so, records     
  reflecting their role in deve lopment alongside the drafting of new project proposals       
targeting donor funding.  
(c) Increased internal generation of funds. This was to be accomplished through the       
 establishment of income-generating activities and the streamlining of service fee         
collection. 
(d) Movement towards more cost-sharing in development projects with the beneficiaries. 
Already many of the NGOs were insisting that the beneficiaries make    a contribution to 
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development projects through the provision of local raw materials,      labour, and a 
certain percentage of finance towards the funding of the projects. 
 
From these responses, it can be argued that a mentality of continued reliance upon 
donors remains strong among the NGOs. To reverse this trend, NGOs will have to 
emphasize more options (c) and (d) that require them to raise funds internally while 
encouraging local communities to be more self-reliant. Smillie (1994:175) has observed 
that in Europe, with the decreasing donor funds, NGOs have turned to Aearning@ money 
as substitute for fund-raising. They (NGOs) have established >trading= organizations that 
import and sell handicrafts, coffee, tea etc. Profits from such endeavours are in turn 
ploughed back into charity. Vincent and Campbell (1990:106-108) seem to share with 
Smillie similar lines of thought in arguing that NGOs must change from viewing 
themselves as charity organizations dependent on >generous= benefactors to 
development enterprises able to produce goods and services for sale. However, in 
adopting these new strategies in the raising of projects= funds, NGOs must guard 
against converting themselves into private profit making organizations:  
It is not suggested that NGOs have to change into business and to be 
governed by the profit motive. But they should be able to manage their 
organizations effectively, to develop financial reserves and to offer 
reasonably-priced, effective services to the local community in the long-
term (Vincent and Campbell, 1994:108). 
 
There is no doubt that NGOs= over-reliance on external funding has led to the 
development of dependent relations with the donors. This threatens not only the 
sustainability of NGO supported projects but also the sustainability of NGOs as 
development organizations. CEEDA and BDS provided excellent examples of NGOs 
which were on the verge of folding up their operations ostensibly for lack of adequate 
funds for reasons ranging from mismanagement to the drying up of donor funding. 
Gariyo (1998:133), in his research on NGOs in East Africa, found out that of the 62 
NGOs he studied, 36 reported that they depended on foreign donations for between 
75% and 100% of their funding, and a further 7 received between 50% and 75%. He 
concluded that ASuch high levels of foreign funding tend to deprive NGOs of a strong 
base in their own societies and contribute to their inability to plan for the long-term.@ In 
another study on the role of USAID in Kenya, Hearn (1998:90, citing USAID) found out 
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that USAID had a direct funding relationship with some seventy NGOs in the areas of 
health and population to business, agriculture, the environment and governance. Hearn 
(p.98) concluded that AMore broadly, we would argue that involving the voluntary sector 
and non-state actors in the official aid system has had...major consequences...the 
voluntary sector that is being promoted in African countries is a financially highly 
dependent one....This raises questions of the extent to which recipients of aid can be 
equal partners with donors in setting agendas.@ 
 
6.2 Human and material resources in self-help NGOs 
In an attempt to inquire into the nature of human resources in self-help NGOs, 
investigations begun with the various roles expected of the leadership of these 
organizations and their levels of qualification. Overall, from the responses received from 
the 8 chairpersons, leadership of the group was perceived as the most significant 
function followed by need to co-ordinate and link organizational activities with external 
organizations and individuals (the Government, other NGOs, powerful politicians etc), 
and finally, the training of organizations= members in certain skills already acquired by 
the chairpersons. 
 
The function of leadership in small organizations, defined as Ainterpersonal influence, 
exercised in situations and directed, through the communication process, toward the 
attainment of a specified goal or goals@,  is considered to be one of the most important 
roles associated with positions in the group structure. Effective group functioning highly 
depends on the degree to which the activities of group members are co-ordinated and 
directed toward achievement of group goals (Shaw, 1981:315). 
 
The central role leadership is said to play in organizations led to the inquiry into the 
possible criteria used in electing/appointing chairpersons to such positions within their 
organizations (women=s groups). 75% of the chairpersons interviewed argued the factor 
of trustworthiness was crucial. 50% pointed out that commitment and level of 
industriousness on the part of a would-be chairperson was significant. Only 25%  
argued that one=s educational level was important in determining her election to the post 
of chairperson. From these responses, it can be argued that the level of formal 
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education attained did not count for as much compared to personal characteristics of 
trust and hard work in the selection of groups= chairpersons. Age also seemed to be a 
factor in determining who becomes the chairperson of a group. For instance, all the 
eight chairpersons  were over age 30. The preference for older women to become the 
groups= chairpersons was also evident in Maas= (1991:41) study of women=s groups at 
Kenya=s Coast region where she found out that the majority group members (over 75%) 
were between 30 and 59 years of age, implying that this could have a strong influence 
in determining the age of the chairperson to be elected. However, in relation to social 
characteristics and leadership, Stogdill (cited in Shaw, 1981:325) found out that among 
others, sociability, initiative, persistence, self-confidence, insights, co-operativeness, 
popularity and adaptability were significant personal characteristics that influenced the 
choice of leaders= selection into leadership positions. Stogdill=s findings, are to some 
extent therefore, consistent with this study=s findings in that social character such as 
commitment and trustworthiness may constitute variables upon which the leadership 
role is predicated. 
 
As for their educational standards, a majority (5) of them had primary-level education 
and only 3 had acquired lower secondary education status. Beside formal education, all 
the eight chairpersons indicated that they had attended some specialized training 
courses. These included: leadership courses; management courses (book-keeping, 
product marketing etc); animal husbandry; poultry; family planning; environmental 
management courses, among others. Training forums included seminars, workshops, 
field demonstrations, and even district and national exhibitions. These training sessions 
were organized and sponsored mainly by the Government ministries and formal NGOs. 
 Chitere (1994:162) in his study, also observed that women=s groups in Machakos 
District had undergone some training in various courses but only that 13 (8%) of the 
members, mainly leaders had attended courses in leadership. 
 
Beside the chairpersons, the research was also interested in the educational levels of 
the ordinary membership. Out of the 74 interviewed, 42 (56%) were of primary 
education level, only 16 (22%) had attained post-primary education, and the remaining 
16 (22%) had no formal education at all. These figures, with the highest number of 
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members having primary-level education, were also comparable with Chitere=s 
(1994:162) findings with 11.3% of his sample having no formal education, 67.9% with 
primary education, and only 20.8% had some secondary education. A substantial 
number (65%) of the membership had undergone some training of one form or the other 
related to entrepreneurial skills such as book-keeping, poultry, dairy-farming, farming-
related courses and community health care techniques. These short-term courses rarely 
lasted beyond one week. The chairpersons, having been sponsored earlier to train in 
some of these courses, helped give basic skills to their members. In addition, members, 
through the advice of their respective chairpersons, were nominated to attend seminars, 
workshops and field-demonstrations in certain relevant areas as organized by the 
Government and the formal NGOs. 
 
Financially and materially, self-help NGOs tended to have four main sources of income 
as revealed in this research: 
(a) The Government. 
(b) Formal NGOs. 
(c) Members= contributions. 
(d) Internally generated income from the sale of goods and services. 
Government assistance was directed through the DDC in form of District Development 
Grants (see also Ondiege, 1992:183; Chitere, 1994:154). Beside the level of this 
funding being extremely low and inconsistent, only 3 groups in the sample (Esabalu, 
Nziwa and Kitenge) had benefited from such funding. Formal NGOs were the most 
active and consistent funders of women=s group=s activities. Among the NGOs 
mentioned by women=s groups (6) as having provided finances and materials included 
Action Aid, PfP, KENGO, KWAP, CEEDA, and CHAK. Women=s groups also raised 
funds through local contributions such as membership fees which each member was 
expected to pay at some defined time interval. Internally generated income was sourced 
from their involvement in both farm and off-farm activities. Farm activities included 
poultry, dairy farming and vegetable-growing while off-farm was mainly through small-
scale enterprises such as  weaving, pottery, and the running of bakeries and maize mills 
(also see Pala, 1983:89-91; Maas, 1991:44-53).   
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Asked to rate the financial status of their groups, all the eight chairpersons felt it was 
neither excellent nor good. At best it was only fair and at the worst, poor. The ratings of 
the members did not depart significantly from that of their chairpersons with 57 (77%) 
arguing the financial base of their organisations to be either fair or poor and only 17 
(23%) observing that it was good. Therefore, it was not surprising that all the eight 
chairpersons argued that among other issues, increased funding to their groups was an 
urgent need to ensure sustainability of groups= activities. In their various studies, 
Feldman (1984), Maas (1991), Ondiege (1992:188), Chitere (1994:169) and Wipper 
(1995:183-184) also observed that women=s groups faced financial and material 
problems, and among other recommendations, called for increased credit facilities for 
such groups. 
 
6.3 Formal NGOs, public policy advocacy, and the development process 
In this section, the main interest was to establish the significance of formal NGOs=  
organizational capacities to their ability and capacity to perform specific rural 
development tasks both at the public policy formation level as well as in the actual 
implementation of development goals. As pressure groups, it has been noted that NGOs 
are increasingly taking on the function of development through their involvement in 
various socio-economic activities (Bratton, 1987; Ng=ethe and Kanyinga, 1992; Ndegwa, 
1996; Opoku-Mensah, 1996). This inevitably brings  NGOs into the arena of rural 
development. NGOs thus, have the opportunity to play a fundamental role in the 
development process either through influencing the formulation of new public policies or 
helping modify, via revision, the existing ones. Bratton (1994:57, also see Clark, 
1997:43-45), explaining the role of NGOs in public policy formulation, notes: 
To date, NGOs have perceived themselves and have been perceived by 
donors as institutions on the >supply side= of the policy process, whose 
primary contribution is to improve the delivery of economic and social 
services to the poor populations. Yet in all quarters, that perception may 
now be changing. NGOs also have an important contribution to make on 
the >demand side= of the policy process where the content of rural 
development policies is shaped and decided...NGO contributions to the 
alleviation of rural poverty will be piecemeal and short-lived unless NGOs 
themselves develop the capacity to form and influence the public policy 
environment. 
 
Gergen (1968:183-189) gives an important framework that can be used in evaluating 
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the potential contribution of NGOs to the policy-making process. He has argued that 
individuals and groups are most influential on a given policy depending on: 
(a) Issue relevance - depending on the importance of the issue at hand in terms of how 
it impacts on their fortunes, an individual or group will be interested in an issue area 
and therefore resultant policy. 
(b) Resources - the nature and levels of resources available to a person/group will affect 
his/her influence on a given public issue. These resources are: material and   
financial; quality of staff; ability to access public through media etc. 
(c) Personal efficacy - the nature of organization leadership in terms of intelligence,        
self-confidence, sociability, and dominance. 
 
In pursuing the role of NGOs in the public policy process, the initial interest was to  
establish whether the NGOs had any form of research units or departments that could 
be utilised for research purposes in the NGOs= respective development areas. This was 
predicated on the assumption that a research unit is pertinent to any organization=s 
research efforts. A research department would refer  to the availability of a data bank 
with a team of trained specialists in data collection, data analysis, data presentation and 
dissemination. Of all the 8 NGOs only two of them, KENGO and KWAP, had something 
near to what can be called a research unit with some of their staff being highly qualified 
in the specialised technical areas and supported with a fairly developed data bank. 
However an NGO like CHAK, in a crucial area of health, did not have its autonomous  
research department and yet it was involved in sensitive issues such as the family 
planning extension programme, community-based health care and Aids  prevention.  In 
recognizing her organization=s weakness, the CHAK project manager candidly argued 
that ACHAK should establish a research department to help identify the health sector=s 
priority  areas and also be able to measure impact of development programmes, which 
is  currently poorly done.@ The significance of NGO research departments would be in 
the strengthening of the respective NGOs in the conceptualization and comprehension 
of their development issue areas and thus ability to contribute intelligently to policies 
related to development. This weakness by NGOs in the creation of research units was a 
possible impediment to their ability and capacity to carry out own specialized researches 
whose findings could be used in the public policy process. General weaknesses of the 
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NGO sector in matters of development research have been noted by other scholars 
including Bratton (1987:33, 1994) and Ng=ethe (1991). Casey (1996:4), while 
investigating the potential role of NGOs in public policy making, has observed: 
Whichever strategies NGOs choose, they must have the organizational 
capacity to carry out this multi-dimensional role. To be effective as 
political actors, NGOs must have the capacity to oversee government 
functions, influence the creation of new legislation or push for reforms, 
lobby for the improvement in current services while continuing to ensure 
the resources and means necessary for their own operations. 
 
However, in spite of a lack of emphasis on research by most of the NGOs in the sample 
for reasons that included shortage of  resources and generally inability to rate research-
related activities highly, it can still be argued that through their development activities, 
some NGOs have implicitly influenced public policy direction. As aptly noted by Casey 
(1996:2), AThese attempts to influence should be seen in the broadest sense and even 
NGOs who self-proclaim to be non-political often seek to influence through such means 
as modelling exemplary service delivery.@ CHAK, no doubt, has helped reinforce the 
Government policy on reduced population growth rates through its family planning 
programmes and the provision of relevant training and equipments to its targeted 
beneficiaries. CHAK=s role, in collaboration with the Ministry of Health, especially at the 
national level, has been impressive in helping reshape certain aspects relating to 
policies of financing health care in Kenya, in view of the declining capacity of the state to 
fund the medical services (see Hearn, 1998:97). The same role has been performed by 
the environmental NGOs in environmental policy issues and also by NGOs in the area 
of promotion of small-scale business enterprises. In studying PfP=s project proposals, for 
example, much emphasis was placed on attempts to justify the relevance of the 
proposed projects to prevailing government national development agendas as reflected 
in the National Development Plans and the various Sessional Papers (PfP, 1995a, 
1995b, 1995c). In its Tiriki Dairy Development Project proposal, for instance, PfP 
(1995b:3-4) rationalised it as follows: 
The proposed project is in conformity with PfP Programme Plan to the 
year 2000, which in turn, is in line with the Government of Kenya policy on 
the promotion of the Micro-Enterprise Sector and promulgated in the 
following (Government) documents....These documents highlight the 
importance of resource mobilization for socio-economic development and 
the crucial importance of the micro-enterprise sector development in the 
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overall socio-economic development of Kenya. 
 
At a different level, there was evidence from the research that beside mere 
reinforcement of already existing public policies, some NGOs had actually pioneered in 
certain development matters and  their successful experiments had attracted scaling-up 
efforts by government authorities. A good example was the successful introduction by 
KENGO of multi-purpose species of trees in Busia District. These trees served various 
functions such as livestock fodder, wood-fuel as well as providing a barrier against soil 
erosion. In response, the relevant Government ministries through the mobilization 
efforts of the local provincial administration, had become committed to spreading the 
growth of such multi-purpose trees among the local population. However,  overall, the 
research findings tend to point towards NGOs being active participants more in 
reinforcing existing government development policies than in challenging them to come 
up with new policy alternatives in the development sector. 
 
There are a number of forums through which NGOs have used and can use to influence 
the public policy process. The DDC under DFRD provides one such forum in which 
NGO representatives are required to be members. In the DDCs, therefore, NGOs have 
an opportunity to contribute to the development dialogue at local level. However, as 
argued earlier, not many NGOs have been active participants in the DDC meetings and 
therefore severely limit their potential to contribute. Formal NGOs may also influence 
public policies through seminars and conferences held to discuss a myriad of issues.  
These seminars could be organized by NGOs or jointly with the Government. Virtually 
all the NGOs in the study had interacted with the Government in such forums. NGOs 
may also use channels such as electronic media, topical publications, films, and public 
exhibitions, aimed at mobilizing communities in respect to certain development  
strategies, to change public opinion and ultimately influence public policy. Smith,  
(1994:142-145) and Casey (1996), in analysing the role of NGOs as advocacy groups, 
have also discussed some of these public-policy-influencing strategies at length. 
 
The overall image of NGOs= dependence on donor funds for their operations as 
evidenced by the research findings was also significant for this study in as far as it 
relates to relevance of NGOs= projects to the rural communities and sustainability of 
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projects. There was some evidence to support the thesis that, donors to some extent, 
influence the nature and type of projects NGOs implement among local communities.  
This was particularly so in the case of CHAK and KWAP. CHAK=s project manager 
lamented that some donors were only willing to fund projects that were in line with their 
own priorities rather than the local communities=. For instance, on matters to do with 
family planning, the donor insisted more on implementing the male vasectomy 
technique, which was very unpopular with the local communities, compared to the more 
common female family planning methods. This, according to CHAK, had resulted in  low 
acceptance rates by locals. In the case of KWAP, the project manager clearly indicated 
that their chief funders - the Netherlands Government - drew up the development 
programmes for implementation and even carried out the subsequent reviews of project 
implementation with the accompanying recommendations. Such donor interference in  
KWAP projects, noted the project manager, had been resisted with the outcome that 
some specific donors had at one time or the other withdrawn from sponsoring KWAP 
projects. Thus, there would seem to be a link between NGO donor dependency and the 
resultant donor-influence of  the development agenda. Kajese (1990:15) in decrying 
NGO dependence on donor funding that could lead to external development thinking, 
models and priorities, noted that African NGOs must learn to respect African knowledge, 
cultures and traditions and work with them if they are to achieve sustainable 
development (p.22). 
 
Another aspect of dependence on donor funding by NGOs related to sustainability of 
projects in terms of provision of adequate funds to ensure continuity. Virtually all the 
NGOs in the study admitted having finance-flow difficulties especially arising from 
donors= preference for project by project funding formulae. This had negatively affected 
the successful implementation of development p rojects. PfP, for instance, experienced a 
big shortfall in terms of satisfying the credit needs of its beneficiaries; CHAK could only 
manage to mount some of its health programmes in selected health units; CEEDA and 
BDS, in addition to traces of financial malpractices, had stalled programmes relating to 
community empowerment through training (in the case of CEEDA) and loan 
disbursement (in the case of BDS). Although focussing on only small business 
development agencies in Kenya, Burbank (1994:68) observed that Athere is no evidence 
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from evaluation reports that the market for small scale enterprise credit has in any way 
been saturated. There appear, by all reports, relatively few small scale enterprise loans 
available compared to the reported demand suggesting that there remains plenty of 
room for the expansion of existing agency operations and even the entrance of other 
agencies into the credit field.@ It must be precisely for this reason(s) that NGOs must 
explore alternative means of raising additional funds to ensure some self-reliance on 
their part and also sustainability of initiated projects in terms of continuity and 
satisfaction of beneficiaries= needs (see among others, Kajese, 1990; Gariyo, 1998:133-
134). 
 
6.4 Impact of self-help NGOs= organizational capacity on rural development 
In as much as self-help NGOs have made progress in certain aspects of poverty 
alleviation, there remain fundamental obstacles that impact on their advancement. As 
revealed in the findings, members of self-help NGOs have low education levels, with the 
majority being primary school education holders. Low education levels in turn affect the 
ability and capacity of members to train effectively in skill-acquisition. This problem is 
even more serious on the part of the leaders of such groups considering that they have 
critical roles to play in terms of co-ordinating and managing group activities. The 
management function which includes book-keeping, general record maintenance, 
financial management among other responsibilities was on the whole not satisfactorily 
performed. With an exception of two groups (Nziwa and Esabalu) the rest had been 
unable to perform basic tasks such as proper record-keeping of groups= activities 
including membership and thus, as mentioned elsewhere, making it difficult to even 
draw reliable sampling frames. These groups also tend to be afflicted with financial 
management problems. Three of the eight groups in the sample indicated, for instance, 
that some (20%) of the members having received loan facilities had defaulted in paying 
back and thus affecting the financial stability of their organizations. Among the possible 
factors that explain defaulting behaviour among some of the members was lack of 
proper training on sound investment criteria. Although women=s groups in Nyanza and 
Western Provinces could be facing slightly different problems due to differences in the 
nature of their economies, Chaiken=s (1987:15) findings in her study of women=s groups 
in Mbita, South Nyanza, were consistent with this research findings as concerns low 
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education standards and its negative influence on the managing of organizations= 
activities: Athe Yreason there may be difficulties in fostering successful women=s group 
projects is the lack of managerial skills and experiences among most group 
membersYmore than one third of Mbita women surveyed have never attended school, 
and less than 10% have received any secondary schooling, which suggests that 
effective business management which necessitates some reading and record keeping 
may by difficult for many Mbita women.@ Similar sentiments are found in the works of 
Adagala, (1989), Maas (1991), Chitere (1994), and Wipper (1995). In his 
recommendations, Ondiege (1992:186), for instance, saw the role of the state being 
among others, the provision of training, especially financial management to the leaders 
of self-help groups. 
 
Another major weakness arising from low education levels was the inability of the 
general membership and the leadership of these groups to work effectively with other 
individuals and organizations in the process of development. Whereas virtually all the 
organizations in the sample would welcome additional financial assistance, the ability to 
seek such assistance, for instance,  in a written proposal format which is incidentally a 
standard requirement by donor organizations before any assistance can be released, 
was simply impracticable. Three of the organizations (Nziwa, Emulundu, and Esabalu) 
that had at one time sought for assistance had their budget proposals prepared for them 
by non-members. Interestingly in the process, the Chairlady of Nziwa Women=s group 
revealed that on one occasion, they had been approached by some individuals who 
claimed could link them to donors for funding. In response, Nziwa group provided all the 
required information on their activities and needs so as to facilitate the preparation of an 
aid proposal. Nziwa group, however, never heard from the individuals again. Whereas 
many reasons may account for the non-response to Nziwa, the chairlady was of the 
strong opinion that her organization could have been tricked into providing information 
that may have been misused for selfish gain by those individuals. Her apprehension 
was based on past experiences where some other organizations had similarly lost 
contact mysteriously with would-be link persons. Maas (1991:64-65), in her study of 
women=s groups at the Coast (Kenya), found more or less similar traits and the 
accompanying problems. She concluded: AThe problem with these groups is the low 
 
 179 
level of literacy among the members and the virtual absence of any inspiring and 
competent leadership. Few members have formal basic education or have experiences 
with or access to government officers or other resource persons.@ 
 
As alluded to in an earlier discussion, in spite of financial and material assistance to 
women=s groups, mainly from formal NGOs, this funding as established from the 
interviews with the chairpersons and the general membership, has been inadequate in 
covering the various activities of these groups. All the eight groups in the sample had 
some projects that had not been accomplished. In some instances, projects had been 
started only to stall mid-way. The Nziwa Women=s group had a collapsed bakery project 
due to inadequacy of funds; Esabalu group in allocating dairy cows to members, had 
done so to only 50 out of a total membership of 162 with 112 members desperately 
awaiting their turn; Fadhili group, in spite of members having reputable knowledge in 
brick-making, could not proceed productively due to lack of adequate financial 
resources for the project; and Ujirani Mwema and Tamu women=s groups were among 
those hard-hit by members= default in loan-repayment and thus other members= turns to 
benefit from the same facility had been put on hold. Shortage of adequate funds to 
pursue and sustain women=s groups= projects can thus seriously affect the efforts of 
members to contribute to the process of rural development within their own local 
communities and immediate families and could have a discouraging impact as already 
evidenced in the fall of membership in some of these organizations. Tamu Women=s 
group, for example, began with 50 members in 1990 but by 1996 membership had 
dropped to only 15. Ujirani Mwema was established in 1988 with 42 members which 8 
years later had declined to 22. In this connection, Chaiken=s (1987: 19) observation is 
crucial, that: 
Further failure of women=s group enterprises will have serious 
consequences, beyond just the failure of an individual project. 
Unsuccessful women=s group projects result in the members feeling 
incapable of helping themselves, it can foster feelings of dependency, it 
can provide sources of conflict between women making future co-
operation impossible, it makes the members less likely to experiment in 
new economic avenues, and it reinforces the perception held by men that 
women are not competent. 
 
However, in assisting self-help NGOs with financial and material resources, care must 
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be taken to balance between the interests of self-reliance and possible dangers of 
promoting and fortifying dependency attitudes (Taylor, 1992; Chitere, 1994; Wipper, 
1995). At best, while emphasizing on use of local resources for development, donor 
organizations such as the formal NGOs and the Government should strengthen 
women=s groups through provision of relevant education and training that can in the long 
run improve scarce resource mobilization, management and allocation on the part of 
these development groups. Groups with a proven record of sound management should 
be given preference when it comes to financial assistance. 
 
Summary and conclusion 
This has been an attempt to assess the organizational capacity of NGOs in terms of 
their resources, both human and material, and how it impacts on their role in rural 
development. Whereas, formal NGOs= project managers and field staff have important 
functions that include the administration and management of NGOs= projects in the field, 
the levels of their formal education, in particular, those of the project managers, were 
found to be generally low with half of them lacking post-secondary school level 
education. However, most of the NGOs have made some effort to provide professional 
training to their managers in an attempt to sharpen their skills of project management. 
 
Formal NGOs had three main sources of funding: public organizations, private 
organizations, and NGO internally-generated funds. However, as revealed in this 
research, foreign public and private organizations have been the most dominant 
providers of these funds as opposed to the internal generation of funds by the NGOs 
themselves. Over-reliance on donor funds has in turn created a dependency 
relationship between the NGOs and the donors in the process threatening the 
sustainability of the NGOs as organizations and their development projects. 
 
The status of human resources in self-help NGOs was even worse off compared to 
formal NGOs. This was especially in relation to the members= low formal education 
levels and the generally inadequate managerial skills. The financial aspect of these 
organizations was also unsatisfactory with most of them unable to sustain development 
projects. Formal NGOs constituted the most significant funders of Self-help NGOs. 
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Over-reliance on formal NGOs for funding has also created a dependency problem for 
self-help NGOs. 
 
In relation to the ability and capacity of NGOs to influence public policy on relevant 
development issues, their role was largely limited to reinforcing existing government 
policies rather than pioneering in the creation of new ones. NGOs reinforce government 
development policies through their participation, although sometimes reluctantly, in 
DDCs and the  tailoring of  their development projects to fit national development 
programmes and priorities. However, NGOs= role in public policy advocacy was very 
much hampered by the fact that most of them lack research units and generally place 
little emphasis on research. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
7.0 PARTICIPATION AND LOCAL CAPACITY BUILDING: THE IMPACT OF NGOs     
   IN WESTERN PROVINCE 
 
The origins of participation as a concept in development can be traced to development 
efforts of the 1950s and 1960s. Around this period, Community Development (CD) was 
seen as the most viable strategy for achieving rural development. But implicit in CD was 
the idea of involving local people, through >self-help=, in the development process by 
utilizing local skills and abilities (UNDP, 1979:13, 1998a). However, in the 
implementation of CD, in as much as the strategy sought to incorporate local 
communities in development, its overall agenda was framed by governments such that 
local communities Awere seen as contributing to and supporting the national 
development agenda and not necessarily as being instrumental in determining its 
content or direction@ (UNDP, 1998a:2). In some circles, CD was seen as an offshoot of 
Modernization theory with its emphasis on the external agent dominating the 
development agenda. In Kenya, for instance, Wallis (1976, 1982) has argued that the 
colonial state encouraged the provision of training in various skills to community leaders 
in an attempt to pacify the African population both as a reform and as a 
counterinsurgency measure to the Mau Mau pressure of the 1950s and 1960s. He 
equally interprets the efforts of promoting harambee (self-help) as a development 
strategy by the newly independent Kenyan state as part of the then CD.  
 
Community Development=s shortcoming of more or less concentrating all the 
development initiatives in the hands of the actor external to the community,  eventually 
led to its decline in the 1970s opening up the promotion of more participatory strategies 
that would attempt to give the poor a central place in the development process. Since 
then, the concept of participation has been expanded to include both the means and 
ends of development (see Kabwegyere and Migot-Adholla, 1981; Kiondo, 1994; 
Friedmann, 1992:72; Westergaard, 1993:15; Dicklitch, 1998). While participation as a 
means in development emphasises on how local people can be integrated in the 
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development process, as an end it focuses on empowering people to be able to 
negotiate, demand and control more of the development process (UNDP, 1998a:5).  
Participation has been associated with several advantages: the emphasis on use of 
local resources; its relevance to local development needs and priorities; the building of 
communities= capacities; the incorporation of peoples= cultures into the development 
process and thus making development people-friendly; and the ability to correctly 
identify the poorest of the poor deserving development benefits (Chambers, 1989:201; 
Chitere, 1994:3-5; UNDP, 1998a). But it has also been argued that it (participation) may 
carry with it some disadvantages that include: wastage of time and resources in case of 
failure; the possibility of destabilizing existing socio-economic relations by altering the 
power equation in society; and the shifting of the development burden onto the poor and 
the relinquishing by national governments of their responsibilities to promote 
development with equity (UNDP, 1998a). 
 
In this study, participation was given a more specific interpretation to refer to the 
restructuring of power relations in society between the privileged (the rich) and the 
marginalised (the poor) through the involvement of the latter in resource mobilization, 
project planning, implementation, evaluation and consumption. It is assumed that 
participation may lead to the empowerment of the poor through emphasis on local 
capacity building. Empowerment in this context refers to Athe creation of an environment 
in which people question and challenge the structural reasons for their poverty through 
learning and action@ (Farrington and Lewis, cited in Holmen and Jirstrom, 1994:16). 
Friedmann (1992:33) observes that there are three forms of empowerment: social 
empowerment concerned with acquisition of information, knowledge and skills;  
psychological empowerment involving individual sense of potency, that is, self-
confidence; and political empowerment in relation to collective decision-making. All 
these forms of empowerment were considered important in that they act to reinforce 
each other towards the emancipation of the poor from being excluded in the 
development process. 
 
Local capacity building, a means to the empowerment goal through participatory 
development, involves improvement of skills, information and knowledge of communities 
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relevant to resource mobilization and utilization. This process is supposed to promote 
self-reliant and sustainable development. Discussing the role of NGOs in local capacity 
building, Cernea (1988:8) contends AThey organize people to make better use of their 
own local productive resources, to create new resources and services, to promote 
equity and alleviate poverty, to influence government actions towards these same 
objectives and to establish new institutional framework that will sustain people-centred 
or actor-centred development.@ 
 
The Government of Kenya through the DFRD strategy embraces the concept of 
peoples= participation in development, at least in theory, by calling for a broadening of 
the rural development base in order to improve problem identification, resource 
mobilization, and project design and implementation (Republic of Kenya, 1987). This 
development has to be sustainable in nature, a process that entails development >of= the 
people, >for= the people and >by= the people (Republic of Kenya, 1994d:41). 
 
Emphasis on participatory development has in turn refocused development efforts at the 
grassroots. This explains the concept of Local Level Development (LLD), which 
encompasses the improvement and utilisation of local communities= experience, 
knowledge, entrepreneurship and human capital in the process of development (Alila, 
1995:7). In this study, the involvement of formal NGOs in the development process in 
the rural areas, which may include the founding and strengthening of self-help NGOs, 
was thus considered as an integral part of this LLD process. This chapter, thus, 
proceeds to analyse and evaluate the role of NGOs in participatory development and 
local capacity building. 
 
7.1 Nature and levels of participation in Formal NGOs= projects 
In an effort to understand the extent of participation in NGO projects, project managers 
were interviewed on whether they involved project beneficiaries in the identification, 
implementation and management of projects. Overall (as indicated by six of the eight 
NGOs), the NGOs argued that they placed much emphasis on involving beneficiaries in 
the development process. This began at the stage of project identification through to 
implementation. In identifying development projects, five of the NGOs had strong 
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evidence of involving the beneficiaries in the initial survey studies that included 
determining the development priority needs of the area. This was done through physical 
field visits by NGO officials which involved various forms of interactions with the would-
be beneficiaries. In addition to interviewing beneficiaries on their immediate needs, 
NGOs also collaborated with the relevant government ministries as well as local 
politicians. NGOs such as PfP and PRIDE involved in promoting the small-scale 
enterprise sector had to do detailed area surveys to establish not only the type of small-
scale businesses in place but also the security of their credit facilities if and when 
disbursed. Those in the sector of environmental conservation, such as KENGO and 
KWAP, made initial surveys to gather information on community cultural preferences 
and the nature and levels of energy needs in the communities. In doing this, formal 
NGOs preferred to work with already existing groups, especially women=s groups, or to 
form new ones in situations where they did not exist. Groups, compared to individuals, 
offered better forums for reaching the wider community and yet were also cost-effective. 
For an NGO like CHAK, women=s groups literally became an entry-point to the wider 
community since through them it became possible to access the community. Exposed to 
community health care techniques, some of these groups literally took it upon 
themselves to popularise and teach the benefits associated with community health care 
and family planning to their immediate communities. 
 
Beyond project planning, this study was interested in the extent to which NGOs involve 
beneficiaries in the implementation aspect. Foremost was the need to find out if local 
development resources, where available, are put into use by the NGOs. Project 
managers were thus asked to state the contributions of beneficiaries to their respective 
NGO projects. Labour provision, contribution of ideas to improve the projects and 
provision of local materials, together were listed as the most popular forms of local 
communities= contributions. This was followed by provision of finances to supplement 
NGOs= contributions. Labour provision, as evidenced in the findings, came in the form of 
participation by the beneficiaries in NGOs= projects. For instance, in the case of CHAK, 
the local community provided labour for the construction of new health units and 
renovation of the old ones. This was the case with Ingotse and Kima Mission Hospitals, 
where members of the local community were mobilized through the assistance of the 
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Provincial Administration to provide labour for construction. One of the women=s groups, 
Esabalu Group, having been sponsored for training by CHAK, was making significant 
progress in terms of educating local community members on family planning and 
community health care both at the homes of individuals and at the Kima Mission 
Hospital. A visit paid to Esabalu Group members during one of their family planning 
teaching sessions at Kima Mission, which was conducted once a week, revealed the 
possession of considerable community health care information. 
 
Reliance on local materials was also encouraged by the NGOs in their projects. CHAK 
for instance, gave first priority to the use of local materials, if available, for the 
construction and renovation of old health units. More often than not, most communities 
could readily supply timber, sand, and even made their own bricks for CHAK projects. 
CHAK=s policy was to go for external resources only in situations where the local 
community could not supply. For NGOs in the small-scale enterprise sector, it was a 
clear condition to would-be beneficiaries to supply the basic infrastructure of a b usiness 
premise, where necessary, before a credit facility could be availed to them. The 
availability of a plot was on the other hand a prerequisite for KENGO=s and KWAP=s 
would be beneficiaries of the multi-purpose trees= project. This had to be ascertained by 
the NGOs= field development officers before any farmer could qualify for the special 
seeds and seedlings. 
 
Project funding required concerted action with both the beneficiaries and NGOs making 
contributions. For example, when considering accessing credit facilities, virtually all 
NGOs (PfP, PRIDE and BDS) concerned with the promotion of small-scale enterprises, 
required that potential beneficiaries had on-going businesses and that they met the 
financial difference in projects since credit facilities were essentially supplementary. 
Furthermore, the credit facility was accompanied by strict repayment procedures of both 
the interest and the principal (for example, PRIDE charged a 20% interest rate). VEST, 
in the sector of water and sanitation and specialising in the construction of roof 
catchment ferro-cement water tanks and modern pit latrines, required that if being 
constructed for beneficiaries in their individual capacities, they contribute 90% of the 
total cost of the project. However, if the project was for an institution such as a health 
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centre or a school, then the institution would pay only 25% of the total cost of the 
project. The logic of lowering the cost to be met by institutions was to encourage 
institutional projects since they had the capacity to serve and benefit the wider 
community as compared to projects for individuals. 
 
The third phase of project participation, beside initiation and implementation, concerned 
 management. The focus here was on the role of the beneficiaries in the administration 
of the on-going NGO projects. The general pattern that emerged in the management of 
NGO assisted projects was of shared responsibilities among the NGO personnel, the 
Government and the project beneficiaries. All the 8 NGOs supervised their on-going 
beneficiaries= projects through their project managers and field staff. In the case of 
NGOs in the area of small-scale enterprises, they made field trips to ascertain proper 
utilisation of loans in terms of the intended investments. KENGO and KWAP, through 
their field staff, made frequent visits to farmers to monitor the progress of their 
afforestation programmes. As for the Government, its key contribution was in terms of 
the provision of technical expertise to help in the management of NGO-initiated 
development projects via its officers. For instance, officers in the Ministry of Livestock 
and Agriculture while undertaking field extension work, visited farmers who had 
benefited from various NGO sponsored projects in the areas of poultry, dairy farming 
among others. The Government, through the Ministry of Health, also provided qualified 
personnel to help manage CHAK assisted health units.    
 
The role of beneficiaries in the management process of development projects was 
carried out with the assistance of NGO project management committees. The 
management committees were made up of members of the local communities, who in a 
sense, were the local notables consisting of active and retired politicians, administrators, 
teachers, businessmen, and church officials among others. The beneficiaries and the 
management committees were expected to oversee the day to day running of the 
projects and report back to the NGOs upon the progress of projects. However, the 
committees had a further role of linking the larger community to their respective NGOs 
as well as occasionally being used as trainers of the beneficiaries. In their role as 
trainers of the beneficiaries, most of the NGOs extended to the committees some basic 
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training in relevant skills. 
 
In counterchecking the views of project managers on the participatory role(s) of project 
beneficiaries in NGO projects, the latter were interviewed on their contributions. Out of 
the 126 interviewed, 116 (92%) acknowledged participating in the decision-making 
process concerning the type of NGO projects(s) to be supported. One hundred and 
thirteen (90%) observed they were consulted on matters to do with further improvement, 
if any, of on-going NGO supported projects(s). On whether they cost-shared the 
financing of projects with NGOs, 77 (61%) answered in the affirmative. Labour 
contributions to projects was acknowledged by 69 (55%) beneficiaries and only 56 
(44%) stated they had provided local materials for NGO initiated projects. The number 
of beneficiaries (55%) indicating that they contributed labour to NGO projects was 
surprisingly low compared to the rating by project managers. This discrepancy could be 
explained by the fact that a substantial number of beneficiaries did not view the 
provision of unpaid labour to NGO supported projects as constituting a significant 
contribution and thus a number of them are likely to have been indifferent on this factor. 
 
Table 11:  Roles of beneficiaries in formal NGOs= projects  
 
 
            ROLES PLAYED 
 
NUMBER OF 
POSITIVE 
RESPONSES. 
 
%  
 
TOTAL 
INTERVIE-
WED 
 
Initial identification and planning of NGO 
project activities 
 
116 
 
92 
 
126 
 
Consultation on on-going NGO activities 
 
113 
 
90 
 
126 
 
Provision of finances 
 
77 
 
61 
 
126 
 
Provision of labour 
 
69 
 
55 
 
126 
 
Provision of local materials 
 
56 
 
44 
 
126 
 
Source: field data based on interviews 
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This study=s findings on the involvement of beneficiaries in formal NGO projects on the 
whole are positive in that, to a large extent, beneficiaries participate in the identification, 
implementation and management of projects with the assistance of local members of 
NGO project management committees. These findings show a stronger NGO emphasis 
 on the employment of participatory development techniques compared to those of 
earlier studies. Burbank=s (1994:73-78) study focussing on small-scale enterprises in 
Kenya indicated a participatory figure of 42%, while Mutiso (1985:65) and Chitere 
(1994:6) concluded NGOs do not solicit community preferences, have no personnel in 
the communities, and are concerned with only the provision of materials and facilities 
than with community education. These differences between this study=s findings and 
those of earlier studies could be explained by the observation that over time, NGOs 
have been widening and embracing more and more, participatory approaches to rural 
development with the realization that there is a greater promise for sustainability of 
projects when beneficiaries are fully engaged in them. This view was confirmed when 
many project managers on being asked why they focus on participatory development, 
argued that it not only cuts down on their NGOs= development expenditure by 
emphasising on cost-sharing, but that it also adds to the skills of the local communities 
and helped build a stronger bond and identity between the beneficiaries and the NGO 
projects. 
 
7.2 Participation in self-help NGOs= projects 
Just as in the case of formal NGOs, in examining the levels of participation in self-help 
NGOs, the study was interested in evaluating members= participation in the 
identification, implementation and management of their groups= projects. 
 
As a beginning point for the analysis, it is important to note that women=s groups are 
formed voluntarily with membership basically depending on each individual=s free 
choice. Wipper (1995:164) has defined a voluntary organization as A.... an organized, 
corporate group, in which a person chooses membership.@ All the eight groups 
examined in this study had been formed voluntarily with the overall objective of 
improving the socio-economic status of members through participation in activities of an 
economic nature. Ondiege (1992:179), commenting on the role of women=s groups he 
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studied in Machakos District, also noted that women used these groups= activities as an 
avenue to enhance their economic status in society. Little (cited in Wipper, 1995:164) 
too, observed that these groups regulate and promote trade, extend credit, teach new 
social and occupational skills, and provide monetary and psychological support. 
 
In examining the phase of project identification, the research focussed on the role of the 
membership in determining group activities to be undertaken. This was considered 
important since it would also shed light on the power relations within these 
organizations, in particular, between the chairpersons and the general membership. 
Group leadership, held by the chairperson alongside the secretary and treasurer, was 
elective after every two years as recommended by the Department of Social Services.  
However, while all the groups had adhered to this rule, there was some evidence, at 
least in four groups, that their respective leadership had not left office for more than 
three terms. The chairperson of Nziwa women=s group for instance, had been in office 
since the early 1990s. While it could be argued that this monopoly of a group=s 
leadership was a sign of a chairperson=s popularity, there were also reasons to believe 
that it was as a result of manipulation and a symbol of authoritarianism considering that 
some members observed that only the leadership was handling tasks such as 
organizational planning, for they were not allowed to contribute to such a role. 
 
Asked to comment on how frequent they held formal groups= meetings with members, 
chairpersons= responses ranged from twice to thrice in a month. Such meetings, they 
observed, provided a forum for reviewing groups= projects. In response to the question 
on the contributions of members to group activities, the chairpersons answered  in order 
of preference as follows: provision of labour; contributions in form of finances and 
materials;  and ideas to improve on-going projects. Labour provision was in the form of 
members jointly working on groups= income-generating activities such as weaving, 
vegetable growing, pottery, poultry and dairy farming depending on the speciality of 
each group as well as community based projects requiring group labour and skills.  
Financial contributions came in the form of membership dues, while materials included 
local resources each member could be able to provide depending on availability such as 
clay for pottery, sand and trees in the case of a construction project, and seeds and 
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local manure for an agricultural project among others. The generally low profile played 
by the rank and file members in planning and management of organizational activities 
tended to deny these organizations a broader decision-making structure and the 
benefits that come with it. This domineering tendency by the leadership of some 
women=s groups at the expense of the wider membership and the resultant 
undemocratic decision-making system has also been revealed in other studies including 
Bebbington=s and Riddell=s (1997:112) who observe that: A...it is equally important to 
note that GSOs (grassroots support organizations) and MOs (membership 
organizations) can be internally differentiated, can be controlled by small groups, need 
not be especially democratic nor equitable in their distribution of  benefits, and therefore 
are not necessarily representative of the assumed target groups.@ 
 
In counter-checking data from chairpersons as regards the specific roles of members in 
groups= projects, the latter were also interviewed. Seventy two (97%) of the 74 
interviewed mentioned provision of finances as part of their contributions to the activities 
of groups; labour supply was pointed out as a role by 69 (93%) members; supply of 
local materials for projects by 52 (70%) members; and only 38 (51%) thought they made 
contributions to their groups= projects through provision of ideas for initiating and 
improving projects. Overall, these responses revealed that there was active participation 
by members in the development activities of their organizations. However, their 
participation in the planning and initiation of organizational activities was the least, 
indicating that the leadership monopolised this function. These findings were consistent 
with Chitere=s (1994:159) who observed that members of the groups he studied 
contributed money, labour and materials. However, according to Chitere, officials of 
these organizations dominated the planning function which included the meeting of 
important visitors and linking the groups= projects to government extension officers.  
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Table 12:  Roles played by members in self-help NGOs 
 
 
ROLES 
 
NUMBER OF 
POSITIVE 
RESPONSES 
 
        % 
 
TOTAL 
INTERVIEWED 
 
Planning including initiation and 
management of group activities 
 
            38 
 
       51 
 
        74 
 
Provision of materials 
 
           52 
 
       70 
 
        74 
 
Labour provision 
 
           69 
 
       93 
 
        74 
 
Provision of finances 
 
           72 
 
       97 
 
        74 
 
Source: field data based on interviews 
 
7.3 Formal NGOs and local capacity building 
The basic interest was to evaluate the role of NGOs= development activities and 
strategies in enhancing local capacity building amongst the beneficiaries of their 
projects. To comprehend this process, there was need to find out the extent to which 
NGOs have tapped local resources in establishing their development programmes, 
especially local knowledge enshrined in people=s cultures. In addition, there was need to 
investigate the extent to which NGOs have contributed to knowledge and skill 
acquisition amongst the target groups and therefore to empower the beneficiaries. 
Ultimately, it was the view of this study that, participation in NGOs= development 
activities ought to lead to sustainable development amongst the target groups and 
communities as a symbol of genuine empowerment resulting from local capacity 
building. 
 
When interviewed, all the NGOs= project managers stated that they took time to 
understand local cultures before initiating their development projects. In doing so, focus 
was placed on comprehending the indigenous techniques and practices of performing 
given developmental tasks. Among the measures taken by NGOs in an effort to 
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understand local practices included the training of their personnel on the various 
aspects  of local culture and a deliberate policy by the NGOs to recruit some locals to 
serve on their projects. To bridge the gap between what is held by local communities, 
on the one hand, and the NGOs, on the other concerning the development process, 
virtually all the NGOs had relied on certain methods in varying degrees depending on 
the nature of the project. For instance, apart from training offered through seminars and 
workshops, there was also emphasis upon the use of field demonstrations, films and 
dramatised plays. 
 
Overall, the findings tend to strengthen the viewpoint that comprehension of local 
culture and knowledge constitute a significant community entry-point for external 
development actors (see Kajese, 1990; Atte, 1992). As such, a people=s culture can 
either be supportive or an obstacle to new development ideas. In the study there was 
evidence of existence of indigenous cultural practices that had proven useful to some 
NGO projects. For instance, agricultural knowledge to do with soil terracing, inter-
cropping and veterinary techniques was very relevant and supportive of NGOs= 
agricultural projects and supplemented newly introduced techniques. Also, the institution 
of women=s groups, many of them formed out of the independent efforts of local women, 
 provided formal NGOs with a viable channel within which to reach the grassroots 
effectively and efficiently. 
 
However, there were also examples of situations where local culture and practices 
acted as an impediment to development. NGOs in the sector of small-scale enterprises 
tended to have more male clients than female considering that many communities did 
not encourage the autonomous participation of women in income-generating activities.  
Where strongly practised, this had an exclusion and marginalizing effect on the 
participation of women in development despite NGOs= objectives of empowering 
women. In relation to family planning programme, CHAK found it difficult to sell the idea 
of a planned family since some communities strongly detested the idea, believing that 
such would invite the wrath of the departed ancestors and therefore lead to disasters. 
On the same wavelength, NGOs such as KWAP and KENGO reported incidents of 
some local communities refusing to implement certain aspects of their environmental 
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programmes related to the planting of certain tree species which were believed would 
lead to sudden deaths within families. At the same time, these environmental NGOs 
lamented that women were excluded from tree planting in some communities, their 
participation being viewed as constituting a taboo.  
 
To ascertain the extent to which NGOs had assisted the beneficiaries in skill-acquisition 
 by either introducing new development thinking or building on what already existed in 
the communities, the latter were asked to state and explain whether they had 
participated in any form of training organized by the respective NGOs. Of the 126 
interviewed, 93 (74%) indicated to have participated in some form of training organized 
by NGOs while only 33 (26%) indicated not to have done so largely due to lack of 
opportunity to do so. Training was  basically in the functional areas of the respective 
NGOs: e ntrepreneurial skills in the management of small-scale enterprises (PFP, BDS, 
CEEDA, PRIDE); skills in environmental and energy conservation (KENGO & KWAP); 
community health care techniques (CHAK); and skills in management of water and 
sanitation systems (VEST). In evaluating the usefulness of NGO training extended to 
project beneficiaries, they (beneficiaries) were asked to rate training relevance. Out of 
the 91 responses received, 84 (92%) argued the training had been either very beneficial 
or simply beneficial while only 7(8%) stated that it had been of no real relevance. 
Improved skills and knowledge in the management of projects was pointed out as the 
salient benefit by the beneficiaries. But many also agreed that NGOs= assistance in 
terms of provision of credit facilities had helped improve their activities quantitatively and 
qualitatively especially in a situation where they were excluded from accessing credit 
facilities from formal institutions due to lack of the prescribed securities. Jennifer Masai, 
a beneficiary of KWAP=s environmental project, noted in an interview: AI have worked 
with KWAP for two years during which I have been able to attend several workshops 
and seminars on tree planting, making of tree nurseries, making of organic manure and 
the growing of fruits. As a result I=m now able to keep my land fertile and productive in 
addition to the growing of profitable fruits and vegetables.@ (Interview with Masai, 17th 
January 1997, Busia District). 
 
Whether NGO-supported projects were ultimately sustainable, project managers were 
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asked to rate the success of their development projects. Virtually all the NGOs in the 
sample indicated that they had some experiences of successful and failed projects 
among the beneficiaries: PfP and BDS had cases of collapsed small-scale enterprises 
(retail shops, dairy farming, poultry etc) in spite of accessing credit facilities for 
beneficiaries who ultimately failed to run the projects beside defaulting in loan 
repayment; environmental NGOs had instances of lack o f sustained enthusiasm on the 
part of the beneficiaries to pursue aspects of tree farming; VEST had examples of water 
and sanitation projects that had collapsed amongst some beneficiaries; and CEEDA, in 
spite of providing training in community development on various aspects, had groups 
whose income-generating activities had declined. Asked to account for cases of 
unsuccessful projects, the most cited reason by the managers was the lack of 
commitment by the project beneficiaries to sustaining projects. When asked to elaborate 
on why there was lack of commitment, many argued beneficiaries failed to identify with 
projects and continued to regard them as belonging to the respective NGOs. This was 
especially so in projects established for institutions, as in the case of VEST=s roof-
catchment water tanks and CHAK=s health units, where they had been mismanaged and 
fallen into disuse. However, in the case of projects targeting individual members of 
groups, their failure was more because of inadequate funds to sustain on-going projects 
as soon as NGOs pulled out. A number of beneficiaries argued NGO initiated projects 
tended to require constant capital in-put which occasionally they could not meet due to 
either the projects taking too long to start generating profits or when they generated 
profits, they did so at very marginal levels that were incapable to offset the costs of 
running them. In addition, a few beneficiaries pointed out that the level of project training 
offered by some NGOs failed to equip them with adequate skills to run the projects. This 
last reason was evident mainly in income-generating activities such as small-scale 
businesses and dairy farming. 
 
Therefore, in as much as there is no denying that formal NGOs have played a 
fundamental role in democratising the development space (by acting as alternatives to 
the state in the provision of development resources as well as by helping strengthen, at 
the grassroots, individuals= and groups= role in the development process), there also are 
salient problems that are obstacles to the achievement of sustainability  of some of 
 
 196 
these projects. These, as already discussed, include negative beneficiaries= attitudes, 
inadequate resources to sustain the completed projects, and inadequate levels of 
project training by some NGOs. 
7.4 Self-help NGOs and local capacity building 
In a compelling assertion, Cernea(1988:16) observed that: 
The self-aggregation of people into economic NGOs magnifies their 
capability to reject paternalistic interventions, to act for their development 
and to assert themselves as organized power-wielding groups in dialogue 
with local governments. 
 
Cernea=s economic NGOs, which he defined as grassroots voluntary organizations that 
aim to provide a service to their own group membership, compares well with what are 
this study=s self-help NGOs. Implicit in Cernea=s assertion is the potential of such 
grassroots organizations for being self-reliant. However to achieve such self-reliance, 
there is a need for local capacity building within these groups whose level is closely 
determined by the participation of members in groups= activities. 
 
Having initially established the levels and nature of members= participation in self-help 
NGOs, the next interest was to find out how this has affected their daily lives in terms of 
ability and capacity to improve their standards of living and overall empowerment to  
determine the direction of their development. Of the 74 members interviewed 63 (85%) 
observed they had, as individuals, been exposed to alternative sources of income-
generation in areas as varied as vegetable farming, poultry, dairy farming, handicrafts 
(pottery, weaving, sewing, knitting), brick-making, and savings/credit facilities among 
others. Beside income-generation activities, members argued they now had an 
opportunity to effectively participate in social activities such as community development 
and health care which served to uplift the quality of rural life. Forty two (56%) were 
delighted that group activities had enlarged their level of sociability by introducing them 
to co-operative activities which made it easier for them to team up for collective benefit. 
At least 9 (12%) of the members thought group activities and interactions had helped 
them break certain social and cultural barriers by encouraging them to participate in 
what traditionally had been regarded as purely a male domain in areas such as the 
management of dairy animals, involvement in environmental programmes and 
commercial activities.  
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Table 13: Benefits acquired by members from participating in self-help NGOs= activities  
 
 
                 BENEFITS 
 
NUMBER OF 
POSITIVE 
RESPONSES 
 
           % 
 
TOTAL 
NUMBERS 
INTERVIEWED 
 
Alternative sources of income and 
participation in community projects 
 
         63 
 
          85 
 
     74 
 
Increased level of sociability leading to 
co-operative ventures 
 
         42 
 
         74 
 
     74 
 
Breaking of cultural barriers to expand 
development space for women 
 
           9 
 
         12 
 
     74 
 
Source: Field data based on interviews 
 
These findings have a closer bearing to Chitere=s (1994:166) where he showed that 
members of women=s groups derive various benefits from participating in group 
activities. These, according to Chitere, were mainly in the form of first, income-
generation which was used to cover financial needs and secondly, the socialization 
process and its attendant benefits. In the words of Chitere: 
Apart from the material benefits, women may also derive security from the 
groups. Some members were even able to verbilize their perceptions of 
their group as an entity they could look to when they had 
problems...Another intangible benefit mentioned by a few members was 
education which was obtained from the groups which enabled them to 
know how to look after their children...Indeed one of the arguments 
justifying the groups is their ability to act as mediums for passing 
information to members. Thus, one of the intangible benefits which is not 
mentioned is the growth of the members as they participate in activities of 
their groups. 
 
When asked whether through their organizations they had attended any training 
sessions, out of the 74 interviewed, 48 (65%) indicated that they had attended courses 
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ranging from organic farming, dairy and poultry farming, vegetable growing, community 
development, leadership and management, environmental conservation and credit 
management courses. These courses in the main were organized and sponsored by 
formal NGOs at times in collaboration with government departments. A majority of 
members sounded confident that the courses had been of much assistance in lifting up 
their skills relevant to rural development activities. 
 
In an earlier discussion it was noted that self-help NGOs generated funds internally.  
However, the total amount generated from members and the organizational activities 
proved inadequate to cover the costs of these organizations= activities. Consequently, 
they had no option but to look to formal NGOs for additional financial assistance. 
However, while the latter might occasionally help bail out women=s groups from their 
financial difficulties with whatever financial assistance they afford to give, there was a 
danger of perpetuating a dependency relationship and therefore the possibility of 
undermining the claim of these organizations to self-reliance. Here obviously, a 
balancing act is required: the need to provide women=s groups with financial assistance 
to support group activities while at the same time guarding against the creation of 
dependency. Equally important, is the observation that, overall, members of women=s 
groups have lower levels of formal education which had impacted negatively on their 
efforts of acquiring relevant development skills. To make matters worse, as revealed by 
the findings, only 65% had any form of training in relevant development skills. Left 
unattended to, these factors are likely to have a negative influence on the local capacity 
building among these organizations and may even erode some of the benefits already 
achieved by these groups. Chitere=s (1994:161-162) findings, too, indicated a general 
lack of adequate educational, technical and managerial skills among members and 
leaders of women=s groups, which he argued, had adversely affected projects such as 
the running of poultry, beehive and agricultural projects. A related problem is that most 
groups operated at subsistence level with all income from their productive activities 
going back to individual members rather than expanding their operations and thus 
making the groups stagnant if not retrogressive (Chitere, 1994:166). Maas (1991); 
Ondiege (1992); Pala (1983);  Feldman (1983), Mwaniki (1986) and Monsted (cited in 
Wipper, 1995; 183); and Chaiken (1987), have in their studies also called for the 
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strengthening of women=s groups in various ways if meaningful local capacity building 
and the accompanying sustainable development has to be achieved and maintained. 
Feldman (1984:84), in what sounded to be an overly pessimistic conclusion, observed: 
AWomen=s groups are often defended in Kenya on the ground that their existence gives 
women more power. But women can only have more power if their activities challenge 
existing power relations. Women=s acquiescence in their lack of many skills and their 
dependence on government for support confirms their lack of power.@ Feldman was 
writing in the early 1980s, and since then many changes have occurred, for instance, 
formal NGOs have substituted for the Government as the main funders of women=s 
groups and of course there are achievements here and there that women=s groups can 
count on. But her caution on need for more skills for women=s groups= members and 
financial autonomy remain as relevant as before. 
 
Summary and conclusion 
The roots of the concept of participation, it has been argued, can be traced to the 1950s 
and 1960s following revived efforts to enhance rural development initially through 
Community Development. In as much as Community Development envisaged 
participation of the poor in development, it was essentially in  terms of an external actor 
setting and controlling the development agenda. It was precisely for this shortcoming 
that Community Development was discarded in the 1970s as a development strategy in 
favour of other techniques that could make the poor the core of the development 
process by transferring more powers to them to determine the development agenda. 
The mission was to make development more participatory and democratic by 
empowering the poor to direct and control the process of development. Participation in 
this sense has therefore become associated more with the restructuring of power 
relations in society in favour of the poor. 
 
The findings revealed that formal NGOs have to a fairly large extent involved their 
beneficiaries in development programmes. This has been in terms of project planning 
and initiation, project implementation, and to an extent, management mainly through the 
NGOs= management committees. Self-help NGOs have also endeavoured to involve 
their members in their development projects especially at the phase of implementation  
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where members= most visible contribution has been labour and materials. The 
leadership of most of the groups has tended to monopolise the planning and 
management processes and thus excluding the general membership from the overall 
decision-making process. 
Formal NGOs, beside providing credit facilities to beneficiaries, have also focussed on 
their training in various areas relevant to development. Beneficiaries have shown that 
the provision of credit and training by formal NGOs has to some extent proven useful in 
strengthening their ability and capacity to participate in development. However, there 
was also evidence of unsuccessful projects mounted by NGOs. Where these projects 
have targeted institutions and whole communities, cases of failure have  been attributed 
to mainly lack of commitment on the part of beneficiaries in managing the projects. 
Being institutional/communal projects, beneficiaries have tended to be negligent 
towards them with the assumption that NGOs remain responsible for them, even long 
after their completion. As for projects that have targeted individual beneficiaries, failure 
has been attributed to inadequate funds to meet the running costs of the projects, and in 
some cases, the level of training offered to beneficiaries has been inadequate to impart 
the necessary skills that can ensure effective and efficient management of projects. To 
this extent therefore, NGOs need to re-examine and place more focus on the provision 
of adequate relevant training to project beneficiaries. Equally important, is the realization 
that projects that target individuals rather than institutions and communities have a 
higher sustainability rate following individuals= higher affinity to projects due to the 
accruing individual benefits, in as much as institutional/communal projects hold the 
advantage of having a bigger coverage rate in a shorter space of time.  
 
There are several significant benefits that accrue to members of women=s groups as a 
result of their participation in group projects. These include: the ability and capacity to 
access new sources of income that may be used to finance household needs; the 
formation of co-operative ventures leading to group projects that can equally generate 
income for the members; and the possibilities of socialization leading to the adoption of 
new ideas that can help break old cultural barriers to development by making members 
gain confidence to take on new development roles in society. 
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However to sustain the benefits acquired through members= participation in women=s 
groups, there is need to focus more on the provision of development-related skills to 
these members to facilitate the management of development projects. Equally important 
is the need to boost the financial standing of these organizations mainly through credit. 
However, it is a caution that in the extension of credit to these groups, care must be 
taken to ensure that this does not lead to the creation of a dependent attitude which can 
easily destroy their autonomy and compromise the ultimate objective of a self-reliant 
sustainable development. 
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                                                  CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
8.0 NGOs AND THE DEMOCRATISATION OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT: A CASE  
      STUDY OF PARTNERSHIP FOR PRODUCTIVITY (PfP) 
 
This is a case study of one of the NGOs in the study sample. The analysis is thematic 
focussing on PfP=s: history in terms of founding, objectives and activities; relations with 
the state in terms of the extent of collaboration and the resultant impact on its role in 
development; internal organizational dynamics relating to human and material 
resources; the levels and nature of participatory approaches utilised and influence on 
local capacity building among the beneficiaries; and overall contribution to 
democratization of rural development. Democratisation here, is used to refer to the 
ability and capacity of formal NGOs to contribute to institutional pluralism in society in 
supplementing or offering an alternative to the state-centred developmental role. To this 
extent then, the state may no longer claim monopoly over the development space. 
Secondly, formal NGOs by involving self-help NGOs and the wider community in 
participatory development, may empower them to claim economic and political benefits 
that they were traditionally excluded from. In this sense then, the process of interest 
aggregation and articulation by the beneficiaries is enhanced in relation to their 
economic and political development agendas. 
 
8.1 A history of PfP 
 PfP traces its roots to America where it was initially founded in 1968 by David Scull, a 
Quaker businessman. In Kenya, PfP was first launched in Kaimosi, Kakamega District 
of Western Province in 1969 by Quakers, otherwise calling themselves the Protestant 
Religious Society of Friends. Their aim was to work in partnership with small indigenous 
entrepreneurs so as to assist them improve their business acumen through training and 
provision of credit. However, their overall objective was to alleviate poverty by making 
an improvement o n the socio-economic conditions. Indeed, the founder member, Scull, 
believed that small enterprises were the key to genuine development for they could fit 
into a rural tradition without causing much dislocation (PfP, 1995a:12, 1995b:21, 
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1995c:1). 
 
Originally registered as a Company Limited by guarantee under the companies Act 
(CAP 486) in 1970, PfP was eventually registered formally in 1992 as an NGO as per 
the requirements of the NGO Act of 1990. In accordance with the Act, PfP established a 
fully fledged Board of Directors headed by a chairman as well as an arm of 
Management and Staff headed by a General Manager. By 1995, PfP had a Board 
establishment of six and a staff of 36 spread all over the country in rural and peri-urban 
areas of Nairobi, Kiambu, Nyeri, Bungoma, Kakamega, Kisumu, Siaya, South Nyanza 
and Trans Nzoia (PfP, 1995a:12). However, by November 1998 only a few of these 
projects were still running, for instance, some in Western and Nyeri (Central Province), 
due to financial and other problems (PfP, 1997:3, 1998a). 
 
PfP Kenya gives its mission as the contribution towards the development and growth of 
the micro-enterprise sector including related environmental issues in partnership with 
small-scale businessmen and farmers through the provision of credit and training with 
the sole objective of making them economically self-reliant and self-sustaining (PfP, 
1995b:23; 1995a:13). The PfP Development Plan to the year 2000 (1995c:14) places 
emphasis upon: 
(a) the development of appropriate management skills in individuals and/or groups 
directly as well as through other institutions; 
(b) the provision of appropriate technical assistance; 
(c) the assisting of clients in dealing with banks and lending institutions until they are      
 adequately empowered to do so on their own; 
(d) the provision of legal assistance and civic education to small scale economic units; 
(e) the serving of poor people who are already engaged in their own economic       
activities; 
(f) putting emphasis on women and youth entrepreneurs; and 
(g) working jointly with sister NGOs, Government Departments and the business sector  
     on projects consistent with its aims. 
 
Target clients have included women=s groups, youth groups,  mixed groups (all of which 
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must have registered with the Ministry of Culture and Social Services) and individuals 
largely operating in the rural areas. Examples of projects implemented by PfP since its 
inception include: the Shinyalu Women Economic Development Project in Kakamega 
District, Western Province; the Bungoma Farmers Small Enterprise Development 
Project in Bungoma District, Western Province; the Women in Development Project in 
Nyeri and Kiambu Districts, Central Province; and the Bungoma Small Enterprise 
Development Project in Bungoma, Western Province (PfP, 1995b:24). Continued 
involvement of PfP in the development process is clearly predicated on the 
understanding of the state=s weaknesses in certain areas and thus its inability to meet 
its development goals. In its Development Plan to the year 2000, PfP (1995c:5) points 
out some of the problems the small enterprise sector faces in spite of the state=s efforts: 
lack of access to institutional credit, raw materials and supplies, and information; lack of 
management and business skills; and marketing and demand problems associated with 
local conditions. 
 
8.2 PfP=s relations with the state 
PfP, like all the other NGOs currently operational in the country, has had to function 
within certain state regulations as stipulated under the 1990 NGO Act. Consequently,  
PfP had to register in 1992 with the NGO Co-ordination Board, the Government arm of 
the NGO Act. At the same time, PfP has had to work with the District Development 
Committee (DDC) under the District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD) where 
virtually all its development projects have had to be vetted. PfP, it can be argued from 
the available evidence, has attempted to fit its development programme within the 
national framework as required by the Government in terms of objectives and goals. For 
example, in justifying the initiation of the Tiriki Dairy Development Project, PfP (1995b:3-
4; also see PfP,1995c:4-5) noted it was in line with the Government of Kenya policy on 
the promotion of the micro-enterprise sector in development expounded on in 
documents such as Sessional Paper No.1 of 1986 on Economic Management for 
Renewed Growth, Sessional Paper No.2 of 1992 on Small Enterprise and Juakali 
Enterprise Development in Kenya, and the National Development Plan 1994-1996 on 
Resource Mobilization for Sustainable Development. PfP thus noted of these 
documents,  
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These documents highlight the importance of resource mobilization for 
socio-economic development and the critical importance of the micro-
enterprise sector development in the overall socio-economic development 
of Kenya. The proposed Tiriki Dairy Development Project is conceived, 
designed and developed within these policy instruments in addition to 
being constructed on the solid foundation of PfP Mission statement 
concerning partnership for productivity and progress. 
 
From the analysis of the Kakamega DDC meetings= minutes, PfP stood out as one of 
the NGOs most regular in  attendance of meetings represented by a member of its 
national Board of Directors and national chairman of Projects Committee (see for 
example, DDC, 1998b, 1998c, 1998d, 1998e, 1999a).  
 
In addition to the DDC, PfP has had interactions with the Government=s technical 
ministries in the course of implementing its development projects. The so-called 
Voucher Training Programme, started in October 1997 and sponsored by the World 
Bank, saw the Ministry of Research, Technical Training and Technology appoint PfP as 
the Allocating Agency whose main role involved the recruitment and in some cases the 
training of the would be participants in various skills related to their small-scale activities 
in the rural areas (PfP, 1998b). This example is a pointer to the fact that the 
Government of Kenya, through the Ministry, recognised that PfP, as a voluntary 
organization working at the grassroots, was the most suitable in identifying the would-be 
beneficiaries of the World Bank sponsored programme.  
 
PfP has also collaborated with other government ministries in its development activities. 
For instance, in its Food Increase and Storage Programme for Nambale in Busia 
District, the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development as well as the Office of 
the President were involved in the initial planning of the project through survey, site 
identification and location of demonstration plot. In the words of PfP=s (1987:20) working 
expectations with the Government: 
The Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development (MALD) has a 
Training and Visiting Section (T&V) which provides a wealth of agricultural 
extension services. These services shall be borrowed and incorporated in 
PfP extension services. The officers will work together. The Farmers= 
Training Centre under the MALD is a ready asset to be exploited together 
with the facilities at Alupe Agricultural Research Centre. The Department 
of Social Services of the Ministry of Culture and Social Services has also 
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been and will continue to be useful in group and social work methodology. 
Other District Departments shall be incorporated as may be required. 
  
Beyond relations with the Government bureaucracy, PfP (1995b:24) has tended to 
depict itself as a non-partisan development oriented NGO without any links to political 
party politics. However, the re-establishment of the multi-party era in Kenya in 1991 
seems to have created a dilemma for the NGO and therefore an identity crisis in terms 
of where its ultimate allegiance ought to be. This crisis seems to have prompted the 
convening of a meeting of PfP=s Executive Committee members of the Board and senior 
staff in January 1993 (Kakamega) where a salient agenda concerned the future role of 
the organization in the new era of plural party politics (PfP, 1993a). Whereas there was 
some ambivalence concerning the NGO=s political allegiance, the stronger indication 
was that in the event of a competition between the opposition parties and KANU for 
PfP=s loyalty, then KANU would be the party to support since it formed the Government 
of the day. One contributor thus argued in the 1993 PfP meeting: APfP is a different 
entity from the members who compose it. If its members are politically-minded, the 
individual members= views should not be regarded as being that of the organization. 
Therefore, PfP as an organization should display a total impartiality in connection with 
politics. It should support the Government of the day in up-lifting the living standards of 
its people.@ But what betrayed the supposed neutral political position of PfP was this 
contributor=s last sentence that it should support the Government of the day, of which by 
implication meant loyalty to KANU which formed the Government. The question of 
where PfP=s loyalty should lie, however, seems to have been concluded beyond any 
doubt by one of the very senior officers, who in his paper presented in the same 
meeting argued: 
Sometimes the political system has been requiring that you dance to the 
tune of the ruling party or else you are deemed to be anti-government. I 
hope this won=t be the system again but suppose it is, then we will 
continue to identify ourselves with the Government of the day. 
 
But if PfP was ultimately identifying itself with the ruling party and its government, a clue 
for this behaviour could be found in the nature of its leadership. A close scrutiny of its 
Board of Directors (PfP, 1981, 1988, 1993, 1994, 1997) beginning from the early 1980s 
to the current period, tends to indicate a continuity in office of more or less the same 
individuals who right from the single-party days to today=s multi-partyism have continued 
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to be strongly identified with the ruling party, KANU. Many of these Board Members 
have held senior public positions at different times in Kenya, especially during the Moi 
regime. While serving PfP, two of the Board members were at one time or another 
KANU Members of Parliament, another, a senior District Commissioner (DC), while the 
others have been either KANU party officials or ordinary members. Ndegwa=s (1996) 
findings that leadership is central in influencing civil society organizations= posture 
towards the state has therefore much relevance in the case of explaining PfP=s pro-
establishment position. It would seem clear that the PfP leadership has been a 
beneficiary of the state=s patron-client networks in terms of political (appointment and 
election to senior public positions) as well as economic rewards(the contracting of PfP 
to undertake certain development projects on behalf of the Government, for example the 
Voucher Training Programme sponsored by the World Bank, and the readiness of the 
Government to team up with PfP in some of its developmental programmes). Probably 
constrained to reciprocate to the state=s rewards that may have facilitated its 
development work through the patron-client relations, PfP (1988) issued to the 
President through the Provincial Commissioner, the Nyayo Era Report that was in 
essence a thanks-giving document. In part, it read: 
All the achievements Partnership for Productivity Service Foundation has 
made during the last Ten Great Years of Nyayo would not have been 
possible without the wise and dynamic leadership of His Excellency, The 
President, Hon. Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi, the co-operation of the 
Provincial Administration, and the willingness of the wanaanchi  to pull 
together in the spirit of Nyayo (PfP, 1988:6). 
 
8.3 PfP and its internal organizational capacity 
As a development organization, PfP ought to have a sound financial, material and 
human resource base to be able to meet its stated development objectives. As already 
observed in PfP=s early history, it was founded by an American Quaker foundation with 
all the accompanying financial implications. However, the collapse of PfP=s mother 
organization in the USA in 1986 had negative implications on its operations, a fact 
acknowledged by the PfP leadership in the country (PfP, 1995c:1-2). It is thus significant 
to examine the efforts taken by PfP since then to re-organize its organizational capacity.  
 
8.3.1 PfP, the flow of finances and implications 
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Up to the early 1990s, even with the collapse of PfP=s mother foundation in the USA, it 
still relied on a number of foreign donors for its cash flow. Among these were 
governmental donor organizations based abroad, foreign NGOs, inter-governmental 
organizations and local organizations. Examples of foreign governmental donor 
organizations were: the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), which 
funded PfP=s Shinyalu Women Economic Development Promotion in Kakamega; and 
the Norwegian Agency for International Development (NORAD) which funded PfP=s 
Bungoma Farmers= Small Enterprise Project in Bungoma. Inter-governmental 
organizations have included the Food Agricultural Organization (FAO), which helped 
fund the Peoples= Participation Project in the areas of Chekalini, and Lugari, in 
Kakamega District; and the International Labour Organization (ILO) used to fund the 
Disabled Persons Project covering six Districts. Among foreign NGOs that have helped 
fund PfP=s development activities are the African Development Foundation of the USA 
and the Ford Foundation. Local organizations have included the Kenya Rural Enterprise 
Program (KREP). 
 
Table 14: PfP=s donors in support of its development activities 
 
 
Governmental donor 
organizations 
 
Foreign donor NGOs 
 
Inter-governmental 
donor organizations 
 
Local Organizations 
 
1. SIDA 
2. NORAD 
 
1. ADF 
2. Ford Foundation 
 
1. FAO 
2. ILO 
 
KREP 
 
Source:  PfP minutes and 1995 Development Plan. 
 
However, by 1994, most of these organizations had completed their grant periods with 
PfP and were pulling out without any much ray of hope of contract renewal. This 
plunged PfP into a serious financial crisis leading to doubts as to its chances of survival. 
This concern warranted the calling of a major PfP meeting to re-examine its goals and 
strategies (PfP, 1993a). At the same time, PfP engaged the services of a leading 
accounts firm in Kenya, Price Waterhouse. Expressing its fears, the PfP (1994a:3) 
Board noted: 
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As the Committee is fully aware PfP is faced with serious problems 
relating to sustainability and self-reliance. PfP has no financial base of its 
own due to traditional reliance on donor funding. This unsatisfactory 
situation calls for aggressive and urgent fundraising programmes as well 
as careful resource allocation and utilization in order to attain a measure 
of financial self-reliance. 
 
PfP=s financial situation continued to deteriorate over the years such that it had no 
option but to rely on a paltry income raised via mainly fees charged on client services, 
and this could hardly sustain the organization. For instance, the 1997/8 income 
generated was only 2,125,634 Ksh against an expenditure of 2,007, 692 Ksh over the 
same period, considering that PfP=s top management had ordered austerity measures in 
the organization=s operations, and thus registering a slim balance of only 117,942Ksh. 
 
Table 15: PfP=s income/revenue in the 1997/98 period 
 
 
CODE 
 
               PARTICULARS 
 
       1997/98 
 
A 
 
INCOME 
 
KSH 
 
1 
 
Opening balance 
 
34,426 
 
2 
 
Service fees 
 
1,623,786 
 
3 
 
Interest on loans 
 
53,650 
 
4 
 
Principal recoveries 
 
56,372 
 
5 
 
Sale of passbooks 
 
27,800 
 
6 
 
Sale of vehicles and cycles (scrap) 
 
210,000 
 
7 
 
Voucher Training Programme (G.O.K) 
 
29,600 
 
8 
 
Miscellaneous income 
 
30,000 
 
 
 
TOTAL INCOME AVAILABLE 
 
2,125,634 
 
Source: PfP, 1998a 
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Table 16: PfP=s expenditure in 1997/98 period 
 
 
CODE 
 
              PARTICULARS 
 
1997/1998 
 
B 
 
EXPENDITURE 
 
KSH 
 
1 
 
a) Salaries 
b) Wages 
 
701,443 
5,550 
 
2 
 
Office general expenses 
 
124,938 
 
3 
 
Office rents 
 
449,1000 
 
4 
 
Telephone bills 
 
103,016 
 
5 
 
Office equipment-repairs 
 
    - 
 
6 
 
Local travelling 
 
187,545 
 
7 
 
Motor vehicle running and maintenance costs 
 
165,486 
 
8 
 
Insurance costs 
 
11,550 
 
9 
 
Annual NGOs = membership local authority charges 
 
6,060 
 
10 
 
Printing and stationary 
 
36,600 
 
11 
 
Training costs: a) clients 
                        b) staff 
 
   0 
8,500 
 
12 
 
Audit fees 
 
   0 
 
13 
 
Daily subsistence allowance 
 
59,755 
 
14 
 
Entertainment costs 
 
4,620 
 
15 
 
Board out of pocket expenses 
 
   0 
 
16 
 
Bank charges 
 
8,413 
 
17 
 
Creditor: rents, NSSF, Mazingira etc. 
 
126,902 
 
18 
 
Contingencies 
 
8,214 
 
 
 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 
 
2,007,692 
Source: PfP, 1998a 
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The fact that PfP was experiencing cash flow problems raised concern about the other 
possible reasons that could account for the phenomenon. This is bearing in mind that 
having been around for some time, PfP ought to have stabilized as an organization. A 
discussion with a top PfP Board of Director=s member (interview with Enane, December, 
1999, Kakamega) tended to reveal other possible explanatory factors. For instance, he 
pointed out that most of PfP=s foreign donors (especially foreign and international 
NGOs) rather than renew their funding contracts with PfP, were instead shifting towards 
a new funding approach in which they opted to deal directly with the grassroots 
beneficiaries and thus by-passing local and national NGOs. This behavioural shift in the 
funding approach by mainly international NGOs prompted a further inquiry into the 
possible reasons for the change of tact. Interviewing the same director of PfP, he saw it 
as an attempt by the foreign NGOs to compete with local and national NGOs for clients 
and communities. This, according to him, could be explained by the desperation of  
international and foreign NGOs to survive by justifying to their sponsors in the 
developed countries that they still had an important role to play in development as 
opposed to merely being used as conduits in the disbursement of funds to the 
developing world. In as much as this reasoning looked far-fetched, it has been 
advanced elsewhere and thus may have some credence. Holmen and Jirstrom 
(1994:30) alluded to the fact that many NGOs engaged in projects including the 
disbursement of funds, find it difficult to disengage from it and in fact, involvement in 
projects becomes an end in itself for it is viewed as a business. In criticizing this new 
development, the PfP director argued international NGOs were unsuitable for engaging 
directly in development at the grassroots without using the inter-mediary role of local 
NGOs since they had little understanding and knowledge of local conditions, needs, 
priorities and culture. This director was also of the opinion that international NGOs 
tended to draw a budget that focussed more on the salaries and other benefits of their 
expatriate staff at the expense of the actual development project.  
 
On the issue of corruption, Mr. Enane observed that some international NGOs were as 
guilty as local NGOs in involving themselves in corrupt practices. Ironically, this was yet 
another factor that the international NGOs advanced for skipping out the role of local 
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and national NGOs in development. Asked to elaborate on the allegation that some 
international NGOs engaged in corrupt activities, the director observed that he had 
personally come into contact with representatives of one of PfP=s sponsoring NGOs 
who, while in Kenya on an evaluation mission, had attempted to co-opt him into a 
scheme that could have robbed the international NGO in question vast amounts of 
money. According to this director, he refused to become an accomplice to this 
corruption and later exposed the scandal to the international NGO=s top management 
overseas resulting in the sacking of the culprit employees. 
 
The issue of some international NGOs competing with national and local NGOs to >own= 
beneficiary groups at the grassroots introduced into the discussion yet another 
dimension of patron-client relations, in this case not between the state and the other 
development actors, but between NGOs and the intended beneficiary groups at the 
grassroots. In other words, the competition seemed to boil down to who becomes the 
patron, local or international NGOs? And since patronage politics carries with it its 
rewards for the patron and not just the client, the PfP director=s assertion that some 
international NGOs were desperate to justify their being to their sponsors via directly 
engaging the grassroots communities and that there were incidents of corruption 
amongst some of them can then be validated. 
 
However, the observation that some local and national NGOs were involved in 
embezzlement of development funds destined for the target communities= projects, was 
in itself interesting in that the PfP director did accuse his own NGO of having been a 
culprit of the same at one time or the other. Mr Enane (interview, December, 1999, 
Kakamega) noted of PfP: APfP has also had incidents of corruption. One of our 
Directors, by then the Chairman of PfP=s Board, was found guilty of swindling the 
organization by signing blank cheques and later collaborating with our suppliers to 
inflate the prices of goods of which they shared the difference.@ According to Enane, 
when discovered, the guilty chairman was asked to step down as a key signatory to 
PfP=s cheques, a move he rejected, leading to the resignation of the organization=s 
General Manager in protest. Perusal of the various PfP=s records and reports revealed  
incidents of corruption within PfP that gave credence to Enane=s claims. For instance, 
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Price Waterhouse, in its comprehensive report on the PfP=s operations, called for the 
streamlining of the Financial and Accounting System as being critical to the success of 
PfP as a credible, transparent and accountable NGO so as to enhance its acceptability 
and image among the donor community (PfP, 1994a:11). But it would seem the 
professional advice provided by Price Waterhouse was not heeded, for in 1997 Mr 
Imbuye, the  then Chairman of the PfP Board of Directors lashed out against the out-
going PfP Management for having Aled to mismanagement and messing up of PfP 
leaving it in a bad state.@ (PfP, 1997:1-2). He continued to point out that PfP=s Acting 
General Manager had left unceremoniously without giving notice and proper handover 
and that the police had been called upon to assist. From this evidence, it can be argued 
that one of the contributing factors to PfP=s financial problems has been general 
mismanagement and abuse of the organization=s resources. 
 
Yet another reason that can explain PfP=s financial problems relate to the organization=s 
inability and incapacity to monitor effectively those who are beneficiaries of its credit 
facilities. This resulted in higher rates of default and thus losses to PfP. The magnitude 
of this problem can be illustrated by the fact that as early as 1993, outstanding loans to 
PfP were to the tune of 9.1 million Kenya shillings (PfP, 1993a). 
 
Table 17: PfP=s outstanding loans countrywide, 1993 
 
 
PROJECT 
 
OUTSTANDING LOAN 
 
Kakamega Projects 
 
1.7 million Kshs 
 
Bungoma Projects 
 
3.9 million Kshs 
 
Nyeri Projects 
 
0.9 million Kshs 
 
Nairobi Projects 
 
0.6 million Kshs 
 
Miscellaneous 
 
2.0 million Kshs 
 
TOTAL 
 
9.1 million Kshs 
 
Source: PfP, 1993a 
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PfP=s incapacity to effectively and efficiently recover its loans from clients has been 
attributed to several factors. These have included: poor screening of loanees due to 
laxity of PfP=s staff to follow fully the laid down procedures; use of nepotism and 
clannism by PfP=s staff in the selection of loan beneficiaries and therefore resulting in 
loan defaultment; poor viability studies on the part of PfP in relation to surveying and 
advising loanees on their new development projects resulting in unsustainable projects 
and thus inability to pay back loans; and interference by politicians who, for their own 
selfish reasons, deliberately confused beneficiaries by asking them not to pay back the 
PfP loans (1993a:13). The fact that local politicians interfere with the administration of 
PfP=s loans to clients was an issue this study investigated further. From the interview 
with Mr Enane, one of PfP=s directors, it was learnt that this has been a major problem 
in Western Kenya. A telling example was the Shinyalu Women Economic Development 
Promotion Project (SWEDP) where, local politicians intervened by asking the loan 
beneficiaries not to pay back the PfP loans. This was on the pretext that these were 
grants and not loans and therefore not to be repaid. Mr Enane lamented: 
Unlike in other parts of the country where politicians have played a 
facilitative role in promoting PfP=s activities, some of our members of 
parliament have deliberately gone out of their way to falsify PfP=s 
objectives and activities. In Shinyalu, for example, one Member of 
Parliament has been cheating beneficiaries of our loans that they are 
actually grants and not loans as such and that this being the case, they 
should not be paid back. This has caused PfP serious problems in 
convincing the clients the need to pay back the loans. Many have 
defaulted. 
 
The fact that some individual politicians chose to interfere with the administration of 
PfP=s projects raised questions as to why this was the case in the first place. Critically 
examined in the Kenyan context, local politicians could be resenting the role NGOs are 
playing in providing resources to local communities and therefore creating an alternative 
to the control and monopoly of the development space by local politicians. Since self-
help through harambee has been a key avenue for aspiring and established politicians 
to capture the support of peasants through the patron-client networks, the entry of 
NGOs was for sure, a threat to these politicians, who view NGOs either as constituting a 
kind of new patron by themselves, or agents of rival politicians serving to undermine 
their monopoly influence over the local communities by intervening in the development 
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space. To such politicians, the best way forward, therefore, would seem to be to fight 
and discredit such NGOs with the sole objective of re-establishing their monopoly 
control over the local communities (see Barkan, 1994; Holmquist, 1994; Kiondo, 1994). 
 
In view of the fact that PfP was experiencing serious financial problems for the various 
reasons discussed above, it became important to establish the measures, if any, being  
undertaken by the organization to re-establish a stable financial base. Fund-raising 
through donor aid remains a key means through which PfP hopes to continue raising 
funds. However, following sudden reduced donor-funding, PfP at the time of this 
research was busy attempting to develop new measures including: the starting of 
income-generating activities mainly in the area of trade; and raising of income through 
fee charged on consultancy services in the development field where PfP had the 
necessary resources. But also, there were attempts to streamline and rationalize PfP=s 
internal functioning as an organization. For instance, efforts towards efficient 
management of the credit programme to reduce losses incurred as a result of high 
default rates on the part of the clients, and attempts at expenditure control via the tight 
control of usage of monies by staff on transport and communication and overall 
streamlining of PfP=s financial management in making it more transparent and 
accountable (PfP, 1993a:4-5, 1994a:6-7). 
 
8.3.2 Human resources in PfP 
As an NGO with countrywide operations, although mainly concentrated in Western 
Province, PfP had an elaborate staff network. At the apex of the organization was a six 
member Board of Directors consisting of the Chairman of the Board, the Chairman of 
Finance Committee and the Chairman of Projects Committee. The Board of Directors is 
in charge of overall policy formulation (as well as recruitment of staff) and acts on behalf 
of PfP in interacting with other organizations. Below the Board, was the Management 
headed by the General Manager who is directly responsible to the Board for the 
execution of the organization=s policies and implementation of approved projects. The 
Management, while headed by the General Manager, included a team of senior staff of 
the Administrative Manager, Accountant, Project Manager, Credit Officers, and 
Business Development Officers (PfP, 1990). Each project was headed by a Project 
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Manager supported by some Business Development Officers who make the actual field 
contacts with the beneficiaries. 
 
While most of the members of the Board were active/retired businessmen and 
politicians, the Management has tended to draw its staff from professionally trained 
people. For instance, the current General Manager holds a Certified Public Accounts 
Certificate while the Accountant has a Masters degree in Business Administration. 
Virtually all the Business Development Officers were recruited on the basis of their 
specialised training in their relevant development areas (PfP, 1987; Interview with 
Enane, December, 1999 Kakamega). 
 
The strength of PfP staff in terms of numbers has however been falling. In 1987, PfP 
had a national staff of 49 excluding the Board members (PfP,1987). In 1995, there was 
an insignificant drop to 42 (PfP, 1995). However, by 1997, the numbers had dropped 
sharply to a paltry 12, spread out as follows (see table 18): 
 
Table 18: PfP=s staff countrywide by 1997 
 
 
             PROJECT CENTRE 
 
TOTAL STAFF 13/11/97 
 
1. Head Office, Nairobi 
2. Nyeri/Karatina Office 
3. Gatundu Office 
4. Webuye Office 
5. Vihiga/Khayega Office 
TOTAL 
 
                4 
                6 
                1 
                1 
                0 
                12                   
 
Source: PfP, 1997 
 
The sharp drop in the staff of PfP was very much tied to the declining financial 
fortunes of the organization which left only isolated and scattered projects 
operational. Most had been declared redundant for lack of producti ve work since the 
organization could not sustain them. Lamenting on the mass sacking of staff, one 
PfP employee commented: ASacking of staff from >ailing= projects can cause or make 
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the organization not to receive funds from donors....Where there is mass sacking, a 
clever donor will sense that there is something wrong within that 
organization....Instead of sacking the staff, they (the Management) should transfer 
them to healthy projects.@ (PfP, 1993a). But some staff were also leaving PfP on 
their own volition having realized it was unable to pay them competitively due to its 
deep financial problems. In a letter to one of its prospective funders, PfP (1990a:4-5) 
observed:  
 ...we would like to state that as an NGO without a reliable source of 
income, PfP experiences the endemic problem of organizational 
sustainability which is a common problem experienced by most of the 
indigenous NGOs in Kenya. The consequences of this are far reaching 
including the inability to recruit and retain qualified staff due to 
unattractive salaries and other terms and conditions of service. 
 
The factor of poor staff remuneration and other terms and conditions of employment by 
PfP was also highlighted in the detailed Price Waterhouse Report evaluating the 
performance of PfP (1994). The Price Waterhouse Report further recommended several 
things to be looked into if PfP had to improve its staff both in quality and output. Among 
these were: 
(a) The need to write up a job description for all PfP employees indicating purpose of 
the job, its end results, authority levels, and skills and qualifications required to perform 
the job. 
(b) The need to undertake a job evaluation and grading system. 
(c) The need to identify staff training needs and to develop a staff training programme. 
 
8.4 PfP, local capacity building and the democratisation of development 
Since its founding in Kenya in 1970, PfP has taken pride in having participated in the 
development process through the empowerment of mainly rural communities via training 
and provision of credit facilities. By 1995, PfP (1995c:2) estimated it had provided direct 
assistance to 253,000 households representing approximately two million Kenyans. In 
1998, PfP indicated that over its 28 years of operation it had worked directly with 209 
self-help groups with an approximate membership of 36,575 to be found mainly in 
Western and Central provinces of Kenya (PfP, 1998c). PfP (1987:37) has preferred to 
work with groups rather than individual beneficiaries for various reasons: credit 
becomes possible for groups through group collateral; the community takes control of its 
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development faster through group mechanism; and training is less expensive for 
groups. In PfP=s (1987:36) own words: 
PfP has found it to be more cost-effective and developmental to assist in 
small-scale enterprise development through groups than through 
individuals. PfP has also found out that group mechanism enables a 
change agent to reach more clients and bring about the development 
process faster without killing the principles of individuality of the 
community but at the same time utilizing the communal spirit of doing 
certain functions together. 
 
In as much as PfP has preferred to work through groups, the study was interested in the 
extent to which PfP has encouraged the participation of the beneficiaries in the 
identification and implementation of development projects. Interviews with some of the 
beneficiaries of PfP development projects tended to support the assumption that the 
organization has actually involved them in project planning and implementation. 
However, to verify these responses, PfP=s records of various meetings= minutes and 
projects= proposals were analysed. What seemed to emerge was strong evidence to 
support the clients= argument that the NGO utilized a participatory approach to 
development. In virtually all its projects, PfP insisted on the would-be beneficiaries 
forming development committees that initially decide on the nature of the project and 
then proceed to implement the project jointly with PfP by contributing labour and the 
relevant local resources (for instance plots of land if an agricultural project and a 
business premise if a non-farm activity). PfP, however, also insisted that the selected 
projects be feasible and viable and therefore involved its Business Development 
Officers in the evaluation process (PfP, 1987, 1990b, 1995a, 1995b).  
 
Provision of training to clients has been a key objective of PfP. Training by PfP in 
collaboration with other NGOs and government departments has focussed on small 
business enterprise development, savings and credit building, appropriate rural 
technology, and soil conservation and afforestation. An important observation to make is 
that PfP=s expenditure on the training of beneficiaries has been declining over time, 
probably a reflection of its equally unstable financial base. For instance, in 1995, out of 
a total income of 6,152,853 million Kenya shillings, 74,110Ksh was spent on training. In 
1996, the figure dropped to 23,570 Ksh out of an income of 3,620,029 Ksh. There was a 
further decline in 1997 to 11,650 Ksh out of a total income of 2,443,283 Ksh (PfP, 
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1998c). In 1998, it was even worse for no expenditure at all was dedicated by PfP to the 
training of beneficiaries (PfP, 1998a:7). Whereas over 80% of PfP beneficiaries 
interviewed acknowledged undergoing some form of useful training provided by the 
former, and which was relevant to their respective development projects, the general 
feeling was that the duration and content of training was inadequate. Lucas Meja, a 
farmer who had been assisted financially by PfP to purchase a dairy grade animal, 
commented:   
On the whole, most of the grade animals bought for farmers by PfP have 
either died or their milk production has gone down drastically. For the 
project to have succeeded PfP should have trained the farmer more and 
provided an extra loan to maintain the animals in the initial stages. 
 
However, it would seem that when PfP was financially sound in the 1970s up to the 
early 1990s, it had a more elaborate training programme for its c lients. A good example 
would be PfP=s (1991a) move that sponsored a delegation of leaders of nine women=s 
groups from Western Province to tour Nyeri ( in Central Province) between 9th and 15th 
July 1991. The object of the tour was to give an opportunity to Western Province groups 
to learn from the success of the Nyeri groups= operation of PfP=s Revolving Loan Fund 
project. Accompanied by the then PfP Director, they were received by the District Social 
Development Officer and later made to visit six prominent women=s groups. In addition, 
the Western team visited the Kimathi Institute of Technology and Ndima Tea Factory 
where they were exposed to coffee, tea and animal production techniques. 
 
Besides the provision of training, PfP has over time concentrated on the provision of 
credit to its beneficiaries. Among the conditions to be met by the prospective loan 
applicants included the following (PfP, 1994b:7): 
(a) The group must be registered as a social/economic group. 
(b) The group must have a bank account. 
(c) The group should have not less than 25 members who must be actively involved in 
group activities. 
(d) The group should have a minimum equity contribution of 30% of the total loan 
request from PfP. 
(e) The group should have revolved their own funds among its members with the 
guidance of PfP for not less than 3 months. 
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(f) The group members must show an initiative of saving with the group. 
(g) The group must agree with PfP=s loan conditions of a loan period of 30 months, an 
interest rate of 20% per annum, repayment of loan interest and service fee monthly, 
repayment of the principal in three instalments after every 10 months, a grace period of 
two months from the date of receipt of the loan, and that the General Manager signs all 
the loan agreements on behalf of PfP. 
 
A close examination of some of these conditions would reveal that rather than 
incorporate the poor in poverty alleviation, they may serve to actually exclude them. For 
example, PfP=s requirement for a group to have a minimum equity contribution of 30% of 
the total loan request from PfP, serves to exclude the very poor who may not be in a 
position to raise it. To this extent, PfP may end up merely serving the interests of those 
who are already in the development mainstream. 
 
Just as in the area of client training, PfP=s emphasis on loan provision had weakened 
over time in the functional areas of small scale trade, manufacturing, agriculture and 
others as clearly indicated in table 19 between 1995-1997: 
 
Table 19: PfP=s declining capacity to provide credit to clients 1995-1997 
 
 
NATURE OF ACTIVITY 
 
1997 (IN KSH) 
 
        1996 
 
      1995 
 
     Trade 
 
29,200,000.00 
 
31,282,000.00 
 
25,450,000.00 
 
     Manufacturing 
 
  1,178,000.00 
 
  2,078,000.00 
 
     987,000.00 
 
     Agriculture 
 
  6,200,000.00 
 
10,400,000.00 
 
  4,350,000.00 
 
     Other 
 
  1,860,000.00 
 
  3,060,000.00 
 
  1,700,000.00 
 
Source: PfP, 1998c. 
 
8.4.1 The Shinyalu Women Economic Development Promotion Project (SWEDP):   
        a case of PfP=s rural development projects 
SWEDP has been one of PfP=s main projects. Initiated and officially opened in 1989, it 
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targeted 60 women=s groups in Shinyalu Division, Kakamega District. Shinyalu Division 
being largely an area depending on subsistence farming, SWEDP had the main 
objective of improving the women=s living conditions via training and the provision of 
credit facilities in the areas of crop production, dairy farming and commercial enterprises 
(PfP, 1989:3,6-7). Specific aims of the programme were:  
(a) To facilitate and strengthen women=s groups for economic development. 
(b) To help women=s groups become economically viable by mobilizing local and 
external resources. 
(c) To provide management and credit training to women=s groups. 
(d) To enhance the marketing of farm produce and dairy products. 
(e) To promote an effective and self-sustaining development through people=s 
participation. 
While PfP was the implementing agency, the main sponsor of the project was the 
Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA). The project, implemented over a 
three-year period, involved a budget of 6,394,815 million Ksh, of which 2,692,000 Ksh 
was to go into credit facilities for the groups. 
 
In formulating the project, PfP relied heavily for information on the Provincial 
Administration, the local leaders including the Member of Parliament, as well as the 
government technical ministries. In addition, the women=s groups played an important 
role in needs= assessment via a PfP=s 1988 workshop on leadership and small credit 
where 12 groups attended. Before the project proposal was presented to SIDA for 
funding, it was vetted by the District Development Committee (PfP, 1989, 1992). In 
justifying the context of the project in relation to the Government=s development goals, 
PfP (1989:4) argued: AIt is in the rural areas that over 80% of the population of Kenya 
live. The majority of these rural people are women and children who depend on the rural 
economy for their livelihood. Therefore, the focus of the project on women is within the 
context of government policy on the role of women in development. This is also within 
the priority programme within the District Focus for Rural Development strategy.@ A 
number of the beneficiaries interviewed confirmed that PfP involved them in the 
planning of the project by carrying out a survey which involved a contribution of their 
views on the relevance of the project. This was done not only through the 1988 
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workshop but also by PfP=s Business Development Officers visiting target groups at 
their specific areas of operation. 
 
Before the disbursement of loans to the selected groups, sixty in all, PfP involved them 
in some form of training. According to PfP at that time (1991b): 
The leaders of the groups have been trained in leadership organization 
and business skills conducted by PfP in four seminars and also 
beneficiaries of the dairy project have been trained in two other seminars 
organized by PfP and conducted by the Ministry of Livestock 
Development in conjunction with the National Dairy Development Project. 
Follow up trainings are conducted on sight. 
Whereas a number of the beneficiaries interviewed were of the opinion the extent of 
training given was inadequate, they agreed that it had equipped them with some 
rudimentary skills in the management of credit and dairy farming. For instance, Anna 
Ayuku, 50 years old and a member of Liyenga Women=s Group, noted that: AI was able 
to attend a course at Rosterman on the management of dairy animals. The course was 
useful for it gave us the knowledge on the growing of cattle feed such as nappier grass 
which has brought about increased milk production in my cattle.@ Yet another 
beneficiary, Marita Amboso of Solyo Women=s Group, who had received a loan of 3,000 
Ksh from PfP for her cash crop project observed: AI was trained by PfP on the best way 
to manage their loan and since then, I have been able to utilize the loan properly to 
expand my maize and beans farm. The increased profits from the farm have enabled 
me to complete repaying the PfP loan.@ 
 
In preparing to disburse loans to various groups, PfP constituted a Project Loans 
Committee consisting of the General Manager (as chairman), Programme Co-ordinator 
(vice-chairman), Project Manager (secretary), the Credit Officer (member), Project 
Manager (member), and the Business Development Officers. For a group to qualify for a 
loan, it had to raise an equity of the value of 25% towards the Revolving Loan Fund in 
addition to having had at the time of application some monthly savings and a bank 
account (PfP, 1991b:2). Evidence from PfP (1991b) records indicated that over 45 
women=s groups benefited from this credit facility to the tune of approximately 2,000,000 
million Ksh, with some groups receiving a fairly substantial amount. For instance, Shilibi 
Women=s Group received 104,879.80 Ksh, Nyota Women=s Group 70,000Ksh, Vilulisha 
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Women=s Group 108,717.90Ksh, and Shiamiloli Women=s Group 94,989.90Ksh, among 
others. 
 
However, the SWEDP project was not without problems. There was constant political 
interference in the running of the project which eventually affected the servicing of loans 
by the clients. This, in a sense, was an aspect of local politicians destabilizing and 
discrediting PfP in the belief that the organization was in the area to promote the 
political interests of rival leaders and thus threatening their old established patron-client 
networks and political base. Narrating the emergent problem, PfP (1991b:6) lamented: 
From the outset of the project, there has been a word going round by 
those interested in politics and opposed to the current leadership in the 
area that SWEDP project funds are free money to be distributed to 
women of Shinyalu. For those people that the project has not reached 
while trying to enlighten them about the project objectives, there is 
misconception of what SWEDP is all about....The problem has touched 
more on East Isukha....These groups that have received funds are not 
servicing their loans at all and no new groups are coming up for 
consideration. Efforts have been done through the Chief=s baraza but all 
in vain. 
 
Yet another problem affecting the implementation of the project, concerned PfP=s 
partnership with the Government ministries meant to provide technical services and 
advice to the farmers. More often than not the Government workers failed to turn up for 
various reasons to assist in solving the new problems that kept emerging in the course 
of the farmers= implementation of the dairy and cash crop projects. One farmer, for 
example, argued: APfP should have own agricultural and livestock officers to help 
farmers since Ministry officials whom they rely upon have failed. They claim they can 
not be regular on the farms since they lack transport. But even when they turn up, they 
demand a bribe before giving service.@ 
 
PfP also experienced another form of problem with the local politicians who were 
attempting to pressurize it to allocate the SWEDP resources in favour of certain vested 
local  interests. Meja, a beneficiary farmer, noted: ASome animals were given to farmers 
without proper feasibility studies. Others were given to politicians who were least 
qualified. As a result those farmers who got animals through such connections have 
failed.@ Indeed, evidence was gathered that one of the PfP officials, then a project 
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manager, had resigned in protest following his refusal to bend to local politicians= 
pressure to have dairy animals allocated to some individuals and groups who did not 
qualify. 
 
8.4.2 PfP and the democratisation of the development space 
PfP, from the analysis, has experienced a number of organizational problems beginning 
mid-1990s. These, in particular, have involved the poor flow of finances from the 
traditional donor sources, and partly as a result, the organization has been unable to 
recruit and retain high quality staff. This, to a large measure, has affected the 
sustainability of PfP as a development organization as well as its development projects. 
In a candid admission of its post-1980 problems, PfP (1995c:11) observed: 
This Development Plan and strategy comes at a very important point in 
the history and work of PfP. The Plan comes at the 25th anniversary of 
PfP=s incorporation in Kenya. The Plan also comes at a time when PfP is 
undergoing a period of enormous change. There is now a challenge to the 
Board and Management to justify the meaning and the interpretation of 
the words Partnership and Productivity in the logo and name of the 
organization. Whereas PfP was ahead of every one else in enterprise 
development in Kenya it has now been overtaken by many new 
organizations who are now able to attract a lot of donor support in 
enterprise development when PfP is receiving zero. It is also common 
sense that all the models being propagated by leading small enterprise 
groups in the country were once practised by PfP in its assistance to the 
poor peoples of Kenya in the 1970s and early 1980s. We understand that 
we became contented and blinded having been the pioneers in enterprise 
development we could not see beyond our failures and/or successes. We 
have gone low on technology and innovativeness. 
 
By 1997, PfP (1997:5-6) had only three projects that were still functioning countrywide: 
the Nyeri Project which was the best performer with a total of 110 active groups and  
posting a figure of 105,000Ksh per month in the form of service fees; the Gatundu 
Project with only 28 active groups which was doing poorly with an average total 
collection of 18,000Ksh per month in the form of service fees; and the Webuye Project 
in Western Province with 18 active groups but very poor in performance since it could 
raise only 10,000Ksh per month in service fees. Some of the reasons given for poor 
performance of the projects included dishonesty and mistrust on the part of PfP staff. 
But it could also be added that PfP=s prioritization of expenditure objectives was more 
often than not misplaced with the lion=s share of income being spent on the 
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organization=s staff in form of salaries and allowances at the expense of the 
development needs of the beneficiary groups. For example, in the 1997/98 financial 
year, whereas there was nil expenditure on clients= credit and training, PfP managed to 
spend a colossal 1,132,899.00 million Ksh on items such as salaries and wages, local 
travelling, motor-vehicle running costs, training of its own staff, daily subsistence 
allowance and entertainment costs (PfP, 1998a:7). Talking to Mr Enane, PfP=s member 
of Board of Directors, the contention about PfP placing little premium on development 
needs of target groups and communities while overspending on non-core items was 
confirmed:  
Like international NGOs which we criticize, PfP has on some occasions 
been guilty of overspending on salaries, allowances and other secondary 
items at the expense of the credit projects which are the sole objective of 
the organization. Very little is kept aside for the Revolving Loan Fund 
(Interview, December, 1999, Kakamega). 
 
The situation got worse in 1998 when the Webuye Project eventually collapsed leaving 
PfP with only two functional Projects, Nyeri and Gatundu. Most of the collapsed projects 
had their offices closed since they could not manage to pay even office rent with their 
bank accounts virtually run down (PfP, 1998b:2-4). 
 
Table 20: PfP=s Project Centres bank accounts status 
 
 
PROJECT CENTRE 
 
 BANK AND AMOUNT ON ACCOUNT 
 
Nyeri/Karatina office 
 
Barclays, Karatina - 41,292.00Ksh 
 
Head office, Nairobi 
 
Barclays, Nairobi   -   6,727.00Ksh 
 
Gatundu office 
 
Kenya Commercial-   5,433.00Ksh 
 
Webuye office (CLOSED) 
 
Kenya Commercial-   4,650.00Ksh 
 
Kakamega office (CLOSED) 
 
Barclays                -   9,117.00Ksh 
 
TOTAL SAVINGS 
 
                              - 67,219.00Ksh 
 
Source: PfP, 1998b:3 
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But if PfP has had a dismal development record in the 1990s, this should not gloss over 
its splendid contribution in the earlier period. The very fact that to date over 209 groups 
(representing approximately 36,575 individual beneficiaries) have benefited directly from 
PfP=s training schemes and credit facilities, is an achievement in itself. This in essence 
has involved the strengthening and in some situations, the founding of entirely new 
development institutions at the grassroots. The case of the Nyeri Project in Central and 
the SWEDP Project in Western are cases in point where beneficiaries have benefited 
from PfP=s sponsored training in areas as varied as leadership, management, dairy 
farming, crop production and appropriate rural technology. The extension of credit to 
these clients has further boosted their economic activities, a likelihood that would not 
have occurred since most of them are excluded from accessing formal bank loans for 
lack of security.  
 
Official state recognition of women=s groups as contributors to the development process 
and their strengthening by PfP among other formal NGOs has to some extent  
empowered them. Some have become more visible at public policy-making forums of 
the District Focus for Rural Development strategy beginning from the Divisional 
Development Committees upwards to the District Development Committees. At least to 
this extent, the grassroots development institutions and groups have a real chance to 
make their contribution to the politics of development space. In this context then, PfP=s 
(1987:40) assertion may be justified, that, 
PfP...has been involved in building self-reliance rather than dependency 
of the rural small-scale producers and business groups in widely 
described projects. Some of these projects are incorporated into 
government agencies, others are independent self-help and volunteer 
efforts geared towards efficient resource use, development of peoples= 
abilities to get information, synthesize for planning, organize themselves 
into viable institutions and build linkages so that they can do things for 
themselves. 
 
Therefore, we may argue, PfP has contributed to the democratization of the 
development space by pluralizing the development space and giving a voice to the more 
often than not voiceless community-based organizations. But for this process to be 
sustainable, there is a need to strengthen organizations such as PfP by creating 
alternative means of income-generation (that are internally controlled) that would reduce 
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their dependence on external donor funding. The same process would apply to self-help 
organizations to help them operate more autonomously from the control of formal NGOs 
and the state as they mature. 
 
Summary and conclusion 
PfP has been a case study of one of the NGOs in the research sample. As an 
organization operating in Kenya, PfP was established in 1970 with American Quaker 
connections. Functioning largely in the area of small-scale enterprise, PfP has 
concentrated on the provision of training and credit to mainly rural-based enterprises. 
 
In formulating its development programmes, PfP like most NGOs operating in Kenya, 
has had to work within the national development framework. This has meant active 
participation in the DDCs for its development projects to get approved. PfP has also 
worked closely with the relevant government ministries in search for technical advice 
and services for its various development projects. The Provincial Administration has  
been useful to PfP when it comes to the mobilization of the would -be project 
beneficiaries through public barazas. Overall, PfP has managed to avoid confrontational 
relations with the state by mainly keeping to the development agenda. However, an 
examination of PfP=s leadership, that is the Board of Directors, shows a leadership that 
is essentially pro-establishment with most of them having held or still holding influential 
public positions partly due to their close association with the ruling party, KANU. The 
fact that the leadership is pro-establishment could also explain why PfP has avoided 
following a confrontational path with the state and has instead opted for politics of 
collaboration. This, to some extent, fits well into the politics of patron-client relations. 
 
PfP=s internal organizational capacity, in particular its financial base, has weakened over 
time following the discontinuation of mainly foreign donor funding. This has negatively 
affected its capacity and ability to recruit and retain quality staff. Overall, a weak 
financial base has continued to threaten not only the stability and sustainability of PfP=s 
projects but also of PfP as an organization itself. 
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However, it has been argued that in spite of the recent organizational problems, PfP has 
made its contribution to the development space as clearly indicated by the successful 
Nyeri Project and SWEDP. By helping strengthen, and in some situations, founding of 
new institutions at the grassroots, PfP has accelerated the process of institutional 
pluralism and therefore provided an alternative to the state as the traditional actor in 
development. At the same time, these institutions are increasingly becoming 
empowered and therefore acquiring a voice to articulate their interests in various public 
forums. To this extent then, PfP has contributed to the democratization of the 
development space. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
 
9.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This study set out to analyse the role of NGOs as development and political actors in 
Kenya. In particular, the place and influence of NGOs in Kenya=s development politics 
was of key concern. To achieve this objective, the study utilised a methodology based 
on primary and secondary sources for data collection. Western Province of Kenya 
constituted the core research area. 
 
NGOs as civil society organizations can only be discussed meaningfully within the 
context of the state as a political organization. Indeed, the historical and ideological 
development of civil society has been juxtaposed to the state. Beginning in the 18th 
century, civil society increasingly came to be viewed as a middle ground between the 
state and the private sector. It has gradually come to be seen as representing an 
autonomous force independent of the state. Within the confines of contemporary civil 
society theory, civil society therefore becomes a counterforce to the state=s tendency 
towards monopoly of the development and political space. 
 
The unending and if anything, deepening development crisis in Africa, has further 
brought into greater focus the role of NGOs as agents of development and 
democratisation. Propelled by the current neo-liberal thinking that calls for the shrinking 
of the state while increasing the penetrative capacity of market forces, of which NGOs 
are seen as an aspect thereof, the international finance institutions (IFIs) have from the 
1980s= decade preferred to work with NGOs rather than the African state. In the context 
of this New Policy Agenda, the African state has been condemned as part of the African 
political and economic crisis. This view has been predicated on evidence derived from 
the decay of salient administrative and political institutions and processes of the African 
state over the last four decades beginning from the 1960s. Characterised by an 
overblown and yet unproductive bureaucracy, and the politics of authoritarianism and 
personalization of power, the state has increasingly been unable to play its traditional 
role of development. Whether by necessity or choice, the African state continues to  
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disengage from development, albeit gradually. 
 
This study in justifying the increased presence of NGOs in Kenya, attempted a critical 
analysis of the Kenyan state. Utilizing Greenberg=s model, a discussion of the 
transformation of the Kenyan state from colonialism to the post-colonial period was 
made. It was argued that the colonial state was essentially an exploitative institution 
whose property relations entailed the establishment of a settler economy that thrived on 
the dis-empowerment of the indigenous peoples. The introduction and consolidation of 
the settler economy fostered the development of a class society in Kenya, with the vast 
African population contributing to the swelling ranks of the peasantry and a nascent 
proletariat. 
 
To maintain itself in power, the colonial state developed an elaborate bureaucratic 
apparatus consisting of the Provincial Administration and the line ministries of the 
technical staff. The bureaucratic apparatus, and by extension, the colonial state that it  
served, was in the main an instrument for control rather than development. African 
political participation was de-emphasised being limited only to the Local Native 
Councils. 
 
It was contended that the colonial state=s significance lies in the legacy it bequeathed 
the post-colonial state in terms of the bureaucratic apparatus and property relations. 
Largely interpreted as a neo-colonial state, the post-colonial regime maintained the 
colonially established structural linkages of production and administration. Initially, the 
post-colonial state emphasised statist programmes that saw the establishment of public 
enterprises and corporations. The objective at this period was to facilitate the national 
spread of development resources in an attempt to re-address the colonially-created 
imbalances. However, as in the rest of sub-saharan Africa, the Kenyatta regime failed to 
escape the politics of ethnicity. Kenya=s >primitive= capitalism began to be characterised 
by the ruling elite=s control and manipulation of state resources to promote narrow ethnic 
interests. There thus emerged a convergence between ethnic and class interests as the 
Kenyatta regime strove to consolidate his own ethnically-based Kikuyu elite. This led to 
what has been described as the Kikuyuisation of Kenya=s political economy. 
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Moi succeeded to the presidency in 1978. He intensified the politics of patronage. But 
this time around, unlike Kenyatta who relied on a Kikuyu clique to govern, Moi opted to 
rely on the Kalenjin elite in alliance with the other ethnic groups that had formed the 
core of the ex-KADU. The Moi regime witnessed not only increased authoritarianism but 
also mismanagement of state resources leading to a near collapse of vital state 
institutions. This grave situation inevitably led to the intervention of the international 
finance institutions (IFIs) in an attempt to forestall the total collapse of the state. The 
management of Kenya=s political economy has thus increasingly fallen under the control 
of the IFIs.  
 
A combination of factors that have included a weak state and the new global thinking 
that favours an enlarged market sector and a minimalist state , have thus opened up the 
development and political space for NGOs in Kenya. However, as discussed, the 
involvement of NGOs in development is not just a post-colonial phenomenon. In the 
colonial period, mission-based churches played a fundamental role in the provision of 
education and health through the establishment of mission schools and hospitals 
respectively. While the colonial state was largely supportive of mission organizations, it 
was extremely repressive of African associations that emerged to protest colonial 
oppression and exploitation. The authoritarian nature of the colonial state further 
radicalised and politicised the emerging African civil society organizations that were 
later to play a core role in the politics of decolonization. 
 
In the immediate post-colonial period, NGOs continued to play a salient role in 
development, especially in the health and education sectors. Encouraged to thrive by 
the Kenyatta regime=s open door policy, the harambee ideology and movement provided 
further impetus to NGO growth in the country. This study has argued that the Kenyatta 
regime was therefore largely supportive of the NGO sector, especially the self-help 
movement of harambee. It is contended that harambee served not only economic but 
also political objectives. Economically, it made it possible for the state to tap resources 
from the public for development purposes through the establishment of community-
based harambee projects. But politically, it was an instrument for state control, providing 
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the latter with the necessary legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry when it offered to 
further promote (through subsidy) harambee projects. At the local level, harambee 
served the interests of local community patrons by guaranteeing them client political 
support in exchange for their resource contributions. 
 
While NGOs have continued to be active in the development process, they  increasingly 
took on political roles in the Moi regime. It has been argued that these have mainly been 
urban NGOs which have a greater access to information and are thus more politicised. 
Oppositional NGOs have also tended to have international connections which more 
often than not have translated into lucrative sources of funding giving them an 
autonomous existence from the state and therefore ability and capacity to evade state 
patronage and control. Equally important, the leadership of these NGOs has tended to 
be more elitist and anti-establishment. 
 
But if largely urban NGOs and other civil society organizations have become more 
oppositional to the Moi regime, it has been observed that it was because of a 
combination of three factors. First, the fact that the state became more authoritarian in 
nature especially from the early 1980s. This involved increased personalization of power 
by the Moi regime as well as the attack on the autonomy of various institutions like the 
judiciary through various Acts passed following manipulation of the one-party 
parliament. This entrenched authoritarianism prompted NGO intervention in politics in 
an effort to  change the status quo. Secondly, between 1982 (with the making of Kenya a 
de jure one-party state) and 1991, there were no formal political organizations that could 
confront and challenge the state leaving NGOs as the only credible alternative. This 
particularly involved the churches which had the necessary resources and were 
committed to the calling for social justice. Thirdly, even after the scrapping of section 2A 
of the constitution in 1991, thereby establishing a multi-party system, NGOs have 
continued to involve themselves in oppositional politics due to the nature of the formal 
opposition: weak, fractious and riddled with divisions and schisms. Unable to provide 
credible opposition to the regime, NGOs have seen themselves as filling the void left by 
the formal opposition. 
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In its confrontation with NGOs, the state has reacted in various ways. This has included 
the use of legislation in the form of legislating new policies and guidelines (the NGO Act 
of 1990) to control NGOs= activities, refusal to grant registration, and deregistration or 
proscribing of NGOs seen as a threat to the state. In addition, whenever possible, the 
state has taken the opportunity to defame and discredit NGOs that are anti-regime by 
resorting to propaganda to portray such NGOs as agents of foreign forces. Equally 
important has been the attempt by the state to replace anti-establishment NGO leaders 
with those deemed as loyal to the regime. The state also resorted to political 
appropriation that involved the co-optation of NGOs, literally making them part of the 
state and eroding their autonomy. In rare situations, the state has also attempted to 
reconstitute NGOs into new bodies. This study has argued that beside the use of its 
overwhelming power to control and contain NGOs, the state has in some situations 
instituted reforms following NGOs= demands for change. Acceptance of NGOs= 
demands by the state therefore ought to be viewed in the context of state response to 
NGO involvement in politics. Overall, in confronting the state, NGOs have played a 
pivotal role in determining outcomes of political questions in Kenya especially those 
revolving around constitutional reform. The most telling example was the restoration of a 
plural party system in Kenya in late 1991. 
 
But as clearly illustrated in the thesis, NGOs have continued being active in 
development issues. This has especially been the case with rural-based NGOs as those 
 studied in Western Kenya. A clear distinction between, on the one hand, most urban 
NGOs that tend to be involved in oppositional politics, and rural NGOs on the other, was 
that the latter tend to play a politics of collaboration with the state and are more 
developmental in nature. The study advanced several reasons that explain this 
behaviour of rural NGOs. The level of resources at the command of rural NGOs, 
especially self-help NGOs, is low. Deprived of resources and without key international 
connections, rural NGOs lack fundamental autonomy from the state such that forced by 
circumstances to rely on the state, their actions and activities are easily controlled and 
directed by the latter. It is significant to note that however weak the state may be, the 
regime, and by extension the ruling party (KANU), still has more access to the depleted 
state resources relative to the nascent opposition parties. This observation is tied to the 
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fact that in Kenya, control of state has been identified as the key source of accumulation 
and patronage funds for the ruling class.  
 
Equally significant in explaining the collaboratory politics of rural NGOs in Western 
Kenya, was the observation that most of their leadership was pro-KANU and therefore 
pro-state. Unlike the many radical urban NGOs that tended to have an anti-
establishment leadership, virtually all the self-help NGOs in the study had women 
leaders that were KANU members and thus their description as Mama Maendeleo (a 
term meaning progressive woman whose origins are closely tied to the ruling party=s 
close ties with Maendeleo Ya Wanawake). As in the case of self-help NGOs, the  
leadership of formal NGOs was dominated by KANU officials and members, some of 
whom had held significant public positions in the Moi regime. The implication drawn was 
therefore that the nature of NGO leadership tended to have a strong influence on their 
posture towards the regime in power. Overall, in addition to the pro-KANU NGOs= 
leadership, Western Province, as shown in the analysis, is a region that is almost 
entirely monopolised by KANU at the expense of an increasingly marginalised 
opposition at both the parliamentary and local government levels. 
 
In recognizing the role of NGOs in rural and overall development, it was indicated that 
the state has instituted the requirement that NGOs fit their development programmes 
within the national framework. To this extent, under the DFRD strategy, NGOs are 
required to participate in DDCs where their development proposals are discussed and 
vetted. The rationale has been to co-ordinate NGO activities to ensure equitable 
resource allocation as well as  to avoid duplication of effort. The DFRD strategy has a 
structure that attempts to link the grassroots to the centre with the grassroots consisting 
of locational and divisional development committees. 
 
The thesis clearly illustrated the current weakness of the state as a development agency 
with most projects that were initiated by the Government being incomplete, stalled, or 
abandoned for long periods of time. There were, however, higher chances of project 
completion when the Government collaborated with other actors. The study revealed 
various factors that negatively affect the ability and capacity of the state to deliver 
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development: shortage of development resources; misuse and embezzlement of the 
available development resources; and a poor work ethic on the part of the bureaucracy 
which was not committed to public service. Again, it was in this context that the state 
welcomed the contribution of NGOs to rural development as a necessary supplement. 
The Government=s salient contribution to NGOs= efforts in development was in the form 
of provision of technical expertise, however erratic, for implementing and managing 
NGOs= development programmes. In addition, the Government through its Provincial 
Administration, participated in the mobilization of communities for development 
purposes. This was particularly through the efforts of the local administration of chiefs 
and sub-chiefs using forums such as the baraza . In as much as the state is resource 
deprived, the Government has through the RDF and harambee efforts, mobilized 
resources which in turn have been used to fund, in particular, self-help NGOs= 
development activities. This patronizing role of the regime has had the effect of 
politicizing women=s groups= activities. It was in this light that the Moi regime in the early 
1980s attempted to officially co-opt Maendeleo Ya Wanawake (the women=s groups= 
national umbrella body) into KANU. 
 
In the field of development, this study has shown that there is some level of mistrust 
between NGOs and the state. The state, constantly aware of the fact that some formal 
NGOs (a good example being CPDA that represents a new generation of NGOs in the 
region) may have the potential to access substantial development resources, has 
remained on guard, propelled by the fear that these organizations could be tempted to 
undermine government legitimacy by politicising local communities through their 
empowerment strategies. But the NGOs too have their reasons for state suspicion. 
Foremost, has been the apprehension by NGOs that the state may interfere and 
influence the content and direction of their development programmes. It has also been 
observed that NGOs= behaviour of preferring to keep safe distance from government 
authorities is driven by their obsession to conceal their sources and levels of funding. 
Many critics of this NGO secrecy argue, and there could be credibility in this, that many 
NGOs are involved in corrupt deals and resource diversion towards non-project 
priorities and that they are averse to its exposure. 
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The issue of whether NGOs= activities serve to promote equitable development in the 
rural areas was also investigated. The study revealed that a number of factors 
influenced NGOs= resource allocation. These include social (religious and ethnic), 
economic and political factors. Some NGOs were influenced by religious factors to 
determine the beneficiaries of their resources as was the case with CHAK, while others 
were subtly utilising ethnicity, for instance VEST. The requirement by NGOs in the 
sector of small-scale enterprise that prospective clients own some level of business 
capital before qualifying for credit facilities, was a widespreadly applied variable. But 
there was also evidence from the research that political pressure by local politicians in 
some situations compelled NGOs, as was the case with PfP, to allocate resources in 
given directions. The effect of these criteria, especially when applied subjectively, was 
biased resource allocation manifested in inequalities between and among beneficiaries. 
 
This study recognized the centrality of internal organizational capacity to the process of 
development. To this extent, an inquiry into the levels of human and material resources 
in both formal and self-help NGOs was made. Formal NGOs had a human resource 
structure consisting of the Board of Directors and the Management. Whereas the 
Directors were charged with overall organizational policy formulation, the Management 
did the actual overseeing of the implementation of development projects at the 
grassroots. Overall, formal NGOs= staff including field officers had undergone some 
level of training to acquire certain development-related skills. These skills were 
constantly required when it came to the implementation and management of their 
NGOs= programmes. Financially, many of the NGOs experienced cash-flow problems. 
The research revealed that there were three main sources of funding for NGOs: public 
organizations; private organizations; and NGO internally-generated funds. However, the 
most dominant of the three modes was reliance on foreign public organizations which 
had led to a crisis of dependence on externally generated funding. This in turn 
translated into unstable NGO development programmes as well as threatening the 
sustainability of the organizations themselves. The financial resource base of 
development NGOs that were in the past dependent on foreign funding has deteriorated 
further with the increasingly declining in-flows for reasons that include a shift to support 
oppositional NGOs, and the preference by international NGOs to directly intervene in 
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the development process at the grassroots. A clear implication of NGOs= weakness 
emanating from a relatively insecure human and material resource base was their 
inability to establish effective research units that could assist in development policy 
formulation and dissemination. Consequently, NGOs have been reduced to being 
reinforcers of existing governmental development policy rather than as autonomous 
actors capable of shaping development discourse through the initiation of new thinking. 
 
The levels of human and material resources in self-help NGOs relative to formal NGOs 
was even poorer. The leadership and general membership of women=s groups (the main 
focus in self-help NGOs) tended to be ill-equipped in terms of formal education as well 
as skills necessary for the performance of various development tasks. This impacted 
negatively on the role of these organizations in development and even threatened to 
erode the limited progress already achieved by them. Their biggest funders were the  
formal NGOs followed by the state. Self-help NGOs by being over-reliant on formal 
NGOs and the state for funding, equally experience a dependency crisis. This threatens 
their autonomy as organizations as well as the sustainability of their development 
programmes. 
 
The question of participatory development and its relationship to the process of 
development was also examined. Participation was given a specific meaning of the 
restructuring of power relations in society between the marginalised poor and the haves 
 by involving the poor in resource mobilization, project planning and implementation. 
Formal NGOs involved beneficiaries in virtually all the stages of development. The 
greatest focus being on the following areas in a descending order: planning of projects 
via community mobilization, provision of finances, provision of labour, and provision of 
project materials. This study indicated increased use of participatory strategies by 
NGOs compared to earlier studies on the same theme. To strengthen development 
skills of the beneficiaries, formal NGOs carried out various training programmes. The 
record of sustainability of NGO supported development projects was mixed with both 
evidence of success and failure. However, there was a greater rate of success in 
projects for individuals compared to institutional ones. All in all, where there was failure 
in NGO assisted projects, it was mainly attributed to inadequate resources to continue 
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running the projects profitably, especially in conditions where project costs seemed to 
outweigh the benefits. Equally important, project failure was tied to inadequate skills for 
maintaining development projects by the beneficiaries. 
 
Participation of members in self-help NGOs= activities was mainly through the 
contribution of financial, material and labour resources to projects. There was however, 
less emphasis on members= participation in projects= planning, a function that was 
monopolised by the groups= leadership. This led to the conclusion that the decision-
making system in women=s groups was skewed in favour of the leadership at the 
expense of the rank and file membership. A poor financial base and lack of adequate 
management skills by the members of these organizations proved to be a major 
impediment to the sustainabilty of their projects, some barely managing to survive. But 
this is not to deny the fact that participation by members in their respective groups= 
activities had in some way at least strengthened the local capacity of the membership in 
the development process. For instance, many of those interviewed argued that they had 
been exposed to alternative sources of income-generation. In addition, they had 
achieved increased levels of sociability and opportunities to play hitherto male-oriented 
tasks. Indeed, as argued elsewhere in the thesis, women=s groups played the role of 
community entry-points by helping popularize and implement government and formal 
NGOs= development policies, which in itself was a symbol of capacity that had been 
strengthened. 
 
Partnership for Productivity (PfP) constituted an NGO case study. Founded in Western 
Kenya in 1969, PfP has focussed mainly on the small-scale enterprise sector providing 
credit facilities and business related training to small-scale entrepreneurs. PfP=s story is 
one of tremendous success as well as failure of NGOs= role in development politics. 
Initially quite a successful organization in the empowering of the poor through its ability 
and capacity to provide them with development resources in the form of credit and 
training, the later phase of PfP (beginning from the early 1990s) has witnessed a 
dramatic decline in its capacity to administer and deliver development resources. The 
deterioration of PfP, as shown in the analysis, can be attributed mainly to a decline in 
the flow of donor funds from the early 1990s. 
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The case study of PfP, in many ways demonstrated and illuminated further the major 
findings on the various dimensions of NGOs that are discussed in the entire thesis. 
First, it exemplified the contention that the development process is politicized in as far 
as NGO-state relations were concerned. This, in particular, concerned the politics of 
patron-client relations between NGOs and the state in the process of development. For 
instance, while the state awarded favours to P fP such as sub-contracting it to implement 
the 1997 World Bank sponsored Voucher Training Programme as well as providing it 
with technical staff to help in the initiation and implementation of its development 
programmes, PfP in turn reciprocated by playing collaboratory politics. Secondly, the 
finding that the nature of an organization=s leadership was significant in terms of the 
posture it took in relation to the state has been ably illustrated. As clearly shown, PfP=s 
top leadership over its many years of existence, had a close affinity and working 
relationship with the ruling party, KANU, with many of them having held fairly senior 
administrative and political positions in the KANU Government. PfP=s pro-regime 
behaviour can therefore be attributed to its leadership, of which as was discussed, 
declared its position to work with KANU rather than the opposition parties in the current 
era of multi-party politics. Thirdly, NGO sponsored development that is heavily donor 
supported carries with it extreme implications and dangers. Dependency on donor 
funding ends up determining not only the sustainability of NGOs as organizations but 
also their activities. This has been the case with PfP which flourished in the 1970s to the 
early 1990s when donor funds were flowing only to decline later with the interruption in 
the flow of these funds. Fourthly, it can however, be concluded that in as much as PfP=s 
major weakness has been dependence on donor funding, it still contributed immensely 
to the development process. For instance, it was shown that by 1998, PfP had provided 
assistance to 209 self-help groups with a total population of 36,575. These groups at the 
grassroots were either already in existence or in some situations founded through PfP=s 
initiative. The beneficiaries, for example of SWEDP in Western and PfP=s projects in 
Central Province, clearly showed signs of empowerment in terms of their ability and 
capacity to participate in the development process. To this extent then, PfP has 
demonstrated that NGOs have the potential to democratise development by opening up 
the development space to other actors in addition to the state. Equally significant has 
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been PfP=s role in pluralizing the development sector through the founding and 
strengthening of grassroots development organizations and institutions and providing a 
voice to the originally voiceless through empowerment. 
 
This study=s overall conclusion, is that, NGOs and civil society in general can provide 
the basis for development as well as opposition to the authoritarian state. As 
development actors, NGOs have demonstrated their potential capacity to address the 
poverty crisis, although focussing largely at the local levels. In their role as political 
actors, urban NGOs in particular, have contributed to influencing the authoritarian state 
to adopt democratic reforms, although rural NGOs have in the main played politics of 
collaboration. But for these incipient development and political achievements to be 
sustainable, NGOs and the overall civil society sector will have to shift from a position of 
dependency, whether domestic or international, to relative autonomy. Only then, will the 
Kenyan civil society be self-sustaining and its contributions firmly anchored in society.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Fieldwork was carried out mainly in 1997. Questionnaires were the main tool through 
which data was generated. The questionnaires consisted of both open-ended and 
closed-ended questions. The distribution of the questionnaires to the respondents was 
done in person by the researcher and only in some cases through postal mail. 
 
Appendix 1 was the questionnaire prepared for government officers in charge of rural 
development programmes at the local levels. These included the District Development 
Officers and the District Social Development Officers. The objective was to generate 
data on the role of the state in development as well as relations between the latter and 
NGOs. 
 
Appendix 2 was a questionnaire for Formal NGO Project Managers. These are the 
officers directly in charge of their NGOs= development activities at the grassroots. The 
objective of the questionnaire was to find out their specific responsibilities, levels of 
training, resources at the disposal of their NGOs, the extent to which the NGOs use 
participatory approaches, nature of relations with the state and the political parties, 
among other issues. 
 
Appendix 3 was the questionnaire administered to NGO Management Committee local 
members. For formal NGOs these were the local notables nominated by NGO officials 
to serve as the intermediaries between the local community beneficiaries (of NGO 
projects) and the NGO. In the case of self-help NGOs, those interviewed were the 
officials consisting of the Chairperson, the Secretary and the Treasurer. Many of the 
questions asked were meant to countercheck the responses provided by the 
government officers and the NGOs= officials. In the process, new data was generated 
that gave a much deeper insight into the functioning of the organizations. 
 
Appendix 4 consisted of the project beneficiaries= questionnaire. Those interviewed 
were individuals and groups that had participated in NGOs= initiated development 
projects. The main objective of the questionnaire was to assess their particular 
 
 241 
contributions to NGO projects and the extent to which they had become empowered as 
a result. It was thus necessary to establish the levels of local capacity building acquired.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR GOVERNMENT OFFICERS/OFFICIALS 
 
1. (i) Name of Government officer.................................................... 
    (ii) Job designation....................................................................... 
    (iii) Area of operation.................................................................... 
 
2. What does the government conceive of as rural development? 
    .................................................................................. 
    .................................................................................. 
    .................................................................................. 
 
3. (i) Point out the main objectives of the rural development policy 
         ............................................................................... 
         ............................................................................... 
         ............................................................................... 
         ............................................................................... 
   (ii) List the main government institutions and organizations at the grassroots through   
  which the goals of rural development are formulated and implemented 
       ................................................................................... 
       ................................................................................... 
       ................................................................................... 
       ................................................................................... 
 
4. (i) What would you say are the key rural development problems in this area? 
       (a) Lack of proper sanitation and clean water. 
       (b) Lack of medical facilities. 
       (c) Lack of educational and training facilities. 
       (d) Low agricultural productivity. 
       (e) High unemployment rates. 
       (f)  Poor environmental conservation. 
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       (g) Poor transport and communication facilities. 
   (ii) So far, what has been the government response to these problems? 
        ........................................................................... 
        ............................................................................ 
        ............................................................................ 
        ............................................................................ 
        ............................................................................ 
 (iii) Rate the success level of government intervention strategies, if any: 
      (a) Very successful 
  (b) Fairly successful 
  (c) Not successful 
(iv) Explain your choice in (iii) above 
       ................................................................................ 
       ................................................................................ 
       ................................................................................ 
       ................................................................................ 
       ................................................................................ 
 
5. (i) List any NGOs (and the specific sectors) involved in the process of development    
  in this area: 
        .................................................................................. 
        .................................................................................. 
        .................................................................................. 
        .................................................................................. 
        .................................................................................. 
        .................................................................................. 
  (ii) What factors prompted NGO intervention in rural development in this         
 area? 
        (a) Inadequate government funds for development projects 
    (b) Shortage of government staff on the ground 
    (c) Lack of support by communities to government initiated projects 
        (d) The community=s historical and socio-cultural situation 
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  (iii) Would you say that NGOs have through their development activities raised the      
living standards of the local people? 
        (a) Yes 
        (b) No 
 (iv) Explain your response to (iii): 
       ............................................................................ 
       ............................................................................. 
       ............................................................................. 
      .............................................................................. 
 
6. (i) List the forums through which NGOs interact with the government at the local         
 level: 
         .......................................................................... 
         .......................................................................... 
         .......................................................................... 
         .......................................................................... 
         .......................................................................... 
   (ii) Explain the role of each forum listed 
        .................................................................................. 
        .................................................................................. 
        .................................................................................. 
        .................................................................................. 
        .................................................................................. 
   (iii) How effective have the respective forums been in shaping NGO-Government         
  relations? 
         .................................................................................... 
         .................................................................................... 
         .................................................................................... 
         .................................................................................... 
         .................................................................................... 
   (iv) Overall, list the assistance the government extends to NGOs in the process of       
  development 
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         .................................................................................... 
         .................................................................................... 
         ............................................................................... 
         ............................................................................... 
        ................................................................................. 
   (v) Mention some of the key problems the government encounters in relations with the 
   NGO community: 
       ................................................................................... 
       ................................................................................... 
       ................................................................................... 
       ................................................................................... 
       ................................................................................... 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PROJECT/PROGRAMME MANAGERS OF FORMAL NGO 
 
1. (i) Name of project Manager........................................................................ 
   (ii) Sex.......................................................................................................... 
   (iii) Age......................................................................................................... 
   (iv) Education level....................................................................................... 
   (v) Professional qualifications....................................................................... 
   (vi) Marital status.......................................................................................... 
   (vii) Area of origin: (a) Local (b) Non-local 
 
2. (i) Name of employing NGO?...................................................................... 
    (ii) When employed by the NGO................................................................. 
   (ii) Area of operation.................................................................................... 
                    
3. (i) As a project manager, what are your specific duties? 
         ............................................................................... 
         ............................................................................... 
         ............................................................................... 
         ............................................................................... 
         ............................................................................... 
  (ii) In performing the above mentioned duties, have you received any form of training? 
      (a) Yes 
      (b) No 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 247 
(iii) If yes, enumerate the training programmes, objectives and impact on job     
performance: 
 
Training programme 
 
Objectives 
 
Impact on Job performance 
   
   
   
   
 
 (iv) If no, explain why 
         ..................................................................... 
         ..................................................................... 
         ..................................................................... 
 
4. (i) For what length of period has this NGO operated in this area? 
        ..................................................................... 
    (ii) What are its main objectives? 
         ..................................................................... 
         ..................................................................... 
         ..................................................................... 
         ..................................................................... 
         ..................................................................... 
  (iii) What development projects has it initiated in this area? 
         .................................................................... 
         .................................................................... 
         .................................................................... 
         .................................................................... 
         .................................................................... 
  (iv) Were there any needs= assessment studies carried out before the NGO decided     
 to embark on the development projects? 
       (a) Yes 
       (b) No 
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  (v) If yes, describe the methods used:  
       ....................................................................... 
       ....................................................................... 
       ....................................................................... 
       ....................................................................... 
 
(iv) In your view what are the salient development problems facing this area? 
      ....................................................................... 
      ....................................................................... 
      ....................................................................... 
      ......................................................................... 
      ......................................................................... 
      ......................................................................... 
 (v) Comment on the extent to which this NGO has contributed to solving these              
problems 
      ......................................................................... 
      ......................................................................... 
      ......................................................................... 
      ......................................................................... 
      ......................................................................... 
      ......................................................................... 
 
5. (i) In the implementation and management of the NGO=s development projects, do     
 local members (of the management committee) from the local community play any    
 role?  
        (a) Yes 
        (b) No 
   (ii) If yes, what roles? 
        ........................................................................... 
        ........................................................................... 
        ........................................................................... 
        ........................................................................... 
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        ........................................................................... 
  (iii) What is the selection criteria for such members? 
        ............................................................................ 
        ............................................................................ 
        ............................................................................ 
        ............................................................................ 
 (iv) Mention training, if any, provided to such members by the NGO: 
       ............................................................................. 
     ................................................................................ 
     ................................................................................ 
 
6. What roles do project beneficiaries play in the NGO initiated development activities? 
   (a) Labour provision 
   (b) Ideas to improve the NGO project 
   (c) Provision of extra (supplementary) finances for the NGO project 
   (d) Supply of raw materials 
   (e) Others.................................................................. 
 
7. List the sources of funding for this NGO: 
    .................................................................................. 
    .................................................................................. 
    .................................................................................. 
    .................................................................................. 
    .................................................................................. 
 
8. (i) Do you consider this funding adequate for your NGO? 
     (a) Yes 
     (b) No 
   (ii) Explain (i) 
        ............................................................................... 
        ............................................................................... 
        ............................................................................... 
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        ............................................................................... 
9. What role, if any, do your funders (sponsors) play in the formulation and    
implementation of your development programmes? 
     ................................................................................... 
     ................................................................................... 
     ................................................................................... 
     ................................................................................... 
 
10. (i) Describe your NGO=s current staffing establishment 
          ............................................................................... 
          ............................................................................... 
          ............................................................................... 
          ............................................................................... 
          ............................................................................... 
          ............................................................................... 
     (ii) Does it meet your staffing needs? 
          (a) Yes 
          (b) No 
     (iii) Explain (ii) 
           .............................................................................. 
           .............................................................................. 
           .............................................................................. 
           .............................................................................. 
           .............................................................................. 
 
11. List the criteria used by this NGO to allocate projects to communities/individuals: 
      ............................................................................... 
      ............................................................................... 
      ............................................................................... 
      ............................................................................... 
 
12. (i) Describe the nature of relations between your NGO and government authorities   
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 (provincial administration, technical ministries etc.): 
      (a) Excellent 
      (b) Good 
      (c) Fair 
      (d) Poor 
      (ii) Explain (i) 
           ............................................................................. 
           ............................................................................. 
          ............................................................................... 
          ............................................................................... 
          ............................................................................... 
 
  (iii) List the assistance, if any, that the government provides to your NGO: 
        .................................................................................. 
        .................................................................................. 
        .................................................................................. 
        .................................................................................. 
        .................................................................................. 
     
13. (i) Are you a member of any political party? 
         (a) Yes 
         (b) No 
      (ii) If yes, which one? 
           ................................................................................ 
      (iii) Comment on the relations, if any, between your NGO and political parties in this 
        region     
          ................................................................................. 
          ................................................................................. 
          ................................................................................. 
          ................................................................................. 
     (iii) What is your NGO=s position on the on-going political changes in the country? 
           ................................................................................ 
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           ................................................................................  
           ................................................................................ 
           ................................................................................. 
 
14. (i) Do you consult with other NGOs in the development field? 
         (a) Yes 
         (b) No 
     (ii) If yes, in what ways? 
     ......................................................................... 
     ......................................................................... 
     ......................................................................... 
     ......................................................................... 
  (iii) Name the advantages, if any, of NGO-NGO collaboration 
       ....................................................................... 
       ....................................................................... 
       ....................................................................... 
       ....................................................................... 
    
15. (i) Overall, rate the success rate of this NGO in the intervention of rural development 
        (a) Very successful 
        (b) Successful 
        (c) Fairly successful 
        (d) Not successful 
   (ii) Explain your answer to (i) 
        .................................................................................. 
        .................................................................................. 
        .................................................................................. 
        .................................................................................. 
        .................................................................................. 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR LOCAL MEMBERS ON NGO MANAGEMENT 
COMMITTEE (FOR BOTH FORMAL NGOs AND SELF-HELP NGOs) 
 
1. (i) Name of committee member....................................................... 
   (ii) Sex.............................................................................................. 
  (iii) Age.............................................................................................. 
  (iv) Educational level......................................................................... 
  (v)  Position on committee................................................................ 
  (vi) Professional occupation.............................................................. 
 
2. (i) Sub-location of origin.................................................................. 
   (ii) Location...................................................................................... 
   (iii) Division...................................................................................... 
   (iv) District....................................................................................... 
 
3. (i) Name of NGO............................................................................ 
    (ii) For how long has this NGO been in operation?........................ 
    (iii) What are the key development activities pursued by this NGO? 
          ................................................................................................. 
          ................................................................................................. 
          ................................................................................................. 
          ................................................................................................. 
    (iv) What were some of the major problems beneficiaries experienced before this 
NGO started its work? 
           ................................................................................................. 
           ................................................................................................. 
           ................................................................................................. 
           ................................................................................................. 
    (v) What efforts were being made by the local people to resolve some of these 
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problems before this NGO intervened? 
             ................................................................................................ 
             ................................................................................................ 
            .................................................................................................. 
            .................................................................................................. 
 
4. (i) How did you become chairperson of the management committee? 
        ....................................................................................................... 
        ....................................................................................................... 
    (ii) What are your duties? 
          ..................................................................................................... 
          ..................................................................................................... 
          ..................................................................................................... 
    (iii) Are you satisfied with the above duties? 
         (a) Yes 
         (b) No 
    (iv) Explain 
          ...................................................................................................... 
          ...................................................................................................... 
          ...................................................................................................... 
     (v) What criteria are used in identifying management members/officials? 
           ...................................................................................................... 
           ...................................................................................................... 
           ...................................................................................................... 
     (vi) Explain the nature of training you have undergone, if any, while with this NGO 
           ...................................................................................................... 
           ...................................................................................................... 
           ...................................................................................................... 
 
5. (i) What role do beneficiaries play in the development activities of this NGO? 
        (a) Labour supply 
        (b) Provision of finances 
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         (c) Initial planning of NGO projects 
         (d) Provision of materials 
         (e) Others (name)............................................................................ 
 
6. (i) Are there any projects that this NGO has successfully completed? 
        (a) Yes 
        (b) No 
    (ii) If yes, list them 
         ................................................................................................. 
         ................................................................................................. 
         ................................................................................................. 
    (iii) If no, explain 
          ................................................................................................ 
          ................................................................................................ 
    (iv) Of the completed projects, if any, who is managing them? 
          (a) the beneficiaries themselves 
          (b) NGO officials 
          (c) the government 
    (v) If they are the beneficiaries managing the NGO completed projects, do you think   
        they have been successful? 
        (a) Yes 
        (b) No 
    (iv) Explain your answer in (v) 
          ............................................................................................. 
          ............................................................................................. 
          ............................................................................................. 
 
7. (i) Rate this NGO in terms of its ability to finance its development projects 
        (a) Excellent 
        (b) Good 
        (c) Fair 
        (d) Poor 
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    (ii) Explain 
         ................................................................................................. 
         ................................................................................................. 
         ................................................................................................. 
 
8. (i) Rate the NGO officials in terms of their ability to comprehend local conditions and 
problems 
        (a) Excellent 
        (b) Good 
        (c) Fair 
        (d) Poor 
    (ii) Explain 
          ............................................................................................. 
          ............................................................................................. 
          ............................................................................................. 
                          
9. (i) Rate NGO officials in terms of organizational and management abilities 
        (a) Excellent 
        (b) Good 
        (c) Fair 
        (d) Poor 
   (ii) Explain 
        ................................................................................................. 
        ................................................................................................. 
        ................................................................................................. 
        ................................................................................................. 
 
10. List the criteria used by this NGO in allocating resources to beneficiaries: 
          ............................................................................................... 
          ............................................................................................... 
          ............................................................................................... 
          ...............................................................................................    
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11. Comment on the relations between this NGO and others in the region: 
       ................................................................................................... 
       ................................................................................................... 
       ................................................................................................... 
           
12. (i) Evaluate the relationship between this NGO and government authorities in your 
area: 
(a) Peaceful, supportive and generally co-operative 
(b) Hostile and non-collaboratory 
     (ii) Explain 
          ......................................................................................... 
          ......................................................................................... 
          ......................................................................................... 
          ......................................................................................... 
 
13. (i) Are you a member of any political party? 
          (a) Yes 
          (b) No 
      (ii) If yes, which one? 
      (iii) Comment on the relations, if any, between this NGO and political parties in this   
          region: 
           .......................................................................................... 
           .......................................................................................... 
           .......................................................................................... 
           .......................................................................................... 
     (iv) What is this NGO=s position on the on-going political changes in the country? 
           .......................................................................................... 
           .......................................................................................... 
           .......................................................................................... 
           .......................................................................................... 
 
14. What measures do you recommend towards the improvement of this NGO=s 
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operations? 
        .............................................................................................. 
        .............................................................................................. 
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APPENDIX 4  
 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PROJECT BENEFICIARIES 
 
1. (i) Name of beneficiary                                                                                                    
(ii) Sex............................................................................................... 
    (iii) Age.............................................................................................. 
    (iv) Educational level......................................................................... 
    (v) Marital status................................................................................ 
    (vi) Number of children...................................................................... 
    (vii) If employed, nature of employment............................................ 
 
2. (i) Sub-location of origin..................................................................... 
    (ii) Location........................................................................................ 
    (iii) Division........................................................................................ 
    (iv) District......................................................................................... 
 
3. Name of project NGO........................................................................ 
 
4. (i) For how long has the NGO been operational in the area? 
         ...................................................................................................... 
    (ii) What projects has the NGO been involved in? 
          (a) Water and sanitation 
          (b) Food and nutrition 
          (c) Health programmes including community health care 
          (d) Education and training 
          (e) Promotion of small-scale enterprises 
          (f) Population and family planning 
          (g) Transport and communication 
          (h) Energy and environment 
          (i)  Others (name)......................................................................... 
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     (iii) How have these NGO activities influenced the development of individuals and 
the community at large? 
         .................................................................................................... 
         .................................................................................................... 
         .................................................................................................... 
         ................................................................................................... 
                          
5. (i) Before entry/formation of this NGO, what were the most serious            
development problems? 
        (a) Lack of proper water and sanitation 
        (b) Inadequate transport and communication 
        (c) Poor food and nutrition 
        (d) Lack of medical facilities 
        (e) Inadequate education and training 
        (f) Environmental problems 
        (g) Shortage of small-scale enterprises 
        (h) Unemployment 
        (i) Poor family planning techniques 
        (j) Others (name)...................................................................... 
(ii) What local solutions had been devised by the local community to solve the above 
problem(s)? 
        .................................................................................................. 
        .................................................................................................. 
        .................................................................................................. 
        .................................................................................................. 
  (iii) To what extent were these solutions successful? 
         (a) Very successful 
         (b) Fairly successful 
         (c) Not successful 
 
6. (i) As a project beneficiary did you participate in the decision-making process 
 concerning the type of NGO project(s) to be initiated? 
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          (a) Yes 
          (b) No 
  (ii) If yes, in what ways? 
       ...................................................................................... 
       ...................................................................................... 
       ...................................................................................... 
       ...................................................................................... 
  (iii) Overall, what role(s) do you play in NGO activities? 
        (a) Labour provision 
        (b) Provision of new ideas to improve the NGO project 
        (c) Provision of extra finances to support the project 
        (d) Supply of raw materials 
        (e) Others (name)........................................................... 
 
7. (i) Have you ever participated in any form of training facilitated by this    
        NGO? 
         (a) Yes 
         (b) No 
   (ii) If yes, what kind of training did you receive 
        ......................................................................................... 
        ......................................................................................... 
        ......................................................................................... 
        ......................................................................................... 
   (iii) How useful was the training to you? 
         (a) Very beneficial 
         (b) Fairly beneficial 
         (c) Not beneficial 
   (iv) Explain 
         .......................................................................................... 
         .......................................................................................... 
         .......................................................................................... 
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8. (i) Are there any projects that have been completed successfully by this  
        NGO? If yes, name them: 
         ............................................................................................... 
         ............................................................................................... 
         ............................................................................................... 
         ...............................................................................................                
    (iii) Of the completed projects, who is responsible for their management? 
          (a) NGO Officials 
          (b) The beneficiaries 
          (c) The government 
    (iv) Give reasons for your above choice 
          ............................................................................................... 
          ............................................................................................... 
          ............................................................................................... 
          ............................................................................................... 
 
9. (i) Rate NGO officials in terms of their organizational and management skills 
        (a) Excellent 
        (b) Good 
        (c) Fair 
        (d) Poor 
    (ii) Explain 
         ................................................................................................... 
         ................................................................................................... 
         ...................................................................................................                 
 
10. (i) Rate the NGO in terms of its ability and capacity to adequately finance the   on-
going development project(s) 
 (a) Excellent 
 (b) Good 
 (c) Fair 
       (d) Poor 
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  (ii) Give reasons for your answer 
       ........................................................................................... 
       ........................................................................................... 
       ........................................................................................... 
       ........................................................................................... 
 
11. (i) Are you satisfied with this NGO=s resource allocation criteria? 
          (a) Yes 
          (b) No 
     (ii) Why? 
           ........................................................................................ 
           ........................................................................................ 
           ........................................................................................ 
           ........................................................................................ 
           ........................................................................................ 
 
12. (i) Overall would you say that this NGO has been successful in the implementation   
         of its development goals? 
           (a) Yes 
           (b) No 
     (ii) Explain 
          ............................................................................................ 
          ............................................................................................ 
          ............................................................................................ 
          ............................................................................................ 
          ............................................................................................ 
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